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Abstract 
Environmental politics is a relatively new inclusion in the discipline of 
political science. It emerged from the 'green movement' in the 1970s and in the 
three decades since, the 'environment' and 'environmental issues' have featured 
in the political discourse of all western nations and at global level. In absorbing 
environmentalism into the mainstream policy agenda, both through traditional 
parties and the entry of Green parties into legislative chambers, governments 
have co-opted the environmental agenda and the environment movement has 
become largely marginalised. Local communities, however, have taken up 
environmentalism where governments and the environmental movement are 
failing, leading to a post-political construct of nature. The campaign to save·the 
Snowy River, conducted over the closing decade of the 20th Century, is used as 
an example to illustrate this progression towards post-political ecology. 
This thesis places the phenomena of green politics in the broad context of 
the history of environmentalism, from its emergence as a social movement 
through the rise of Green parties and the prominence of environmental issues 
on local, national and global scales. It takes a paradigmatic approach, in 
keeping with the ecological (scientific) basis of environmental issues, and is 
thematic rather than chronological. 
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Ne o si tosto mai ne i si scrisse, 
com' el s 'accese e arse, e cener tutto 
convenne che cascando divenisse; 
e poi che Ju a terra si distrutto, 
la polver si raccolse per se stessa 
e 'n quel medesmo ritorno di butto. 
Casi per li gran savi si confessa 
che la Jenice more e poi rinasce, 
quando al cinquecentesimo anno appressa; 
erba ne biado in sua vita non pasce, 
ma sol d'incenso lagrime e d'amomo, 
e nardo e mirra son l 'ultime fasce. 
Dante Alighieri 
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Introduction 
The Snowy River in context 
One river, one town, one outcome 
The Snowy Water Inquiry, conceived from the 1991 announcement of plans 
to corporatise the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority, represented one 
of the most hotly contested processes of environmental management in 
Australia. Its focus was the significantly reduced flow of the Snowy River, 
caused by impoundment and diversion of water for irrigation and hydro-
electricity. The Inquiry sought to develop options for equitable water supply to 
a wide range of users. This process was highly complex due to the often 
conflicting views of five separate governments together with the divergent 
needs of various stakeholders: a complexity which had the potential to derail 
the process. 
The final report (1998) recommended an increase of 15 % flow to the 
degraded Snowy, significantly less than the 28 % recommended by ecologists as 
a minimum environmental flow. The report described outcomes in superlatives 
such as 'cutting edge' methodologies in stakeholder participation processes1 . 
This view, however, was at odds with grassroots perceptions and clearly, the 
final report was not the compromise solution aimed at by the New South Wales 
and Victorian governments. What drove the Inquiry beyond this point, and 
eventually resulted in an agreement to deliver 28 % environmental flow down 
the Snowy below the Jindabyne Dam, was the determined efforts of a 
community group to take a leading role in influencing legislators. This group, 
consisting of about 90 members with an average age of 45-552, was motivated by 
1 Snowy Water Inquiry: Draft Options for Discussion (Snowy Water Inquiry, 1998) 
2 Demographic statistics of environmental groups surveyed or interviewed for this thesis are 
.contained in Appendix 1 
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a core group of local women representing fundamental grassroots concerns: the 
importance of the river to their community and the need for ecological integrity. 
The campaign to save the Snowy has been one of the longest running 
environmental battles this country has seen. It ranks alongside the Franklin and 
Lake Pedder in arousing passions from both sides, but unlike the Tasmanian 
campaigns, the Snowy has been driven wholly fro~-a l~cal perspective. It 
pitted one of the world's most ambitious engineering projects against one of 
Australia's most enduring folklores: the Snowy Scheme versus the Man from 
Snowy River. From the point of view of the community campaign, however, 
neither progress nor history was as important as the immediate state of the river 
in the present tense. 
On Wednesday 28th August 2002, the Premiers of New South Wales and 
Victoria presided over an informal ceremony to turn off the Mowamba 
aqueduct near Jindabyne, releasing the first 6 % of the agreed 28 % 
environmental flow that will be restored to the Snowy in stages over the next 
ten years. The event was attended by a large group of local residents as well as 
the heads of 'peak' environmental bodies, representatives from the newly 
corporatised Snowy-Hydro, local goverllillent and.Indigenous community 
representatives and state politicians from Nevv South Wales and Victoria. The 
national media recorded the moment in prose that, if not exactly purple, 
certainly verged on deep mauve: "The nation., s iconic river has begun flowing 
again", gushed Neius.com3; "After 35 years of silence, the sound of water can 
again be heard flowing down the famous Snowy River," spouted the ABC4; and 
"Snowy' s flow a beautiful noise", trilled The Australian5 . Downstream at 
3 Online news report: "The nation's iconic river has begun flowing again", 28 th August 2002, 
http://www.news.com.au/ 0,6093,4987612,12,00.html 
4 Online news report: "Premiers put the Snowy on tap", 28 th August 2002 
http://www.abc.net.au/ news/ justin/ nat/ newsnat-28aug2002-62.htm 
5 Online news report: "Snowy' s flow a beautiful noise" , 29th August 2002 
http://www.theausfralian.news.com.au/ 0,5942,4991901,00.html 
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Dalgety, the entire population of the town turned out to a celebration under the 
bridge, constructed in 1889 at the point where the Buckley brothers first crossed 
the Snowy River in the 1870s. It had taken the heartbreak of 35 years watching 
their dying river struggle down the dry silt and weed-choked riverbed and an 
eleven-year campaign of small gains and large setbacks, but Dalgety, 
population 70 or so, had taken on the Federal and four state governments, the 
Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority (Snowy Hydro) and the farmers' 
and irrigators' lobby groups and had won. They had their river back. 
Parameters of the case study and thesis approach 
This thesis takes the campaign for the Snowy River's rescue as a case study 
to illustrate the changing role of environmentalism in politics, presented in the 
context of a history of environmentalism and green politics, and poses two 
questions: 
• What has happened to environmentalism? 
• Does politics matter? 
The case study will be treated as illustrative of the line of argument taken in the 
thesis rather than a test of the thesis, as, whilst the argument is that of the failure 
of the environmental movement to address localised issues in the political 
arena, the subject 111atter is still very much a moving target and to use a single 
example to make a generalised claim would be rni~representative. 
Ecological consciousness arose in Australia in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
through early campaigns such as that for the Little Desert (Victoria), Lake 
Pedder (Tasmania) and Kelly's Bush (NSW). This period of early activism, 
based on values of conservation against development, was followed by the 
politicisation of the environmental movement in the late 1970s and 80s. The 
later growth of corporate environmentalism lent a green patina to government 
and industry alike, but the I greenwash', while it uses the language of 
ecologically sustainable development, has not itself proved a solution to long-
3 
term environrnental problems.· In addressing the question, I ·have taken the 
well-trodden path of an ecological-paradigmatic approach6, analysing the 
development of ecological consciousness and the environmental movement as a 
thematic political construct. Dovetailing with the two central questions are the 
issues of the socio-cultural significance of natilre, the influence of ecological 
thought on the political process and the political manipulation of ecological 
thought, environmentalism and conservationism. 
The term' paradigm' can be problematic in this application in that it infers 
the use of a particular language and set of indicators. For the purposes of 
terminology and illustration I have borrowed from the language of Dunlap and 
· Van Liere' s "The New 'Environmental Paradigm: A Proposed Measuring 
Ins_trument and Preliminary Results" (1978) and their later "Measuring 
Endorsement -of the New Ecological Paradigm: A Revised NEP Scale" (2000), 
and also from Thomas S. Kuhn's 1962 text, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
It is acknowledged that the use of Kuhnian terminology is a convenient device, 
and the terms thus used in this thesis are done so in a general form and should 
not be taken to refer directly to Kuhn's philosophy. It is my intention to take an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of environmentalism and environmental 
politics. In so doing, the political construct of nature is viewed as a sequence of 
paradigms, each with its own corresponding social values and political 
processes, that dominate the body of thought and which are ultimately 
challenged and superseded by a new paradigm. For the purposes of this thesis, 
a' paradigm' will refer only to the social and political factors dominating the 
direction of environmentalism and environmental politics at a given time. It is 
further acknowledged that, while I have focused on .a linear paradigmatic . 
progression, looking at a cause-and-effect historical account of the environment 
6 eg. Hutton (1987); Dunlap and Van Liere (1978); Bliihdorn (2000) 
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movement and green politics, that within the movement itself, and its political 
manifestation, there are numerous overlapping paradigms. 
In order to address the historical progression of environmentalism and to 
incorporate the case study, the thesis is structured thematically, starting with 
the elevation of ecology in the social conscience and consciousness, through its 
politicisation as environmentalism and the challenge this paradigm currently 
faces from a return to an arcadian perception of nature. The themes to be 
examined are: 
• the role of science and key factors in the history of environmental politics; 
• the irnportance of social movements in the rise of the ecological 
consciousness; 
• the problem of political representation of nature; 
• political institutionalisation of the environment through the party system; 
• social and economic justice as extensions of environmentalism; 
• the development of environmental policy and the eco-bureaucracy; and 
• risk management and crises as environmental issues. 
.. - , 
Chapters 1 - 3 examine the political construct of nature in relation to its 
historical and socio-cultural origins using the case study as an example. 
Chapter 4 departs from the Snowy case study to examine the construct of green 
politics in relation to social democrat parties as red-green alliances. Chapters 5 
- 7 look at the politicisation of environmentalism through mainstream 
approaches to social justice, policy development and risk management, once 
again using the case study as example. Chapter 8 looks at the current situation 
and trends in environmental politics and environmentalism, and suggests a 
post-political approach which, illustrated by the example of the Snowy 
campaign, could represent a move away from large scale environmental 
campaigns based around green NGOs and Green parties, towards a localised 
issue-specific construct that is neither centred on institutionalised politics nor 
globally oriented: a post-political ecology. 
5 
Politics: definitional context 
The term 'politics' and its variations require some definition and 
clarification. The title of this thesis, Beyond a political construct of nature?, implies 
the existence of a construct of nature that is political, and further, questions the 
applicability of this construct to future directions and issues of 
environmentalism. Given that the practice and theory of politics underpins all 
collective deci.sion-mqkiµg in human society, a construct of any environmental . 
decision-making that is completely removed from politics would not be 
practical, and indeed, all such decisions ultimately lie in government and the 
state7. Taking this position as axiomatic, 'politics' and the 'political construct' 
for the purposes of this analysis are taken to refer to the body of institutional 
and legislative politics or the institutionalisation of environmentalism through 
organisational means such as social movements8 rather than the informal, non-
hierarchical or decentralised form of politics, or 'politicking', wherein 
negotiations and campaigns are carried out from a position outside those formal 
institutions, structures and movements. 
Post-political ecology, as described in Chapter 8, is a theory whereby the 
negotiative process for environmental issues i~ removed from the realm of the 
legislative ch3:mber, regu.latory b9di~s and recogni.?eci organisations, and 
handled at a local level, albeit' politically', and in full acknowledgement that 
institut~onal political authority is required if such decisions are to be recognised 
by and beyond the state.9 In this construct I suggest that an awareness of 
ecological issues, as a result of preceding 'paradigms' and knowledge of 
ecological science, is a presupposed factor in the political processes of 
7 D.Wells and T.Lynch, The Political Ecologist (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 
8 E.Papadakis, Politics and the Environment: The Australian Experience (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1993) 10-44 
9 A.Carr Grassroots and Green Tape (Sydney: Federation Press, 2002); E.Weber Bringing Society 
Back In (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2002) 
6 
environmental decision-making and policy. This awareness is evident in such 
government-driven measures as considering the environment as a stakeholder 
in water allocation negotiations10, government programs to preserve biological 
diversity in rural areas11 and greenhouse gas accounting and reduction 
measures12. While these programs and similar political moves towards 
environmentally-friendly policy may be regarded as cynical means by 
governments to capture the' green' vote13, the fact that this is seen as politically 
advantageous only underlines the validity of the point. With the absorption of 
an ecological consciousness into government, or 'political', decision-making, a 
localised focus begins to challenge the dominant 'big picture' approach as a 
means of addressing place..: or time-specific environmental issues. The 
institutionalised 1big picture' approach reflects whatCre·nson described in1971 
as the rise of the "reform politician", taking a "wholesale" approach to 
representation as opposed to the individual approach of the "ward politician" .14 
A construct of post-political ecology suggests a return to Crenson' s 'ward' 
approach, reacting against the politico-institutional and bureaucratic constraints 
that have characterised much environmental decision-making in the most recent 
paradigm of environmentalism: the 'political' construct of nature. 
The term' extra-political' refers to community-driven or grassroots 
processes of environmental action that exist in the post-political ecological 
context, and the influences that these have on institutional decision-making 
processes. The term is used to emphasise the position that environmental 
campaigns, where they are intended to influence policy or legislative decisions, 
10 For example, the water allocation arrangements in the Murray-Darling Basin 
11 For example, the NSW Government's $3m 'Snowy-Monaro Biodiversity Strategy' 
12 For example, the Federal Government's 'Cool Communities' program to promote greater 
efficiency in energy use 
13 E.Papadakis, Environmental Politics and Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 14 
14 M.Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollu tion: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1971) 16 
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are implicitly and inherently political even while the proponents wish to appear 
to be distancing themselves from' politics'. Such campaigns, and the Snowy 
River is used here as an example, differ from institutional grassroots or 
. - . 
community-based environmental work such as Landcare, which sits within the 
political framework, or direct action-based campaigns such as that for the 
Franklin, which protested a political decision that had already been made and 
directly influenced political processes to overturn that decision. The 'extra-
political' approach is neither within the formal process nor directly opposed to 
it, but seeks a solution that can be accepted by the greatest number of 
stakeholders possible. The features of extra-political environmentc4ism to be 
illustrated through the case study are: 
• non-partisanship 
• independence from political groups and NGOs 
• outcomes-orientation 
• inclusiveness of individuals or groups who may not be - or have any desire 
to be - engaged in institutional politics or the political process 
• avoidance of emotional appeals 
• reliance on scientific information 
• willingness to negotiate. 
The methodology underpinning this approach is summed up by the President 
of the Dalgety and District Community Association and Chair of the Snowy 
Alliance, Ms Jo Garland, who stated in an interview for this thesis, that from the 
outset of the Snowy campaign in 1991, the aim was to "make no enemies"15. 
This illustrates the non-partisan approach whereby as broad a range as possible 
of stakeholders are engaged in such a way so as to avoid the conflict and trade-
offs that frequently accompany the formal or institutional political process. In 
the 'extra-political' context the outcome, not the process, is important. The 
15 Interview with Jo Garland, Dalgety, 4th April 2000. Transcript in possession of author. 
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process, while it inevitably involves 'politicking', exists only as a means to the 
end and has no validity outside that context. 
'Extra-political' and 'apolitical' are not the same nor are they used 
interchangeably. I have avoided using the latter term at all except in reference 
to specific points that are completely removed from political process or thought 
and to place them in a category for comparison with the political or extra-
political areas_. It is difficult to conceive of apolitical action within the . 
parameters of a thesis dealing with a political construct of nature, therefore, use 
of the term is restricted and very selective. 
The final term that requires clarification at this stage is that of 'community' . 
Communities are, essentially, political entities in that they consist of people 
grouped according to certain common criteria: for example, location ('the 
Canberra community'); values, social or personal orientation ('the gay 
community'); religion ('the Muslim community'); type or category of work ('the 
scientific community'). Some such communities are overtly political, others less 
so. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the concept of community is taken 
to be outside political process, that is, it is extra-political and is generally 
defined geographically or bio-regionally, in that it includes the range of 
stakeholders immediately affected by and with a direct inter~st in resolving a 
specific environmental issue. Where environmental campaigns or issues are 
said to be' community-driven', it refers to the group of stakeholders within that 
locality who are working towards a common environmental goal, even in 
situations where not all members of the geographically-defined community are 
wholly sympathetic towards that goal. A 'community-based' campaign is one 
that is carried out within the defined region of the issue to be addressed16. 
16 E.Weber, 2002 op cit. 
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Ecological and eco-political themes 
The progression of themes is structured according to three identified 
dominant phases ih the development of an environmental politics. These are 
characterised as: 
• preservationism: the period from the mid-1800s to the 1960s, covering the 
establishment of the science of ecology, the romanticism of nature and 
'environmental' policy as ad hoc solutions to specific problems relating to 
human welfare; 
• apocalypticism: beginning in the early to mid-1960s and coinciding with the 
publication o{ Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, the period representing the 
weakening of the preservationist pel"iod and marked by the rise of social 
movements including the modern environment movement; 
• green democratisation and integrationism: the emergence in the early to mid-
1970s, from the period of early social movement activism, of a' green 
politics' represented by green parties and a mainstream integrated 
environmental political agenda. 
It must be stated that despite its political associations and in full recognition 
of its ideological connotations, the term 'ecology' will be used in a context that is 
neither ideological nor representative of political doctrine, that is, ecology is to 
be regarded in its scientific context. Specifically, it is the branch of science that 
examines and explains the economy of animals and plants and the 
interrelationships between living organisms and their e·nvironments. The word 
itself derives from the Greek roots, oikos - house/household, and logos - reason 
or understanding . . The science of relationships between organisms within their 
environment was originally formulated and described in much the same way as 
the science of life (biology) and the science of the earth (geology), neither of 
which require or demand political standing. It is unlikely and entirely 
hypothetical that a Geology Party would be successful in securing many votes 
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in an election, and yet, the UK Green Party contested elections from 1975 to 1986 
under the banner of the Ecology Party (with arguably as much success as the 
hypothetical Geology Party would have had). While the term' ecology' is 
frequently associated with its political extension17, I have not used it in this 
context as my intention is, firstly, to distinguish between it and 
environmentalism, and secondly, to maintain the constancy and significance of 
the human-nature interrelationship on an extra-political level, that is, outside 
the institution of formal political process. 
Jonathon Porritt, former leader of the UK Green Party, explains the use of 
the term' ecology' in a political context by stating that it is "wholly appropriate 
... that the politics of ecology should concern itself with the interactions 
between members of one particular species (namely, us) and the impact that we 
have on our environment."18 While this may well be the case, it nonetheless 
does not explain the need for a politics of ecology any more than it would 
explain the need for a politics of astrology, biology, physiology, or indeed any 
field of study that deals with the way in which humans understand nature. 
Ecology and environment are together linked inextricably with history but 
the terms 'ecology' and 'environment', while representing similar bodies of 
thought, are not interchangeable and are used in this thesis to describe very 
specific foundational directions within the broad 'green' movement. Dovers 
points out that "ecology is an uncertain science and comes in many forms, and 
is crucial to environmental history."19 Even before the German naturalist and 
zoologist Ernst Haeckel coined the term ecology, defining it as: 
... the body of knowledge concerning the economy of nature - the 
investigation of the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic 
17 eg. Dobson (1990 and 1995); Porritt (1984) 
18 J.Porritt, Seeing Green (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) 3 
19 S.Dovers, 2000. "Still Settling Australia: Environment, History, and Policy" in Dovers ( ed) 
Environmental History and Policy; Still Settling Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2000) 7 
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and organic environment ... ecology is the study of all those complex 
interrelations referred to by Darwin as the conditions of the struggle 
for existence20, 
the impact of humankind on the natural environment was already documented. 
In the 18 th century, philosophers and scientists21 were analysing the history of 
the earth through empiricism rather than religion . .. By the middle of the 19th 
century Darwin had inextricably linked human history with that of the natural 
world through the Theory of Evolution. At the same time, American diplomat 
and earth science pioneer, George Perkins Marsh, on diplomatic mission in 
Turkey and Italy, compared the effects of civilisation on the Old World with the 
relative environmental rawness of North America: 
... the very earth had a hoary and ancient aspect, the meadows 
levelled and the hills rounded, not as with us [Americans] by the 
action of mere natural forces, but by the assiduous husbandry of 
hundreds of generations.22 
The mid-19 th century represents the emergence of the first ecological 
paradigm identified for this account: preservationism, bringing together the 
history of the earth with the history of the human species and interlinking the 
cultural and social aspects of human civilisation with the physical aspects of the 
earth. Preservationism forged its direction in the concern for humankind's 
deleterious effect on nature, evident in degraded soils, eroded pastures and 
deforestation. It was the observations and conclusions of this body of thought 
· that led to the formation of the first environmental organisations, among them, 
the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, UK, 1889; the Sierra Club, USA, 
1892; ar1d the Council for the Protection of Rural England, UK, 1926. These 
organisations, the forerunners of the ones to follow in the paradigm defined by 
20 Haeckel quoted in Foster Marx's Ecology (New York: Monthly Rev iew Press, 2000) 195 
21 von Herder; de Buffon; Hutton; Lyell 
22 George Perkins M.arsh quoted in Lowenthal, 2001 . "Environmental History: From Genesis to 
Apocalypse" History Today Vol.51(4) 37 
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the social movements of the 1960s and 70s, arose from a perception that a 
scientific approach alone was insufficient to adequately solve the problem of 
humankind's impact on nature, and provided a response to the social need to 
provide such solutions. It is important to note also that the earlier organisations 
all still exist as active conservation societies and have been frequently subject to 
criticism from their more contemporary counterparts for their political and 
social conservatism. While the preservationist period linked the histories of 
nature and humanity into a_ common direction, it remained largely as historical 
empiricism and did not begin to manifest as an ideological component to the 
body of thought until the mid-20th century. 
In linguistic derivational terms, there is considerable synergy between the 
science of ecology and the discipline of politics. The latter, deriving from the 
Greek polis, meaning city, and referring to the ,government of the city-state, 
overlays to a considerable extent the concept of household contained within 
ecology. The ecology-politics relationship is taken for granted in the 
contemporary lexicon and reflected through such linguistic devices as 
'ecopolitics', 'ecologism', 'ecosophy', 'ecosocialism' and' ecofeminism'. There is 
also a strong relationship between ecology and economy, given that not only is 
ecology defined as the science of the econon1.y of animals and plants, but also 
the common derivation, oikos, which, when applied to economy incorporates 
nonws - calculus: economy and ecology are, in effect, two branches of the same 
. 
.. 
. . . . . . . 
science. While economics, however, has been regarded of political necessity as 
an adjunct to the political and social sciences since the emergence of modern 
political doctrine, ecology is a relatively new science and its transition across 
disciplines from the physical sciences to the social and political has been 
effected only in the past few decades. As such, the hegemony of the dominant 
paradigms of economic activity within the social and political sciences has 
worked against any influence from the ecological side of the equation, which in 
turn is often perceived by economists as irrelevant and running counter to 
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prescribed economic directions. Political and social directions in the latter part 
of the 20th century have brought economics and ecology closer together, forcing 
further alteration within their respective bodies of thought. 
In the context of the Snowy River campaign and its significance to this 
thematic study, the links between ecology and, individually and in combination, 
environment, history, politics and economy are significant in delineating the 
different elements of the total Snowy River story. These links will be further 
drawn through the chapters dealing with the separate themes. The Snowy 
River campaign is relevant to the central thesis questions and the history of 
environmentalism in that it represents, firstly, an example of transition from the 
'political construct of nature' to an emergent post-political construct, and 
., 
secondly, a broad view of the elements contained within the concept of 'political 
ecology'. Temporally and spatially, the SnovVy ca111paign encompasses three 
levels of government over a period of several electoral terms and changes of 
government, a community-driven campaign ~nd a counter-campaign, a major 
corporation, several national icons, issues of cultural and political heritage and 
national identity and, at the very root of it all, an ecological disaster. While the 
campaign itself has resulted in the reversal of the degradation and ultimate 
death of the Snowy, post-political ecology is not necessarily an optimistic 
outlook at the global environmental scale. The Snowy is a single example of 
place-specific ecological concern within a much broader environmental picture. 
Linking all the relevant themes in an historical analysis has provided a 
foundation, within the scope of political ideotogy and scientific knowledge, that 
creates a progression of changing social values as well as empirical constructs. 
The Snowy R{ver campaign story will be approached thematically within· the 
chapters dealing with the different themes rather than chronologically or on its 
own. 
When I began writing this thesis, the Snowy campaign was entering its final 
phase: the contest over the outcome of the Snowy Inquiry. The nature of the 
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subject matter of this body of work is such that changes to the theoretical and 
physical landscape have been incorporated up until August 2002, when the first 
of the 28 °!~· reallocation was realised. A lot more water flows under the 
Buckley's Crossing bridge at Dalgety now than ·did vvhen I began this thesis and 
it is symbolic on a personal level that the decommissioning of the Mowamba 
aqueduct and the return of water to the Snowy represented not only the end of 
an era of environmentalism defined by the campaign, but also the end of this 
study. More importantly, however, the changes that have occurred at political 
and institutional level locally, nationally and globally have been incorporated in 
order to contribute collectively to a theory of eco-politics that takes into 
consideration as many contemporaneous perspectives as possible· while 
maintaining a thematic approach. Issues of environmental politics tend to be 
moving targets, but in taking this thematic approach and allowing for new 
developments, I have attempted to present as complete a picture as possible 
given the changeable nature of both politics and environmental issues. 
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Chapter 1 
The nature of ecology and the science of ecological politics: 
a conceptual overview 
Man is. nature which has become conscious of itself - Elisee Reclus 
The Snowy Scheme in ecological history 
The Snowy River rises on the slopes of Mt Kosciuszko1, the highest point in 
the ancient and rugged mountains known cartographically as the Snowy 
Mountains, but historically and culturally as the High Country. Each spring the 
Snowy becomes a narrow rocky conduit for snowmelt and spring rafns, turning 
it into a raging mountain torrent that nature dictated would follow the 
precipitous glacier-carved channels north-east down the mountains and then 
south through the sub-Alpine grasslands, finally emptying into the Tasman Sea. 
Other rivers rise in the High Country and are similarly fed by spring snowmelt 
and rain, but the Murray, Tumut, Tooma, Geehi and Swampy Plain Rivers, 
unlike the Snowy, flow inland, all joining the Murray to flow west towards its 
mouth at Lake Alexandrina and the Southern Ocean. The Snowy and its 
tributary, the Eucumbene, alone of the montane rivers flow towards the eastern 
seaboard. 
The High Country is not a benign environment. It is harsh and exposed, 
prone to climatic extremes and extraordinary geological features. At the same 
time it is fragile, with many species of vegetation and ~nsects appearing only for 
days each year in a delicate balance between changing seasons. Both the 
harshness and the fragility draw people to the region; some to test themselves 
against the natural elements while others simply enjoy the aesthetic 
environment. The Kosciuszko National Park which contains most of the Alpine 
Region in New South Wales is a region larger than the Netherlands and in 
1 The spelling 'Kosciuszko' was gazetted in 2000. Prior to 2000 it was 'Kosciusko'. Throughout 
this thesis, where the spelling Kosciusko is used, it is in a pre-2000 context. 
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winter has a greater snow-covered area than all of Switzerland. Former General 
Manager of the Park, now General Manager of the Snowy River Shire Council, 
Ross McKinney, when asked about the number of people who go missing in the 
National Park each year, candidly comments that "the Park is littered with 
human bones.''2 Most are bushwalkers or cross-country skiers who get lost and 
perish in extreme conditions, their bodies quickly and efficiently disposed of by 
foxes and wedge-tailed eagles long before their remains can be found. 
Prior to European settlement the region around Mt Kosciuszko, known to 
the original inhabitants, the Ngarigo and Wulgalu aboriginal people, as Tar Gan 
Gil, was a summer meeting place where the migratory bogong moths could be 
scraped off the leeward faces of rocks and roasted in campfires. The volcanic 
rocks made excellent knives and scraping tools to be used during the winter 
months when the tribes would move back to the lower country of the Monaro 
Plain, the eastern escarpment of the Great Dividing Range and the coastal strip. 
Archaeological research indicates a long relationship between humankind and 
the Snowy Mountains3 and, though the area is 'wild', the regular seasonal 
habitations of humans, from the aboriginal summer migrations for the bogong 
moths to the current winter migrations for the skiing, conclusively refute the 
popular perception of the region as 'wilderness'. 
Partly because of the harsh alpine environment, the Snowy River has come 
to symbolise a part of the Australian identity. Rugged, uncompromising and 
free-spirited4, the Snowy and the High Country are acclaimed in art, literature 
and legend as cherished cultural heritage. This cultural heritage, however, has a 
distinct political element that has become as much a part of the Australian socio-
cultural identity as the literary and historical legacy. In the 1940s, the 
2 Discussion with Ross McKinney, December 2000. Notes in possession of author. 
3 J .Kamminga, "Aboriginal settlement and prehistory of the Snowy Mountains" in Cultural 
Heritage of the Australian Alps: Proceedings of the 1991 Symposium B.Scougall (ed) (Canberra: 
Australian Alps Liaison Committee, 1992) 
4 L.Wigmore, Struggle for the Snowy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1968) 
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· Australian government announced plans to harness the fast-flowing waters of 
the Snowy to generate hydro-electricity and to divert the water inland through 
the mountains to 'drought-proof' the fertile but dry farming land to the west of 
the ranges. The Snowy River became the focal point of the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro Electric Scheme. Politically timely, plans for the Snowy Scheme were 
being negotiated.between the state and federal governments just as Australia 
was requested by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
to assist in post-War European resettlement efforts by accepting 100,000 
displaced persons5• In 1949 Prime Minister Joseph Benedict (Ben) Chifley and 
his Minister for Works and Housing, Nelson Lemmon, in a political manoeuvre 
that relied for its success on post-War national security concerns, assumed total 
Commonwealth control of the Snowy Scheme under the Defence Act6 and 
established the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority (SMHEA) as a 
Federal government statutory body. With Australia already committed to 
accepting European war refugees, a ready labour force was recruited. The first 
Commissioner of the SMHEA, William (later Sir William) Hudson, "toured the 
displaced persons' camps offering work 24,000 kilometres away: 'You won't be 
Balts or Slavs ... you will be men of the Snowy', he had told them."7 
Significant in terms of the question to be addressed in this chapter is not the 
fact of the Snowy Scheme itself, but the reasoning that led to its establishment. 
The idea was raised as early as 1937 to use the Snowy River to irrigate 
Australia's 'breadbasket' to the west. The volume of water that crashed through 
the Snowy Mountains each spring en route to the Tasman was regarded as 
water wasted. Collis states that: 
Before the construction of the Scheme the bulk of the vast Alpine 
run-off flowed eastwards into the Snowy River, turning it, after the 
spring thaw, into an unchecked torrent that raged along an erratic 
5 B.Collis, Snowy: The Making of Modern Australia (Rydalrnere: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990) 
6 Wigmore (1968) op cit. and T.Fullerton, Watershed (Sydney: ABC Books, 2001) 
7 Collis (1990) op cit. 40 
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course to pour into the sea off south-eastern Victoria. In peak flow, 
the Snowy wasted into the Tasman Sea at the rate of two million litres 
• 8 
ammute. 
At no point during the planning or construction of the Snowy Scheme was the 
impact of such a development on the natural environment, and in particular, the 
' 
riparian ecology of the river and the areas it served downstream, ever 
considered. Councillor Neen Pendergast of the Snowy River Shire had a young 
family in Jindabyne when the township was relocated prior to the construction 
of the Jindabyne dam. She recalls that concerns were raised by Jindabyne and 
Dalgety residents about the effect of the dam on the river downstream, but these 
were quickly dismissed by the SMHEA. "We were assured that the river would 
not fall below half of its original flow", she states. "I don't think they really 
knew what the effect would be and even if they had known, I doubt it would 
have made any difference."9 
The Snowy Scheme belonged within the political and ecological body of 
thought that regarded nature in terms of its utility. Water that was not used 
was therefore 'wasted', and the more that was allowed to escape down the 
Snowy, the less could be utilised for irrigation. Although ecology had no social 
dimension and was not a factor in planning for human development, it was a 
factor, however, in terms of preserving nature. In the 1950s the Australian 
. Academy of Science, the CSIRO and a group called the Canberra-Kosciusko 
Committee all prepared separate reports and submissions proposing the 
preservation of an area known as the 'Kosciusko Tops': 
... an area contested by the Snowy Mountains Authority 
(hydroelectricity), pastoralists with summer grazing rights, and 
ecological scientists concerned about erosion. The management of 
Australia's highest alpine areas was investigated by a small sub-
8 Collis (1990) op cit. 33 (my emphasis) 
9 Discussions with Neen Pendergast held from September 1999-February 2001, notes in 
possession of author 
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committee ... [and their] investigation resulted in the Academy's 
first official report on a subject of general (and national) scientific 
interest, the high country of New South Wales, the Australian 
Capital Territory and Victoria.10 
The Australian Academy of Science subsequently referred the matter to its 
national parks steering committee, which recommended approaching the 
SMHEA with which relations had been strained. It was finally agreed that the 
SMHEA, through its "active Conservation Section" should be a sponsor of the 
"Primitive Area proposal" for the Kosciusko Tops11: 
In the 1950s, scientists could be called upon as unquestioned arbiters 
of such decisions by political activists and the establishment alike, 
and this gave the Academy [ of Science] considerable power in 
negotiating a middle course, some~g which it was careful never to 
. 12 
comprormse. 
The relationship between ecology and politics was, simultaneously and 
paradoxically, both symbiotic and independent. Scientists did not regard 
themselves, nor were they regarded, as political agents but could act in a 
mediating role in areas of contested grounds13 • Ecologists were not consulted, 
however, in matters of planning and development, which were strictly the 
premises of politics. Impartiality set the scientific community apart from the 
political community and allowed it to act from a position of neutrality in 
ecological disputes14 • If the political paradigm was one of utilisation of nature, 
the ecological paradigm was contained within the belief that nature had value 
10 L.Robin, 1994. "Nature Conservation as a National Concern: The Role of the Australian 
Academy of Science", Historical Records of Australian Science, Vol.10, No.l, 1-24 
11 ibid. 4 
12 ibid. 4 
13 ibid.; also T.Bonyhady, 2000. " An Australian Public Trust", in Davers (ed) Environmental 
History and Policy: Still Settling Australia (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
14 L.Robin, pers.comm. 
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and its preservation was important but that this belief, based on empirical 
principles, was not politically relevant. It is appropriate, then to examine the 
causal factors that have led to the development of environmentalism and the 
ecological politics that has made empirical ecology not just politically relevant, 
but of significance to political decision-making in areas other than those directly 
associated with nature or the environment. 
Eco-political paradigms and causality 
It is accepted that causes are objective insofar as causes occur between 
events irrespective of human thought and intervention15 • The relationship 
between cause and effect remains between and within the objects of that 
relationship. This is not to say that human action or thought does not act as a 
cause, but that in the relationship between cause and effect, it becomes the 
object. The relationship between the evolution of ecology as a science in 1865, 
through ecology as the basis of a social movement in the 1960s and the 
subsequent emergence of Green parties and ecologically-based environmental 
policy, will be examined as a series of paradigms with direct, linear relationship 
to each other. Paradigmatic shifts represent asymmetrical causality16 in that 
they follow a linear progression and are not equally reversible, that is, the 
progression flows from cause to effect. 
The leap from ecology as science to ecology as ideology occurred both as a 
series of asymmetrical causes and effects, and also as an independent catalys~. 
These factors ran concurrently with one another; they are interrelated but not 
dependent. Almost a century elapsed between the coining in 1865 of the term 
ecology to refer to the science of relationships within the living environment 
15 D.Hausman, Causal Asymmetries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
16 ibid. also D.Ehrig, 1982. "Causal Asymmetry", The Journal of Philosophy Vol.79 No.12, 761-774 
and D.Papineau, 1985. "Causal Asymmetry'', British Journal of the Philosophy of Science Vol. 36, 
273-289 
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and the shift from that definition to a new meaning: that of humankind's 
custodial relationship with the natural environment. This major change reflects 
John .Stuart Mill's belief that "great change ... in the fundamental constitution of 
[humankind's] modes of thought"17 was the sole catalyst to improvement in 
humankind's situation and condition. Insofar as the perception of the 
environment as being under threat and humankind's role as environmental 
arbiter is an exclusively anthropocentric concept, then any improvement in this 
situation would also need to be preceded by a major change in the 
"fundamental constitution of modes of thought". The Reclus quote that appears 
beneath the heading of this chapter, however, suggests that, at least from an 
anarchic, and arguable, point of view, nature and humanity may share a closer 
relationship than the anthropocentric viewpoint might allow. Dario Padovan 
believes that the words of Reclus "comprises one of the most efficacious 
descriptions of the moral feelings that link man to his environment."18 The 
major change in the fundamental constitution of modes of thought, then, has 
always been present as a parallel stream of thought. 
There is a question of function linked to the use of the term ecology that 
must be resolved before attempting to resolve the nature of causal relations 
between successive paradigms of environmentalism and a politics of ecology. 
To what extent is the use of the term ecology linked to the theory of ecological 
science and the evolution of a politics of the environment? If Haeckel' s term 
'ecology' describes the scientific discipline of ecology, it follows that the 
discipline existed prior to the term. Both the scientific discipline of ecology and 
its political dimension would exist as in~erconnected entities even if the term 
'ecology' had been something else. There are, however, certain assumptions 
and values that have come to be associated with the term that are not 
17 J.S. Mill, Autobiography quoted in Papadakis, Environmental Politics and Institutional Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 5 
18 D. Padovan, 1999. "Social Morals and Ethics of Nature: from Peter Kropotkin to Murray 
Bookchln", Democracy and Nature Vol.5, No.3, 485 
--· 
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necessarily present in either the discipline or the politics. Ecology would exist 
as a science and, causally, as a basis for political ideology regardless of the term 
_applied, but it is relevant to note that the term itself has been used variously, 
and become a vehicle for implicit and related values since the emergence of 
environmentalism and green politics. 
Environmentalism: ecology gets political 
As stated in the introduction, it is fundamental to the determinative 
relationship between the political discourses of ecology and environmental 
politics to note that the terms 'ecology' and 'environment' are not synonymous 
nor are they interchangeable either in the common lexicon or for the purposes of 
this thesis. While 'ecology' describes the relationships between all living 
organisms, including the human species, and their surroundings, 'environment' 
denotes those surroundings. The phenomenon recognised as 'green' politics is 
usually concerned with the latter, that is, the environment, rather than ecology, 
which, according to Radcliffe, has arisen as a political discourse in response to 
the inadequacies in both environmentalism and conservationism19 • While there 
is a certain passivity associated with the term conservation, environmentalism 
has become the overarching generic term applied to any human action 
associated with the preservation of nature. Radcliffe defines the use of the term 
ecology asserting that: 
... th~ inclusion of humanity as a part of ecology has led to the 
development of a radically different approach. However, there was 
also a more political reason for its increasing adoption, particularly 
in the United Kingdom. Increasingly, governments have adopted 
the environment as a part of the mainstream, and consequently those 
19 J. Radcliffe, Green Politics: Dictatorship or Democracy? (Houndsmill: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) 
Xll 
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who deem government activity as inadequate to the crisis see 
ecology as providing a wider ideological foundation.20 
Dobson uses the term ecologism to refer to the politics of nature, stating that 
"environmentalism is not a political ideology" and that while it is II sufficiently 
non-specific for it to be hybridized with most ideologies, it is at its most 
uncomfortable with ecologism."21 
Environmentalism, rather than being an ideology, can be grafted on to 
existing ideologies, which leads inevitably to a dilution of its intent. It 
encompasses a broad range of both politically and extra-politically motivated 
actions that purport to be in the best interests of the environment. Any nature-
conservation activity, from gardening clubs to tree-spiking can be, and generally 
is, labelled environmentalism. Governments and political parties routinely 
court the 'green vote' and highlight their sound environmental records and 
policies in attempts to capture the perceived growing' green' demographic. No 
modern development project proceeds without an environmental impact 
assessment being carried out for the informed benefit of the consent authority 
and the public. Corporate giants and multinationals from mining companies to 
fast food chains establish and maintain an image of good corporate citizenship 
through sponsorship of environmental campaigns and by highlighting their 
own commitment to the environment. Increasingly, even the most banal 
household products on supermarket shelves feature labelling with the words 
'environment' or 'green', in order to make them more attractive to consumers. 
Even while mass-consumerism is regarded as a major contributor to global 
environmental problems, environmentalism is being used by corporate public 
relations to encourage greater consumption of resources by tapping into a social 
consciousness of environmental responsibility22 • Environmentalism has no set 
20 ibid. xii 
21 A.Dobson, Green Political Thought Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1995) 14 
22 S. Beder, Global Spin: The corporate assault on environmentalism (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 
1997) 108 
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criteria and anyone can belong. It is at once saleable commodity, corporate 
ideal, political football, government policy and personal ethic. 
The basis of environmentalism is social. The word itself is of social rather 
than scientific derivation, denoting surroundings and the conditions and 
influences which affect and determine the development of those surroundings. 
The current usage of the term, that is, to refer to the natural environment and 
ecology, is a relatively recent development stemming from an awareness of the 
limitations of nature against the seemingly unlimited capacity for human 
development and expansion. The ethic unpinning environmentalism is the . 
reconciliation of human society with nature. Meyer states that this is 
interpreted as an "issue area" 23, that is, dealing with specific issues_ as they relate 
to human society and the ability of human society to develop. The public 
environmental agenda is not necessarily reflective of actual environmental 
developments. While saving old-growth forests from logging and large marine 
mammals from extinction are, without doubt, environmentally worthwhile 
activities, the publicity and income subsequently generated are far more 
valuable for the environment movement than a less popular, public or well-
funded, but potentially more ecologically valuable campaign to investigate the 
effect of leachate from landfill on the microbial organisms of a water catchment 
area. 'Big ticket' campaigns allow the movement to be self-perpetuating in 
order to maintain a public credibility, which, in turn, allows it to run big ticket 
campaigns and so forth. The public campaigns draw the funding and publicity 
but are less likely to use the science of ecology as a basis for their claims, 
predictions and prognoses. James Lovelock pointed this out in 1979: 
Biological arguments which appear to have a sound scientific basis 
carry very little weight with scientists . ... The result is an 
23 J.M.Meyer, 1999. ulnterpreting Nature and Politics in the History of Western Thought: The 
Environmentalist Challenge", Environmental Politics, Vol.8, No.2, 2 
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environmental movement which is thwarted, bewildered and 
24 
angry. 
The.basis of ecology, on the other hand, is scientific. Proponents of 
ecologism as the politics of ecology believe, with reason, that a sound 
knowledge basis for policy and decision making is more politically credible 
than unsubstantiated claims made on the basis of opinion. It remains, however, 
that a considerable amount of liberal-capitalist policy in modern western 
democracies is designed on the basis of opinion polls and media coverage of 
specific issues and is intended for mass consumption without question. At least 
on a superficial electoral level, knowledge does not necessarily translate to 
political success; indeed, recent electoral history in the USA may well suggest 
the opposite to be true. While environmentalism could be regarded as the 
populist end of the green political yardstick, drawing wide-ranging support on 
the basis of well-publicised issues and campaigns, ecologism formulates 
ideology on the basis of sound empirical evidence, political theory and 
associated values. 
It becomes necessary, therefore, to identify whether ecology and 
environmentalism separated from a single cell into two distinct entities, or 
whether they began as two separate and completely umelated cells and have 
merged as a result of popular culture and consciousness. There is a certain 
nebulous quality to environmentalism which allows it, as in Dobson's view, to 
attach to any host organism, but there the parasitic analogy ends. The word 
'environment' only entered the lexicon in its current usage after the publication 
of Silent Spring and the subsequent raising of ecological issues, specifically the 
use of agricultural chemicals, as opposed to the conservation issues of the 
previous era, in the public consciousness. The subject matter of Silent Spring, 
however, itself arose from a crisis of the environment. Lord Shackleton, in his 
introduction to C~rson' s book, notes that: 
24 J. Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 137 
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Silent Spring is not merely about poisons; it is about ecology or the 
relation of plants and animals to their environment and to one 
another. Ecologists are more and more coming to recognize that for 
this purpose man is an animal and indeed the most important of all 
animals and that however artificial his dwelling, he cannot with 
impunity allow the natural environment of living things from which 
he has so recently emerged to be destroyed.25 
Ecological evolution in the social consciousness 
The catalyst that caused the development of the modern environmental, or 
green, movement was a perceived failure of government to adequately address 
what was seen, certainly by Carson, Shackleton and a number of other 
prominent writers of the same period, as the inevitable destruction of nature by 
human development. In the shift to environmentalism as a social movement, 
scientific ecology remained a dominant influence, both as a scientific discipline, 
and as the foundation of the later ideology of ecologism. In becoming 
instrumental in politics, however, ecology lost the impartiality that had defined 
its role in preservationsim. Environmentalism, on the other hand, separated 
from the ecological paradigm relying instead on social factors to determine its 
progress. Where science was found to be lacking in not providing solutions to 
the seemingly inevitable crises of Silent Spring, Tragedy of the c_ommons and 
Population Bomb, human society provided both the problems and the solutions. 
The influence of earlier paradigms on ensuing social revolutions· must be 
viewed within a broader socio-cultural context. For example, where Vernon 
suggested that the tendency of the Maoist and Soviet Russian paradigms to 
repeat certain practices of the Confucian system and Czarist era respectively26 
25 R.Carson, Silent Spring (London: Penguin, 1962) 11 
26 R.Vemon, /,'Politics as Metaphor", in Gutting (ed), Paradigms and Revolutions (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1980) 259 
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indicated that those paradigms were not 'revolutionary', it must be realised that 
the practices adopted by the revolutionaries from their imperial antecedents 
arose more from embedded cultural factors than political influence. Within the 
scientific, social and political paradigms of ecology and environmentalism, too, 
there are cultural factors that must be considered in relation to the influences of 
one upon the other, and of earlier paradigms upon later. There is a strong 
environmental literary, scholarly and philosophical tradition, dating from 
Whitman, Emerson and Thoreau in the 19th century through to Leopold and 
Carson in the mid-20 th century to the contemporary scholars, theorists and 
writers who lend increasing academic weight to the discipline of environmental 
politics. Many of the ecological themes of the earlier writers are reflected in the 
context of western culture in the most recent writings on the subject. Both 
environmentalism and ecology have been, and, up to a point, continue to be, 
influenced by both western and eastern religious traditions which also remain 
as a source of polemic and dialectic within the paradigms. These traditions 
have provided the cultural contexts in which ecology and environmentalism 
have not only been allowed to function as socio-political paradigms, but also 
provided a foundation stone for several millennia of human social 
development. Cultural habits cannot easily be shed when a certain body of 
thought ceases to adequately provide solutions to immediate issues. 
In this socio-cultural context, paradigmatic shifts will invariably maintain 
some continuity through the progression, most notably in the form of language, 
but in other embedded forms of sociological and technical apparatus as well. 
Whether the revolution has been political (the French Revolution did not change 
the language and cultural habits of the former regime), cultural (the early Italian 
Renaissance introduced the concept of perspective but retained pre-Renaissance 
composition and technique) or scientific (Copernicus changed the way in which 
the solar system was perceived but did not change the Ptolemaic calculus) 
where an established paradigm no longer adequately addresses questions or 
.. ~ . 
issues, a new model is developed. In the socio-cultural context of the 1960s, the 
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political establishment that encompassed conservation as its sole ecological 
instrument could not address the questions being posed by such writers as 
Carson, Hardin and Ehrlich. Against the global political backdrop of the Cold 
War and its associated social mores, the state of the natural environment in the 
light of post-World War II industrialisation and economic expansion was 
perceived as dire. While the ensuing environmental 'revolution' sought to 
provide answers to the environmental crisis, it sought to do so on the 
foundation already established by ecology. 
From the convergence of ecology and politics, based on Thoreau's 
romanticisation of nature, George Perkins Marsh's lament of its imminent 
demise and Charles Darwin's establishment of the human connection with it, a 
body of thought was formed based on the premise that humankind had 
responsibility for the stewardship of the earth and all its resources: a post-
industrial revolution awareness of humanity's place in the natural world, and 
belief that environmental damage and degradation could be arrested through 
management and preservation. A body of thought that recognised the 
complexity of the interrelationship of the human species with nature, the 
common histories of the human species and nature and the need for a greater 
cognisance of both the effective and affective domains of the human-nature 
interrelationship. This human-ecological approach established the direction 
that has become the link between subsequent shifts in the dominant body of 
thought: that is, that nature and humanity share a common history and that 
while humanity, being of nature, cannot survive without it, human linear social 
evolution has impacted negatively on the cyclical nature of ecology. 
The drawing together of ecology and society in the mid-19th century 
occurred at the intersection of two linear developments - those of thought 
(science) and action (society), and the cycle of ecological development. The 
result provided a basis for understanding by, firstly, bringing thought and 
action into line with one another through the creation of 'ecology', and 
secondly, establishing the precedent by which all subsequent ecological crises 
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would be approached. A cultura~ context was also established in the body of 
work to ensure that certain norms of behaviour have remained as constants 
throughout the subsequent evolution of eco-political thought and action. 
Preservationism and the discourse of conservation 
In response to the impact of industrialisation on the environment an 
essentially ecocentric approach arose aimed at preserving areas of untouched 
wilderness for the sake of nature: Thoreau wrote in 1862, "In wilderness is the 
preservation of the world."27 While the intrinsic value of nature was 
fundamental, however, it was couched in the cultural anthropocentrism of 
viewing the natural environment as a place for human spiritual and aesthetic 
nourishment, for example, the concept of nature as "cathedral" and "art 
gallery"28 • Preservationism was also a reaction against a burgeoning 
materialism and consumption ethic fostered by industrialisation. This reaction 
manifested in a strong tendency by preservationists such as Thoreau and 
Scottish-born American mountaineer and founder of the Sierra Club, John Muir, 
to romanticise nature: 
Preservation celebrated the sublime and the primitive in nature. 
Describing the Yosemite Valley in California, Muir rhapsodized that 
it was "so beautiful that one is beguiled at every step, and the great 
golden days and weeks and months go by uncounted ... [with] five 
hundred miles of waterfalls chanting together. What a psalm was 
that!"29 
The methodology of preservationists lay in the belief that the most effective 
and powerful arbiter was government, and thus they appealed to the (US) 
federal government to create areas where nature may be protected "from the 
27 R.Brulle, Agency, Democracy and Nature (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2000) 161 
28 W.Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Boston: Shambhala, 1990) 160 
29 W.Shutkin, The Land that Could Be (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2000) 92 
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harmful effects of human settlement and consumption".30 In 1872 the US 
government proclaimed the nation's first National Park, Yellowstone, and in 
1890, Yosemite. Preservationism was neither anti-establishment nor politically 
reactionary; it believed in a value of nature in terms of non-material human 
values and sought to preserve those human values in their natural extension 
from the artificial and contrived ugliness of industry and progress. In so doing, 
the advocates of preservationism utilised the structural frameworks of existing 
institutions, such as government, to both support their ethic and as a model for 
the organisations founded specifically to foster preservationism. 
Within the parameters of the preservationist approach was the discourse of 
conservation31 • This discourse challenged the problem-solving ability of the 
body of thought and also become the source of anomaly within the body of 
thought, ultimately leading to paradigmatic shift. The conservation discourse, 
led by American Gifford Pinchot, sought not to preserve wilderness, but to 
manage it as a resource32• The concept of resource management has remained a 
constant discourse throughout the evolution of the ecological ideology and 
environmentalism, but has neither provided an ideological basis for 
environmental action, nor sought to solve the ecological crisis. Rather, it has 
sought to solve the purely human-industrial crisis of dwindling natural 
resources for human-industrial consumption. The conservation discourse is an 
instrumental application of ecology, rejecting the intriDsic value of nature. 
Preservationism established the links between human and natural history, and 
believed that only deliberate action by humankind in retaining areas of 
wilderness could prevent the inevitable destruction of nature. Conservationism, 
used the science of ecology to challenge the central notion of a crisis, stating 
instead that nature should be subject to human intervention in the form of 
30 ibid. 92 
31 Brulle (2000) op cit 25-26 
32 R.Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory (London: UCL Press, 1992); M.Oelschlaeger, 
The Idea of Wilderness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) 35 
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management and that all natural resources could, and should, be used 
sustainably in the interests of economic growth. 
The publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962 is now widely 
regarded as the catalyst33 that finally undermined the preservationist approach 
to the environment, precipitating the emergence of the social movement era 
characterised by an apocalyptic view of the future. While preservationists were 
lobbying governments to create national parks and protect areas of natural 
significance from industrial growth, agriculture and industry, responding to 
unprecedented economic growth and the need to support a burgeoning world 
population, were pouring chemicals into the air, earth and water. Carson wrote: 
· The most alarming of all man1 s assaults upon the environment is the 
contamination of air, earth, rivers, and sea with dangerous and even 
lethal materials: This pollution is for the most part irrecoverable; the 
chain of evil it initiates not only in the world that must support life, 
but in living tissues is for the most part irreversible. In this now 
universal contamination of the environment, chemicals are the 
sinister and little-recognized partners of radiation in changing the 
very nature of the world - the very nature of its life.34 
This was a crisis both within the human-ecology relationship and the 
preservationist approach that had for almost a century provided the parameters 
for action and thought concerning that relationship. The result was the rise of a 
social movement which challenged existing methodology and thought and 
shifted the focus from decision-making led and implemented through formal, 
legislative political processes, to socially-based and largely reactionary politics 
·on issues where existing policy was perceived to have failed. 
33 P.Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2002) 16 
34 Carson (1962) op cit., 23 
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Social revolution and the birth of the green movement 
The 1960s saw the convergence of a number of political, social, technological 
and cultural factors that manifested in a rejection of traditional institutions in 
favour of radical social movements. The first of the post-war baby boomers 
entered the universities; the Vietnam War sparked a furious anti-war movement 
in the US and its allies; the invention of the contraceptive pill was credited with 
the start of the sexual revolution and the liberation of women; the Cold War, 
symbolised by the erection of the Berlin Wall and the ever-present threat of 
nuclear warfare, became suddenly hot with the Cuban missile crisis; and the 
civil rights movement in the US all heralded social upheaval and change. The 
so-called 'space race' put humankind beyond the earth's atmosphere and 
provided, for the first time, a view of the earth from a new perspective: the 
view of earth from space proved to be one of the defining factors in the birth of 
the environment movement. Culturally, rock music and pop art led a 
hebecentric revolution celebrating conspicuous consumption in rejection of the 
conservative ethic of the previous generation. In this cauldron of social 
upheaval, Carson's work, along with later works by Paul Ehrlich and Garrett 
Hardin, provided the seedbed for revolution and the emergence of an 
apocalyptic view of the environment and the human-nature relationship. 
'Apocalypticism' was a revolution against the conservative approaches to 
economic and natural resource management and the ethic of development that 
marked the socio-political era that contained preservationism. The ecological 
crisis described by Carson turned the spotlight not just on the loss of wilderness 
and nature due to industrial expansion, although that was a related fact, but on 
loss of life on a far greater scale than George Perkins Marsh or John Muir could 
have imagined. It was this that led scientists to respond differently to the natural 
environment and challenged the social, political and cultural order. 
Within apocalypticism, the pro-nature ethic, represented by separate nature 
preservation organisations, transformed into a social movement distinct from, 
33 
but sharing many of the values of other social movements of the same period, in 
particular, the peace and anti-nuclear movements, which have remained closely 
allied to the environment movement. This common system of values is the 
hallmark of social movements. A values-system, distinct from the more 
instrumental application of ideology35, is represented through strong 
commitment to "general social values and moral principles considered by their 
members as universally valid."36 It follows that the radical and anti-
establishment movements of the 1960s shared a foundation of values and moral 
principles shaped by the events and rapid social and technological change of the 
fifteen years following the Second World War. 
Essentially, apocalypticism was characterised by an overarching belief that 
the earth was in peril from the destructive activities of human civilisation and 
that if nothing were done to alter the situation, the crisis would worsen 
exponentially to the eventual extinction of all life. Within this body of social 
thought were the conflicting discourses of deep ecology and environmentalism, 
which provided the poles between which the green movement has operated 
ever since. The emergence of environmentalism was the fundamental factor in 
the eventual politicisation of ecology, in the same way as the emergence of other 
social movements forged the way for the politicisation of human rights and 
equality. 
As a fundamentally social discourse, environmentalism provided both 
counterpoint and turning point within apocalypticism. Where the dominant 
body of thought was based on the findings and interpretations of physical 
science and was, to a large extent, concerned more with the earth holistically 
rather than with the earth as human instrument, environmentalism rested on a 
system of entirely human and subjective values. In 1968 Garrett Hardin, 
warning against the effects of continued population growth on the earth, 
35 Defined in Pakulski, Social Movements (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991) and Dalton & 
Kuechler, Challenging the Political Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 
36 Pakulski (1990) op cit., 34 
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pointed out that: "No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of 
overpopulation."37 Although "The Tragedy of the Commons" has been 
interpreted almost to the point of exhaustion as a metaphor for social and 
political theory, in that one statement Hardin articulated what had been missing 
in the scientific approach to ecology for over a century: that while the problem 
can be quantified and described scientifically, the cause is social. Population 
growth, industrial development and progress are all factors of society, not 
science, and the solution, therefore, is social. Ecology, to provide the answers to 
the crisis it described, had to develop a social dimension - a politics of the 
environment. 
Environmentalism opened the ecological crisis to a broader community of 
both protagonists and antagonists than preservationism, which remained the 
preserve of a small minority. The result was an ideology based on an 
underlying belief that without urgent action, the earth and all life would have a 
limited future. The factors that influenced the emergence of the ecological 
ideology: 
... required a system of thought-action bases to both reflect 
perceptions and understandings of the particular political 
environment and to provide direction38 • 
Ultimately, conflicting discourses within the social revolution of apocalypticism 
yielded to the emergence of a direction and methodology more in line with the 
process of institutional politics. This occurred in the mid-1970s when the 
environment movement began to enter the political mainstream through 
political parties based on what became known as a 'green' ideology39 • This 
heralded an optimism that lay at odds with the doomsaying of the 
37 G.Hardin, 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons" Science Vol.162, No.3858, 1248 
38 M.Freeden, 1995. "Green Ideology: Concepts and Structures", OCEES Research papers, Oxford 
University, 2 . 
39 ibid., also: J.Porritt Seeing Green (Oxford: Basil Blackwood, 1984); D.Hutton (ed) Green Politics 
in Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1987); A.Dobson Green Political Thought 2nd edition 
(London: Routledge 1995); P.Hay 2002, op cit. 
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revolutionary period. The environmental answers provided by the direction 
taken by green democratisation and integrationism, were, in effect, the 
institutionalisation of those that grew from the social movements of 
apocalypticism: nature and ecology became social and political actors. 
The political reaction: green democratisation 
The political direction represented by Green political parties moved beyond 
an ethic based on visions of an environmental apocalypse, which required 
action to address the ecological crisis, to a broad-based ideology which 
recognised the role and value of society within an environmental context. The 
merging of ecology with society into common ideology was an inevitable result 
of the shared values of the social movements: equality, including 
intergenerational equity; peaceful conflict resolution; social and economic 
justice; participatory democracy; the upholding of rights, including the rights of 
non-human animals. Given that ideologies are attempts to: 
... confer cultural and conventional legitimacy on particular, narrow 
understandings of each of the political concepts they employ [in 
order to] translate the indeterminacy of political options into the 
certainty necessary for a political decision to take place ... 40 
the green political parties that exemplified the green democratisation approach 
embodied the environment movement in terms of cultural context, political 
concepts and alternatives for political decision-making. While a solid 
environmental ethic remained fundamental to all green parties, the concept of 
the environment and the ethic underpinning its governance assumed a more 
socio-political role. 
Green political parties emerged as a more conservative counterpoint to the 
sometimes radical environmental organisations formed during the same period. 
4
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Organisations such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, both of which were 
formed in 1969 by "renegades from the staid Sierra Club"41, typified the shift 
from preservationism to apocalypticism, but their appeal was too narrow for the 
broad-based shift to green democratisation. The world's first' green' party, the 
United Tasmania Group (UTG), formed in March 1972 in response to the 
proposed flooding of Lake Pedder by the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric 
Commission and the state government. While holding to the values of the 
environmental organisations, the UTG proclaimed itself according to a raft of 
environmental as well as social and economic policies, including the rejection of: 
... the wholesale extraction of non-replenishable resources; the 
alienation of people in their social and work roles; and the 
acquisition and display of individual wealth as an expression of 
greed for status or power.42 
The UTG was followed quickly by the New Zealand Values Party in May 1972, 
and the People party in the UK (later the Ecology Party and later again, the UK 
Green Party) in 1973, based on a similar platform of environmental and social 
policies. While UTG and Values were the first 'green' parties, the first party to 
use the name 'Green' was the German Greens, Die Griinen, formed in 1979. 
These parties were largely the pragmatic offspring of earlier social movements: 
more conservative in their approach than the anti-establishment organisations 
while at the same time recognising the weaknesses and failures inherent in the 
environment movement. The resulting 'ecologism', as Dobson describes the 
politicisation of ecology43, held to the same values and much of the same 
methodology learned from its parents. For a decade the green political 
movement operated outside the parameters defined by established political 
parties and processes, using elections as platforms for raising public awareness 
to environmental issues and working actively against the political 
41 F.Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1991) 17 
42 B.Brown and P.Singer, The Greens (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Co., 1996) 69 
43 Dobson (1995) op cit. · 
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establishment. Green politics, in this era, was peripheral and radical. Green 
· parties existed as political pressure groups and acted to influence politics and 
policy from the outside. By the late 1970s, however, they had grown in strength 
and voice due to the heightened awareness of issues such as the nuclear power 
industry in Europe, and the logging of old-growth forests and hydro-
industrialisation in Australia. As a result of this awareness and the ideology 
driving it, Green political candidates started to become regarded as viable 
electoral alternatives, albeit by a minority of voters, and began to take their seats 
in parliaments in Germany and Switzerland, and then, in 1983, Tasmania. 
The optimism accompanying green democratisation originated and 
developed mainly from a belief that political parties, founded on.a solid ethical 
platform and working in accordance with the social values of a liberal society, 
would succeed in influencing environmental policy development in order to 
address the ecological crisis. The issue of the crisis itself was not in question: 
scientific evidence documenting the environmental effects of pollution, 
unsustainable agricultural practices, species loss, population growth, 
development and urbanisation formed the empirical basis for an ideology 
which also considered the social and economic effects of the ecological crisis. 
Thus, while the central empirical tenet of the ecological crisis remained 
essentially one of apocalyptic doom, salvation was at hand through the socio-
political interrelationship of the human and non-human environments. Green 
parties provided a vehicle for action across a wide social and environmental 
front. 
The concepts of' development' and 'the environment' are inevitably linked 
by human association. Given this, the socio-political framework must be taken 
into consideration in terms of the perspectives of both the dominant liberal-
capitalist political doctrine which forms the framework of human progress, as 
well as that of the environmental movement. If it is inevitable that the 
environment is subject to human intervention, it must follow that such 
intervention will, ultimately, be political in nature and execution, for even while 
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the environment movement challenged the liberal-capitalist structure during 
the revolutionary period between preservationism and green democratisation, 
the formation of a social movement is itself based on power relations. The green 
movement arose in opposition to the liberal-capitalist "material foundation of 
our society and our basic attitudes:,', and claimed: 
... to contest the current power relations on behalf of us all, in the 
interests of the survival of the human and other species. The theme 
that emerges ... . is the struggle of people to achieve influence over 
decisions that affect their very lives; to limit the power of those social 
forces perceived to be dangerous to the planet and its inhabitants. 
They are concerned with preventing the destruction of the world we 
li . 44 vem ... 
The green movement gave rise to a political movement represented globally by 
political parties and elected representatives who promote themselves as being 
different from the established political order. Those within the environment 
movement saw political action as the most effective way of raising 
environmental issues in the public domain and influencing the political 
direction to ensure long-term environmental sustainability. In order to 
politicise the environment, enabling action by humans on behalf of nature, the 
green movement first had to define the environment in a socio-political context. 
The mainstream green agenda: integrationism 
The conservationist discourse of land and resource management which 
emerged to challenge green democratisation took the viewpoint that Dobson 
describes as "weak anthropocentrism"45 or "human-centred"46, including the 
socio-environmental ethics of intergenerational justice, the precautionary 
44 V.Burgmann, Power and Protest: movements for change in Australian society (St Leonards: Allen & 
Unwin, 1993) 187 
45 Dobson (1995) op cit., 61 
46 term used by Warwick Fox and quoted in Dobson (1995) op cit., 61 
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principle and 'triple bottom line' environmental accounting. This discourse 
differs somewhat from the conservationism that emerged as an 
opposing discourse to preservationism in the 19th century, which was "human-
instrumental"47 and regarded the earth as existing purely for human ends. The 
weak version of anthropocentrism, implemented on a non-ideological basis as a 
practical discipline, is responsible for much of our current environmental 
practice and policy. Many of the practices undertaken according to this 
discourse during the period of green democratisation have been positive; many 
failed. Davers documents the passing of many participatory natural resource 
management institutions48 from which lessons, good and bad, may have been 
learned by contemporary practitioners. A weakness in the resource 
management discourse is its ad hoc approach to decision-making and a general 
lack of will to learn from environmental history49. Against the discourse of land 
stewardship, the ecological ideology of green politics recognised its 
evolutionary development and drew on history as a model for environmental 
action50 • 
In the early to mid-1980s, however, with the electoral success of the 
Tasmanian Greens and Die Griinen, as well as major environmental campaign 
victories which successfully influenced government decision-making, such as 
the Franklin River campaign, green parties crossed the threshold to the inner 
sanctum of political process. Their aim, to enter the formal structure of the 
legislature as a truly representative body, if not fully realised in all areas, then 
within reach, the green political machine based on working from the outside 
underwent a progression from green democratisation to integrationism without 
a change in the body of thought. This progression took the ecological ideology 
47 Dobson (1995) op cit., 61 
48 S.Dovers, 2000. f/Still Settling Australia: environment, history and policy" in Dovers (ed) 
Environmental History and Policy (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000) ., 5 
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from the exclusive domain of enviro-political ginger groups to the polity. 
Integrationism was characterised by the mainstreaming of environmentalism 
through the adoption of 'green' political agendas by established parties, and, to 
an extent, the reining-in of environmental activists51, who, in the formal confines 
of legislative chambers and governmental negotiations, often lost the advantage 
they were able to employ as radical environmental campaigners . . As will be 
argued later in this thesis, electoral success did not translate to a resolution of 
the ecological crisis; rather, it has forced a somewhat diluted environmental 
agenda into mainstream politics but has not adopted the green ideology 
necessary to effect widespread change. 
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development, chaired 
by then Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, published the 
landmark Our Common Future and gave the world the term 'ecologically 
sustainable development', defined as: "the ability to meet the needs of the 
present without sacrificing the ability of future generations to meet theirs"52• 
Ecologically sustainable development (ESD) became the major discourse within 
green democratisation and integrationism creating the direction for decision-
making and policy bodies. Ecological modernisation, particularly in Europe, 
became the methodology for implementing the discourse of sustainability in a 
functional context. The path once open, however, the bandwagon quickly 
followed, to the point where the term sustainability is now used to justify 
environmental action from the perspectives of both 'weak' and 'strong' 
anthropocentrism. Perhaps there is no more evident a contrast between the 
ecological ideology formed from the apocalyptic social movement revolution 
and green democratisation-integrationism than the two international summits 
51 Joschka Fischer (Die Grunen) and Ian Cohen (Greens NSW) are two examples of formerly high-
profile radical activists now conforming to the comparatively conservative modes of behaviour 
expected of elected representatives. 
52 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) 43 
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held twenty years apart. The UN Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972: 
... included calls for a "loyalty to the Earth" that recognized 
planetary interdependence of all life, the adoption of global (as 
opposed to national) responses to environmental problems, and 
massive changes in over-consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy.53 
By comparison, the 1992 Earth Summit (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro: 
. .. institutionalized ideas associated with this new conception of 
environmental governance. Some called it a "paradigm shift" to a 
new international law of sustainable development from previous 
formulations of both an international law of the environment and of 
development. Others argue that the Earth Summit "succeeded in 
formulating an umbrella regime in the field of sustainable 
development" that will continue to shape specific responses to 
environmental problems well into the future :54 
The institutionalisation of the environmental agenda has had two major effects 
on political ecology: firstly, it has pushed green parties into the position of 
forming the sort of political alliances they once sought to avoid in order to 
ensure institutional and legislative support on environmental issues; and 
secondly, it has raised the question, in many public and political fora, of 
whether, in the light of ecological modernisation, there is, in fact, a need for a 
politics of ecology. 
Meanwhile, back at the station . .. 
As a case study, the Snowy River campaign represents a weakening in the 
integrationist approach, which, while evident as early as the 1980s in Europe, 
had not emerged as a threat to the dominant political approach in Australasia. 
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2001) 2 
54 ibid 
42 
In 1991 a single window of opportunity to save the degraded Snowy River 
opened when the Federal government announced plans to corporatise the 
SMHEA. Were the authority to remain under government control there would 
have been no avenue to pursue a campaign of change. For this reason, the 
National Party, representing the irrigators who directly benefit from the Snowy 
Scheme, opposed corporatisation, fearing that a change in ownership would 
result in a loss of commitment to the irrigators55 • Once corporatisation was 
effected the opportunity to change policy on the Snowy River would be lost. It 
was clear that any changes in policy regarding future water use would need to 
be embedded in the legislation that would determine and define the terms of 
corporatisation. 
The Dalgety and District Community Association (DDCA), which was 
established early in 1991 to oppose the shire council's plans to close down the 
caravan park in town, took up the challenge of pressuring the authorities on the 
issue of the Snowy. The governments involved at the time were the Hawke 
Federal Labor government, the Kennett Liberal government in Victoria and the 
Greiner Liberal government in New South Wales. During the eleven years of 
the campaign, all those governments would change, but it was the 1999 narrow 
election of the Bracks Labor government in Victoria, supported by the 
Independent MP for East Gippsland, Craig Ingram that proved the most 
significant in finally achieving the goal. The corporatisation process itself 
stalled and was postponed a number of times during the course of negotiations 
and the Snowy Water Inquiry. In the meantime, the Snowy Alliance, an alliance 
of a number of smaller groups including the DDCA, had formed to spearhead 
the campaign. 
Grassroots environmental campaigns are not novel, but where this 
campaign differed from other similar grassroots campaigns was in the nature of 
the issue. The construction of the Snowy Scheme in 1949 was never opposed. If 
55 Fullerton (2001) op cit. 183 
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doubts arose during its construction regarding its impact on the natural 
environment, such as those raised by the CSIRO and the Australian Academy of 
Science regarding the area known as Kosciusko Tops, they concerned very 
specific areas and were addressed accordingly. Bergmann points out that: 
While politically little concern was given to the natural environment, 
either in the immediate surrounding area or downstream, those 
working directly on the Scheme did in fact take environmental 
considerations into account. The first major project on the Snowy-
Tumut side of the development, the Tumut 1 project, elicited much 
examination by the engineers and scientists of the Scheme relating to 
issues such as water runoff, erosion and soil conservation .... 
During construction of Tumut 2, further precautions were taken 
concerning soil conservation ... 56 
Bergmann indicates, however, that there were other factors of consideration for 
the engineers and scientists of the Scheme than the conservation of soil. The 
focus of environmental concerns was those areas "which could directly affect 
the viability of the Scheme"57 • The campaign to save the Snowy, then, was one 
against a long-established fact, not against a proposed development such_as the 
campaigns for Lake Pedder a·nd the Franklin. Opposing government policy 
retrospectively with the benefit of modern science but against the weight of 
industry and agriculture was never going to be easy, but, as many Dalgety 
community members have stated, they had nothing further to lose. 
The Snowy campaign was based on information, not rhetoric. From the 
outset the campaigners knew they needed sound, scientific information about 
environmental flows, riparian ecology and timeframes. Scientists from the 
NSW Department of Conservation and Land Management (now Department of 
Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources, DIPNR), the CSIRO, and 
56 M.Bergmann, 1999. "The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Scheme: How did it ~1anage 
without an EIA?" Discussion Paper No.60, Canberra: Australian National University, 
unpaginated 
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independent researchers such as Dr Kurt Cremer, an expert in willows and 
forestry, were asked for advice. The findings were consistent and not 
optimistic, although not all the scientists agreed on a course of action. Cremer' s 
submission to the Snowy Water Inquiry, while acknowledging the degradation 
of the Snowy, questioned the wisdom of increasing the flow to the Snowy at the 
expense of water for the red gum forests along the Murray, while Dr Martin 
Kent of the Gippsland and Southern Rural Water Authority recommended an 
immediate release of water to alleviate the creeping salinity problem at Orbost58• 
It was already agreed by the early 1990s, however, that the minimum 
environmental flow required to restore and maintain ecological health to the 
Snowy was 28% of its original flow. Since 1967, the year the Jindabyne Dam 
and the Mowamba aqueduct were completed, the flow had dwindled to less 
than 1 % of original. The target of 28% thus established, the campaigners began 
to read policy documents, lobby government ministers at both state and federal 
levels, write letters and build a foundation of public support. The integrationist 
approach was not likely to succeed for the Snowy River issue for several 
reasons, the main one being the demarcation of environmental responsibility 
between state and federal governments. While the Federal government 
controlled the SMHEA, the state governments, with responsibility for river 
catchments, could not act independently. This was further compounded by the 
counter-campaign from the irrigators who claimed that under the Snowy 
Mountains Hydro Electric Power Act 1949, they had a right to the water from the 
Scheme and that, as primary producers, their requirements for water should 
have priority. Given that the Murray-Darling catchment covers approximately 
one-third of Australia and involves four separate states and the ACT, 
governmental negotiations were precarious at best. Taking an extra-political, 
58 Submissions to the Snowy Water Inquiry, 1998. 
http://www.snowywaterinquiry.org:au/ submissions.htm 
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information-based path would ensure the campaigners continuity through 
changes of government and pressure from industry. 
This was not an environmental campaign: it was an ecological campaign 
driven by the community. The following chapters will examine the themes of 
social movements, party-political alliances, environmental policy, social and 
economic justice and risk management along the lines of the broad historical 
structure of environmentalism outlined in this chapter, underpinned by the 
issue of the Snowy. While the thesis contends that environmentalism, as 
constructed in the 1960s and 70s, is losing ground as an effective political actor, 
ecology is of growing concern. 
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Chapter 2 
Social movements to politics: 
from .1greenie' to .1Green'; .1no nukes' to .{Nuclear Disarmament' 
.1women' s lib' to .{Feminist' 
The world that we have made as a result of the level of thinking 
we have done thus far, creates problems that we cannot solve at the same 
level as they were created - Albert Einstein 
Harbingers of change: the pre-revolutionary period 
In his 1967 allegorical anti-war ballad, Alice's Restaurant, folk singer Arla 
Guthrie described his theory for conscription avoidance: 
... just walk in say ''Shrink, You can get anything you want, at Alice's 
restaurant." And walk out. You know, if one person, just one person 
does it they may think he's really sick and they won't take him. And 
if two people, two people do it, in harmony, they may think they're 
both faggots and they won't take either of them. And if three people 
do it, three, can you imagine, three people walking in singin' a bar of 
Alice's Restaurant and walking out. They may think it's an 
organization. And can you, can you imagine fifty people a day, I 
said fifty people a day walking in singin' a bar of Alice's Restaurant 
and walking out. And friends, they may think it's a movement.1 
The birth of a social movement was hardly a new phenomenon when Guthrie 
'dodged the draft' and penned Alice's Restaurant. Alice's Restaurant did, 
however, encapsulate the radical, establishment-defying, social movement ethos 
of the 1960s. During that time a major confluence of social and political factors 
was taking place, producing social upheaval which challenged and ultimately 
changed the political and social order. In terms of singular events, the Vietnam 
1 Arlo Guthrie, 1967. Alice's Restaurant, Polydor, lyrics from 
http:/ /www.arlo.net/lyrics/ alices.shtml 
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War; the Berlin Wall; Prague Spring; Mao's Cultural Revolution; the Cuban 
missile crisis; the assassinations of President John F.Kennedy, Senator Robert 
Kennedy, Dr Martin Luther King Jr and Malcolm X; a series of milestones in 
space exploration; and the Six Day War all shaped the world political and social 
climate. The period was fertile for divergent thinking, liberation of the 
oppressed, and the expression of outrage. This chapter will explore the factors 
. that led to the emergence of social movements in the 1960s, and the 
commonalities in values between separate movements that led to the formation 
of the Greens as a global political movement incorporating those values that 
shaped late 20th century ecological thought. 
The economic boom that followed the Second World War, the so-called . 
'Long Boo1n', based on Keynesian economic theory, ensure~ that by the 1960s 
an economic contentment had taken hold in Western society. In Australia, 
Canada and the USA in the 1950s, displaced persons from war-ravaged Europe 
had found, if not exactly streets running with milk and honey, at least a level of 
prosperity that afforded opportunity and material well-being. The Baby Boom 
produced a 'bubble' in the population demographic which has been the focus of 
analysis by demographers ever since as those born between the years of 1945 
and 1965 have progressed through school, university, into the workforce and 
now, retirement. Government spending on large-scale civil projects, such as the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme and soldier resettlement schemes in Australia and 
the South Saskatchewan River Project in Canada, produced unprecedented 
economic and administrative confidence. In the US, President Dwight David 
Eisenhower (Republican) promised, "There must be no second class citizens in 
this country"2; in Australia, Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies (Liberal) 
embraced industrial and economic development, declaring, "We must go out 
and develop Australia's resources and increase the national wealth", and, "Let 
2 Eisenhower, quoted on Lists of US Presidents 
http:/ /www.fujisan.demon.eo.uk/USPresidents/preslist.htm 
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us produce our way to prosperity"3; Canadian Prime Minister, John George 
Diefenbaker (Progressive Conservative) also looked to growth, exhorting, 
"Canada must populate or perish- that is the answer. With such great resources 
as we possess, and such extensive territory, we can't survive with a small 
population"4; while in the UK, Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden (Conservative), 
invoked global peace and security with a 1955 election slogan, "Working for 
Peace" and courted the perception that the world in 1955 was" a safer place 
than it had been in 1951" .5 
The basic tenet of Keynesian economics, saving during the 'boom' cycles to 
allow for continued spending during the 'bust' cycles, was the same ethic 
espoused, in an ecological context, by the preservationists: that is, to save areas 
of wilderness while it exists in preparation for future scarcity of nature, both for 
the intrinsic value of nature and its value as environmental amenity. This same 
maxim was the dominant social paradigm of the pre-l 960s era: fiscal 
responsibility, conservative values, confidence in progress and development, 
traditional social norms. The socio-political principles, corresponding to the 
preservationist body of ecological thought, reflected conservative, prudent and 
unflinchingly anthropocentric values. There was an overriding, if naive by 
modern standards, faith in government to act responsibly and in the best 
interests of the citizenry. The strong ethic of progress and prosperity, however, 
evident in the major construction projects and technological development of the 
era, further emphasised that the preservationist ethic of prudent natural 
resource management was not embedded in the general socio-political direction 
which concentrated on growth and development. While conservative principles . 
3 Sir Percy Joske Sir Robert Menzies: 1894-1978 A new, informal memoir (Sydney: Angus 
&Robertson, 1978) 316 
4 Diefenbaker quoted on Diefenbaker: links and information on Canada's 13th Prime Minister 
http://www.ggower.com/ die£/ main.shtml 
5 Victor Rothwell Anthony Eden: A political biography 1931-57 (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press: 1992) 167 
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'.... ·. 
were the social norm in both political and ecological thought, the two remained 
separate. 
It was this optimistic view of technology and the ability of government to 
further Australia's economic growth and social stability, that provided the 
socio-political conditions for the Snowy Scheme, the long-term social and 
environmental impact of which, fifty years later, could not have been imagined . 
. - · . On the basis of necessity being the mother of invention, Coombs points out that 
new technologies arise in response to population pressures on existing 
resources: 
At certain critical stages in human history, technological 
developments have occurred, perhaps stimulated by the need to deal 
with population pressures or to respond to major environmental 
changes, which made necessary a revolution in the whole lifestyle of 
the peoples affected.6 
The Australian population at the end of World War II was 7 million. The 
government's development strategy, coupled with the resettlement of war 
refugees saw an influx of 1.6 million immigrants between October 1945 and 
June 19607. The 'populate or perish' proclamation of the era meant also that 
natural population increase was significant, with the total Australian population 
in 1960 reaching just over 10 million8. The projected increased pressure on 
Australian agriculture to feed a rapidly increasing population was deemed 
sufficient justification, if any were required, for the Snowy Scheme to proceed. 
By the time the environment movement emerged in response to the social 
and political conditions of the 1960s and the growing awareness of the 
detrimental impact of human development on the natural environment, the 
Snowy River was dammed and its flow below Lake Jindabyne reduced to less 
6 H.C.Coombs, The Return of Scarcity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 64 7 Australian Department of Immigration http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/02key.htm# l 8 Australian Bureau of Statistics 
http ://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/9471 3ad445ffl425ca25682000l92af2/0db74c39eee3a02fca256 
b350010b402!OpenDocument 
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than 1 % of original. At the same time as the Snowy was rapidly dwindling to a 
trickle, the campaign, led by the late Milo Dunphy, to save the Colong Caves in 
the Blue Mountains from quarrying by a cement company, and the campaign 
led by urban environmentalists, mainly in Dandenong, to save the Little Desert 
in western Victoria from development were gaining ground and publicity. 
Why,-then, given the apparent burgeoning environmental consciousness at 
the time, was there no outcry to save the Snowy when it became apparent that 
99% of the river was being diverted and that below the Jindabyne Dam the river 
would become degraded? The answer to this is political, socio-cultural and 
ecological. Firstly, the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electricity Act 1949 provided for 
utilisation of the Snowy River for irrigation and hydro-electricity. Water users 
downstream from Jindabyne were not considered in the drafting of the 
legislation and, while they were misled in the belief that the river v1ould not be 
as severely altered as it was, under the legislation it was the irrigators who had 
the rights to water despite the fact that the natural course of the river was 
eastwards from the mountains. Secondly, the environmental campaigns for the 
Little Desert and Colong Caves, and later, Lake Pedder, Fraser Island, Terania 
and the Franklin, all sought to protect areas of wilderness from development. 
By the time the Snowy was dammed at Jindabyne, the region was already 
developed, the Snowy was no longer a 'wild' river and the Jindabyne Dam was 
simply a further step in the process to provide economic and material benefits 
to both the region and Australia .. The development ethic of the ~ 940s sealed the 
fate of the Snowy well before the rise of an ecological consciousness in the 
1960s. Further, the Australian environmental movement has concentrated 
largely on wilderness protection rather than restoration of lands already 
damaged. Finally, there was no indication when the river was dammed at 
Jindabyne of the full extent of long-term ecological damage. The extent of 
degradation, including streambank erosion, salinity backwash, algal bloom, 
eutrofication and noxious plant infestation, only became evident after the fact. 
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Revolutionary change and institutional breakdown 
The convergent social factors which created the acceleration in radicalism 
and rise of social movements in the 1960s have been the subject of much social 
analysis9, and while it is not my purpose to dwell on this, I will extrapolate from 
existing analysis the factors that created the conditions for the emergence of the 
social movement era. In January 1961, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was 
inaugurated as the 35th President of the United States. Almost immediately 
upon assuming office, Kennedy was politically obliged to honour a commitment 
made seven years earlier by his predecessor, President Eisenhower, to assist 
South Vietnam to resist" any aggression or subversion threatening the political 
independence of the Republic of Vietnam."10 When Kennedy was assassinated 
in November 1963, the American commitment to the war in Vietnam included a 
total of 15,500 military personnel plus financial support to the South Vietnamese 
forces11 . In August 1961 the Berlin Wall, one of the most evocative and 
controversial symbols of the Cold War, was built around West Berlin by the East 
German government, closing the border between the Eastern and Western blocs. 
The American entry into the Vietnam War, and the Berlin Wall cemented, quite 
literally in the latter case, the geopolitical divide that defined world politics for 
the next three decades. These two events, closely following the unsuccessful 
and ill-conceived US invasion of Cuba in 1959, heightened an awareness of 
realpolitik: an awareness sharpened further in 1962 when the US and the USSR 
went to the brink over the Cuban missile crisis. Socially, questions were being 
raised over all these issues, and it was becoming clear that the pro-development 
9 For example, Habermas Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann Educational, 1976); Pakulski, 
Social Movements (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991); Tarrow Power in Movement 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Burgmann Power and Protest (St Leonards: 
Allen & U nwin, 1993) 
10 Eisenhower administration statement quoted in Sorensen Kennedy (New York: Smithmark 
Ltd., 1965) 651 
11 .b.d 1 1 . 
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economic and political attitude and conservative values of the pre-1960s socio-
political institutions would not provide answers to the constant threat of nuclear 
war, a divided Europe and western involvement in what was essentially a civil 
war in Indo-China. 
When Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was published in 1962, a certain degree 
of civil unrest was already starting to question the conservative and optimistic 
doctrines that defined western politics and social thought in the post-World 
War II era. Carson pointed to the ecological effects of the industrial and 
agricultural practices encouraged and increased over the past fifteen years and 
prophesied a bleak future if such practices continued unchecked: a silent 
spring. A scientist, Carson drew on an ecological foundation to hypothesise a 
future devoid of nature. Against the global backdrop of escalating military 
conflict in Vietnam, increasing tension between the USA and the USSR and a 
growing nuclear industry, the spectre of the demise of nature through human 
agency appeared an undeniable and entirely plausible prospect. This ecological 
understanding became the basis for a social movement that promoted a new 
way of thinking about the human-nature interrelationship. The preservationist 
value of prudence in laying aside areas of wilderness for the appreciation and 
preservation of nature, would not resolve issues of chemical and poison 
overuse, toxic runoff into waterways, air pollution and the eventual death of 
whole ecosystems. Silent Spring prompted an immediacy that had not been a 
factor in preservation.ism. The issue, according to Carson, was clear: unless 
action was taken as a matter of urgency to amend industrial and agricultural 
practices, an environmental apocalypse was inevitable. 
The sense of urgency invoked by Carson underscored the rapidity of social 
change and contributed, perhaps ironically, to a social image of living only for 
the present. This was reflected in much of the popular culture of the time, 
which celebrated the ephemeral rather than the timeless. Former Harvard 
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psychology professor12, Timothy Leary, promoted the use of the so-called 
'psychedelic' drugs, and coined the phrase, "Turn on, tune in and drop out". 
Songs with lines such as, "I hope I die before I get old" (1966)13, and "There's no 
time to lose/ I heard her say/ Catch your dreams before they slip away" 
(1967)14 and the apocalyptic, anti-nuclear warning of Bob Dylan's "Hard Rain" 
(1963) became the anthems of a generation that both resented the apparent 
short-term future they had inherited as the result of previous generations' lack 
of foresight, but also wanted to address the situation before there was no 
situation left to address. While Carson's treatise was a major step in the 
development of a public ecological awareness, it did not reach the social 
consciousness through popular music or mass-consumption media in the way · 
the Vietnam War and the start of what became the nuclear arms race were 
absorbed. The immediacy of these issues, highly visible through the media and 
popular culture, precipitated an anti-war movement that extended its base to 
include the wider issues of peace including the use of nuclear power and 
weapomy. 
Peace became politicised as a social movement in Europe much earlier than 
the peace movement started in North America. The geopolitical division in 
Europe was a far more physical and tangible entity than in the USA, where it 
remained largely a matter of conflicting Cold War ideologies and rhetoric. 
Furthermore, the realities of the second World War were still very much part of 
the European social and political landscape in the late 1950s and into the 1960s: 
with the exception of the attack on Pearl Harbour, the USA had not been a 
battlefield and had sustained no military attacks on its mainland during the 
1939-45 conflict. In 1958 Aktion Suehnezeichen/Friedensdienste ( Action 
Reconciliation/Services for Peace) (ASF) was formed in West Germany to allow 
12 Leary was dismissed from Harvard in 1963 for his radical outspokenness 
13 My Generation (Townshend) The Who, 1966 
14 Ruby Tuesday (Richards/Jagger) The Rolling Stones, 1967 
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West Germans to travel in Western Europe, Poland, Israel and the US to "work 
for 'peace and reconciliation' with nationalities that had faced the terror of the 
Nazi regime."15 The peace movement in Europe aimed mainly at maintaining 
peace and strengthening peaceful relations between nation states that had 
recently been at war with one another. 
The peace movement in the US, and later Australia and New Zealand, was a 
people's reaction against the social injustices of a hegemonic 'superpower' 
dominating and controlling a conflict in which it was perceived to have no real 
part, either politically or culturally. The involvement of Australia and New 
Zealand as allies of the US was vehemently, and often violently, opposed by the 
peace movement in those countries as both governments moved to strengthen 
military and strategic relations with the 'superpower'. Australian Prime 
Minister, Harold Holt, famously declared Australia's increased involvement in 
the Vietnam War in 1966 by stating that Australia would go "all the way with 
LBJ"; and during the controversial 1968 presidential visit to Australia, when 
anti-war demonstrators lay on the road in front US President Lyndon 
B.Johnson' s motorcade through Sydney, NSW Premier Robin (later Sir Robert) 
Askin, reputedly told the driver, "Drive over the bastards." The issue of peace 
during the 1960s transformed from an institutionalised grassroots movement to 
maintain security and peaceful relations in Europe, to a mass movement against 
the apparent course of Western liberal democracy. 
Participation and emancipation: the women's and civil rights movements 
_ In order for the emerging social movements to provide the foundations for a 
reconstruction of society, it required not only politicisation of the issues, but 
participation and empowerment of the citizemy. Participation and 
empowerment necessitated the removal of the discriminations and prejudices 
15 E.Papadakis The Green Movement in West Germany (Beckenham: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984) 135 
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that had been embedded in the previous social paradigm. Thus, within the 
cultural and social framework of the 1960s, the removal of discriminations 
included the liberation of women and African-Americans from social 
oppression and inequity. These emancipatory movements, which also began 
the polarisation towards the New Left16, formed the backbone of social change 
and provided a socio-political context for the environmental movement. The 
conservative values of the post-war androcentric paradigm allowed for a 
limited and exclusive dominant social aspect. Black and white America were 
officially segregated until the congressional passage of the Civil Rights Act 1964, 
the first of a number of federal laws that overrode racially discriminatory state 
legislations, especially in the southern states. Aboriginal Australians were 
denied suffrage until 1962 and excluded from census figures until 1967 and the 
practice of removing mixed-race aboriginal children from their families 
continued throughout the 1960s. In the post-World War II years as men 
returned from military service and resumed civilian employment, women who 
had entered the workforce during the war returned to the home: the population 
boom, generally large families and the social emphasis on conservative tradition 
kept them there during the 1950s. The mould, however, was cracked. As the 
political pendulum swung towards the left, groups that had been denied 
political or social empowerment began to seize the opportunity for liberation. 
By the early to mid-1960s the first of the post-war 'baby boomers' were 
entering the workforce; the long economic boom ensured that employment was 
plentiful, the 'populate or perish' proclamation of the 1950s was no longer an 
issue in terms of reproductive expectations (that is, child-bearing was no longer 
regarded as equivalent to patriotic duty), and girls, as well as boys, began to 
look to higher education and careers outside the home. As women's 
involvement in the anti-war and other movements increased, so too did their 
16 Tarrow (1998), op cit 
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awareness of social inequity and double standards, even within the movements 
themselves17. Sexually, specifically in regard to childbirth, contraception and 
abortion, the early women's movement exposed inequalities in terms of a 
patriarchal dominance over women's bodies and expressed these politically: 
Our lack of control over our own bodies matches the workers' s (sic) 
lack of control over production.18 
The left' s empowerment of the workers paralleled the empowerment of women, 
allowing the left and the women1 s movement to become interlinked during the 
period of rapid social change. 
Likewise, the oppression of black Americans as a product of slavery from 
the 16th to the mid-19th centuries produced a movement whose objective was to 
end the dominance of the downtrodden by the ruling class. The civil rights 
movement differed from the women's movement in the violence and militancy 
that accompanied it, despite the advocacy of non-violence by its most 
recognised leader, Dr Martin Luther King Jm. King's 1963 Washington oration, 
"I have a Dream", became the mission statement of the civil rights movement, 
which, like the women's movement, broadened its focus as it progressed. The 
fact that King delivered this speech at the culmination of the 'March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom', symbolised the opening up of the 
movement to the rights of the oppressed, unemployed and disenfranchised19 
and not simply a restriction to equal rights for black Americans. The issue of 
civil rights was taken up on the university campuses where it became part of the 
mass social movement "against the goals of Western society and the functioning 
of the democratic political process."20 
While the labour movement was not a major force as a social movement 
17 A.Sebestyen (ed) '68, '78 '88: From Women's Liberation to Feminism (Bridport: Prism Press, 1988) 
18 S.Rowbotham Woman's Consciousness, Man's World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) 37 
19 P.Bailey Bringing Human Rights to Life (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1993) 
20 Dalton, Kuechler & Burklin "The Challenge of New Movements" in Dalton & Kuechler (eds) 
Challenging the Poli,tical Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 3 
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during the 1960s, its part in shaping and influencing the directions of the other 
social movements is acknowledged, as well as the influence it has had on 
political directions both during that time and subsequently. There is 
considerable commonality between the core values of the labour movement and 
those of all the social movements: the women's and civil rights movements 
embraced labour values in terms of equality in the workforce and trade unions 
campaigned against the Vietnam War and protested nuclear testing. It is with 
the environment movement that the labour movement had, and still has, its 
most contentious and vexed relationship. 
'Green bans' and the birth of the green movement in Australia 
During the early 1970s, the Builders Labourers' Federation (BLF), led by 
Jack Mundey, instigated a series of' green bans' across Sydney to halt urban 
development of areas of natural or historical significance, beginning with the 
now celebrated campaign to save Kelly's Bush in 197121 . Rather than the 
traditional view of nature as labour-utility from the standpoint of the left, 
Mundey believed that socially useful employment and a sustainable 
environment were concomitant values central to the labour movement22. When 
a group of middle-aged, middle-class women from Hunters Hill approached the 
State Executive of the BLF and requested the union's assistance in saving the 
. tract of bushland on the Parramatta River known as Kelly's Bush, some 
members of the executive resisted on grounds of class differences: 
'Why should we the working class be fighting to save open space for 
these well-heeled upper-class people from the fashionable suburb of 
Hunters Hill? There is nothing in it for our members.'23 
21 M.Burgmann & V.Burgmann Green Bans Red Union (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1998) 
22 V.Burgmann, Power and Protest (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993) 192 
23 J.Mundey "From Red to Green: Citizen-Worker Alliance" in Hutton (ed) Green Politics in 
Australia (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1987) 107 
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Mundey and several of his colleagues, however, regarded the issue as beyond 
the question of class, believing that the social issues associated with trade 
unionism and the environment were, in fact, closely aligned: 
In a modern society, trade unions must broaden their vision and 
horizons and become involved in wide-range social, political and 
environmental activities. The struggle for improvement in wages 
and conditions must continue, but the broader issues should be 
addressed. Not only has the trade union movement the right to 
intervene, it has the responsibility to do so.24 
This view, while strongly held and practiced during the early 1970s in the 
context of the 'green bans', lost both momentum and relevance a? the period of 
the social revolutions merged with a greening of social institutions: green 
democratisation. During the period of change, values and social values systems 
were forming the basis of a new socio-political paradigm. In intervening to 
protect areas of bushland and historic sites, Mundey and the BLF were not 
assuming new values; they were acting upon the values inherent in the 
movements themselves. The environment movement's belief in assigning moral 
standing to non-human species and the importance of the environment 
1nirrored the left's belief in social equality and the ownership of the means of 
production. The BLF recognised and took an ideological stand, perhaps for the 
first and last time, on the interrelationship between the human species and its 
environment. 
There is a further factor to consider regarding the labour movement's 
involvement in the social movements of the apocalyptic era: it was a period 
during which the dominance of conservative politics was generally in decline. 
The labour movement was part of a larger global movement of citizen-driven 
protest against the entrenched values system of establishment conservatism. 
The values espoused by the women's, peace, anti-war and environment 
24 ibid 107 
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movements were t0ose of the traditional left, altered, perhaps, to suit the 
specific issues being addressed. The labour movement's suppo~t for the 
environment movement was an extension of the workers' struggle against a 
class-dominated capitalist social and political structure. As green 
democratisation emerged to address environmental issues in the political 
forum, the new values system was influencing the socio-political process and 
the labour and environment movements consolidated separately in the context 
of the new process and the values and directions it represented. Mundey, now 
regarded as a major figure in the Australian green movement, believes that 
environmentalism has become largely class-based, with environmentalists 
JI generally the more enlightened of the middle-upper classes", while trade 
unions JI all too often confine themselves to mere economism"25 and he is critical 
of both groups for not concerning themselves with the issues of each other. 
Mundey' s criticisms are true in terms of the broader values systems of social 
movements, but it remains that in later political contexts, the trade union 
movement has come to regard the green movement as anathema to the working 
classes and a threat to employment and labour - a view encouraged by 
governments and corporations keen to ensure the two groups do not join forces 
again. 
To recapitulate briefly to Arlo Guthrie's P...lice's Restaurant, if a large number 
of people profess a certain opinion or belief contrary to that of the socio-political 
establishment, that belief may be called a 'movement' (JI fifty people a day" in 
the song). If a considerably smaller number of people (JI three people" according 
to Guthrie) profess that belief, it would be an ' organisation'. In the same way as 
preservationism gave rise in the late 19th century to the Sierra Club and the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, during the 196Os and early 7Os 
organisations formed within the broad churches of the social movements to 
25 ibid. 106 
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represent factions or to take direct action on specific concerns and issues arising 
as a result of social mobilisation and change. Decisions on courses of action to 
be taken to address certain issues were no longer solely the premise of 
government or institutions. Organisations which had at their disposal not only · 
the unswerving belief of their membership in the value of the issue, but also 
expertise, filled the vacuum created as institutionalised decision-making 
weakened against public opposition to an increasingly unpopular war, and the 
mobilisation of emancipatory movements. While some sub-movement 
organisations were small with a narrow focus and limited social appeal, others 
almost became movements in themselves and, like the ecological organisations 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many have endured as institutions 
dedicated ~o particular causes. Within the women's movement, for example, 
the National Organization for Women (USA) and the Women's Electoral Lobby 
(Australia), representing the moderate end of the movement, both formed in 
1972 specifically to raise awareness of women's issues within the political 
process26 . The civil rights movement provided the ideological umbrella for 
organisations representing the rights of specific minority groups, such as 
homosexuals, indigenous people and religious or ethnic minorities. Far from 
weakening the structure of the movements, sub-movement organisations have 
meant that the ideology can be more inclusive and more focused in its aims. 
Many within the movements, in particular the women's and, to a degree, the 
peace movements have deliberately rejected the notion of any single, centralised 
body to represent the movement as an institution, arguing instead in favour of 
local action and specific-function groups and organisations27. 
The environment movement, which emerged in protest against the 
destruction of the environment and the overuse of chemicals and pesticides, 
26 V.Burgmann (1993) op cit. 83 
27 R.Dalton The Green Rainbow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 
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broke into "at least seven distinct 'streams"' 28 of protest and action. While each 
of these streams represented a specific environmental concern and produced 
various organisations to act on those concerns, they also represented points on 
the ideological spectrum from the moderate to the radical extremes of the 
environmental movement. In terms of the growing green movement, the early 
campaigns such as Little Desert and Colong Caves, provided a raising of 
ecological awareness and a consciousness of the environment, particularly 
among urban dwellers, which served as the foundation for action in the later 
movement. The green bans, while initiated at a localised level, through the 
involvement of the BLF expanded to unite people across a much broader front, 
thereby drawing upon issues, not only of ecological integrity, but of social and 
economic justice. In addition, there was recognition of diversity within the 
movement as well as the greater recognition of a common goal, a fact which 
became evident in the campaigns for Terania and Lake Pedder which were 
orchestrated not by local communities, but across a broad spectrum. As the 
. green bans extended from the Kelly's Bush campaign to other successful 
campaigns in the Royal National Park and the historic Rocks area of inner 
Sydney the green movement grew broader and stronger, with local campaigns 
and organisations forming and drawing upon the movement ideology. 
Two of the early organisations to emerge internationally from the green 
movement were Earth First! and Greenpeace, the former occupying the radical 
end of the spectrum and the latter, as indicated by the name, taking a more 
holistic and slightly less radical view of campaigning on environmental and 
peace issues, defined in combination by Pakulski as "ecopax"29 . Organisations 
within movements, however, do not necessarily represent those movements 
other than from the standpoint of basic values. Furthermore, while the 
28 J.Pakulski Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991) 
159 
29 ibid. 158 
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women's movement resisted institutionalisation of the movement, choosing to 
work through smaller organisations with differing ideological positions but 
similar values, the ecopax movement, from the early 1970s, moved, perhaps 
unconsciously, towards a centralised ideological structure. This structure 
ultimately emerged in the form of the Greens political party, which, while 
criticised by the more radical end of the movement for its moderation, has 
become synonymous with the values inherent in its social movement origins. 
The political appropriation of social movement values 
In order to establish a definite politico-ideological connection between 
separate social movements and organisations, it is useful to examine the 
normative values common across all the social movements and which 
ultimately formed the ideological foundation for a 'green' politics. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the 'values' in question are not regarded as having been 
created by the social movements, but are defined after Midgley30 as being 
already embedded in the specific cultures to which they belong: 
No human being ... can possibly find himself going out to shop for 
values for the first time, without any idea what he is after. He 
cannot be a Creator who, before creating, would have to decide what 
wants to create in himself. (The notion of' creating values' is a piece 
of nonsense - all that anyone can do is to adjust, develop, and extend 
them.)31 
Given that according to this definition, values exist socially a priori, it follows 
that the questions that arise are not whether or not to have a certain value, but 
whether to ascribe a higher priority to one value over another. In an evolving 
30 Mary Midgley Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (Hassocks: The Harvester Press Ltd., 
1978) 
31 ibid. 183 
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postmaterialist values-based society32, certain values occur as common bases of 
understanding across movements that may have different stated aims. The 
aims are not the same as values. Aims exist as the cognitive functions of an 
underlying system of enduring values33. Thus, while a phase-out of nuclear 
power exists as an aim of the anti-nuclear movement, it is based on the value 
ascribed by that movement to safety and security. The phase-out of nuclear 
power plants has,.in itself, no value. 
A compilation of core social movement values from a review of the 
literature34 found the following values common to all, although not in the same 
order of priority (and presented in no specific order here): 
• Social justice (including issues of equity) 
• Peace 
• Participatory democracy 
• Nature - care for the earth and considerability of life systems 
• Post-materialism 
The picture that emerges is firstly, a socio-political position closely aligned with 
the left; and secondly, very close to the values which the Greens state as the 
foundation stones of green politics: ecological democracy, peace, social and 
economic justice, and grassroots (participatory) democracy. As the era of 
protests and social movement demonstrations began to wane in the early to 
.... ... - . 
,, . . 
. - . . 
- . 
mid-70s, a new battery of issues arose that could not be solved by taking them 
to the streets. Apocalypticism had created a heightened awareness of the 
earth's mortality and the futility of unchecked industrial progress and 
militarism, but it offered no solutions of its own. Conditions were created for 
the emergence of a new socio-political institutional paradigm for decision-
32 Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, Value Change in Global Perspective (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Ronald Inglehart "Globalization an Post-Modern Values", 
The Washington Quarterley, Winter 2000 
33 Ronald Inglehart "Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization in new Social Movements" in 
Dalton & Kuechler (1990), op cit, 43 
34 A.Naess (1973); E.Papadakis (1984); R.Inglehart (1990 & 2000); H.Kitschelt (1990); J.Pakulski (1991); V.Burgmann (1993); R.Dalton (1994);P.Abramson & R.Inglehart (1995); S.Tarrow (1998); 
T.Tenbensel (1998) 
64 
making. While the social movements generally rejected the established political 
order, their ultimate instituationalisation was required in order to politically 
advance the values they promoted. While the political pendulum swung from 
the conservative preservationist era to the more radical apocalypticist era, the 
question that emerged from the social movements was whether politics in any 
established form could resolve the issues of greatest concern: an ecological 
crisis, human rights, global security, the threat of nuclear war. All of which 
concerns were, by the early 1970s, moving closer together under one, left-
aligned, eco-political umbrella. 
What, then, influenced the progression of environmentalism from social 
movement to political actor? The key is the institutional framework. The 
undermining of the established political order, such as which occurred during 
the social revolution of the 1960s and 70s, can provide the space for society to 
reinvent its political institution according to the new set of socio-political 
circumstances. Papadakis35 indicates the centrality of political institutions in 
influencing the directions of social change and Putnam36 argues the causal role 
of history in shaping political institutions and associated social change. A 
particular event, however, can be causally connected to a particular effect 
without it being a cause of that effect37 and therefore, while tradition is 
influential in social change, it cannot be held to have caused specific changes. In 
the case of the social and political traditions of which preservationism was part, 
their temporal relationship to the rise of the social movements and the 
subsequent socio-political revolutions of the 1960s influenced but did not cause 
the social and institutional changes that occurred subsequently. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, culturally, certain elements of 
preceding paradigms are maintained independently of the changes which are 
35 Papadakis, Environmental Politics and Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 
36 Putnam (1993) cited in ibid. 27 
37 Hausman, 1984. "Causal Priority", Nous Vol.18 No.2, pp .261-279 
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embedded in emerging paradigms. This is the case with the social revolution 
that succeeded preservationism and preceded the emergence of green 
democratisation. While certain cultural traditions were challenged and 
overturned in the social revolution that followed, for example, the 
androcentrism and racial segregation that were embedded social norms in pre-
1960s Western society, others, such as nationalism, the hegemony of the nation 
state, and the value of organisations as channels of public opinion, were 
retained. Social revolutions can lead change insofar as they give rise to the 
organisations and restructured institutions that effect long-term decision-
making. In the case of the environmental movement, the formation of 
Greenpeace and Earth First!, among other organisations, was a function of the 
social revolution. The organisations began to fill the void left by the weakened 
state of the established institutional framework in the face of social dissent. 
The catchcry of the social revolutionary movements, "power to the people", 
was more than a rallying cry. Absolute power of the state does not exist in 
Western liberal democracies, and therefore, it follows that there are significant 
power relations and transfers of power within the institutionalised structure of 
the state. The notion of the transfer of power from the state to the citizemy has 
been explored by social theorists including Weber, who believed that the 
absence of institutional constraints favoured the power of society over the 
power of the state. The concept of authority, on the other hand, was essentially 
institutionalised power vested in a specific individual or group38• Given this 
definition, the weakening of a dominant socio-political system provides the 
opportunity for the people to seize power, but there is an absence of authority 
until the restructuring of the central institutions. The post-preservationist 
events of the 1960s and their effects support this theory. Undeniably, there was 
considerable power in the social movements that swung the political pendulum 
38 Max Weber Basic Concepts in Sociology, trans. H.P.Secher (London: Peter Owen, 1962) 
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to the new left, rallied against the Vietnam War, fought for the emancipation of 
black Americans and the liberation of women and protested nuclear power and 
weapomy. There was, however, no authority in these movements. 
Social change cannot occur in an authority vacuum and requires the 
centrality of the socio-political institution. With the undermining of state 
authority in the mid-1960s to early-1970s, sub-movement organisations emerged 
to legitimise, and thus centralise, the power of the social movements. 
Organisations became their own institutions, with covenants and guiding 
principles and, ultimately, a hierarchy of decision-making power within the 
structure. It is worth noting here that one of the founders of Greenpeace, Paul 
Watson, left that organisation and founded Sea Shepherds in 1977 when the 
former began to appear more as a green bureaucracy than a radical 
environmental organisation39 • As the social movements grew in strength, the 
need for a single centralised institution to advance their values to the level of 
social change arose. As noted earlier in this chapter, certain social movements 
resisted this move towards centralisation, preferring to concentrate power in 
smaller organisations. Environmentalism, having largely distanced itself from 
its purely ecological origins and reformed as a social movement, absorbed the 
values of the other major movements and, by 1972, was beginning to structure 
itself as a political force. The formation of the United Tasmania Group and the 
New Zealand Values Party during that year followed as a logical consequence 
and a direct effect of the refining of the values system that defined the 
movement and its representation. 
It is appropriate to briefly delineate the differences between social 
movements as precursors of social change, and the concept of civil 
disobedience. Henry David Thoreau wrote the acclaimed eponymous essay in 
1849, four years after the publication of Walden, his ecocentric treatise on living 
39 F.Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1991) 30 
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in harmony with nature. These two works, probably his most famous, indicate 
that he is not so much political radicat revolutionary or anarchist as he is a 
utopian 40. In the opening statement of Civil Disobedience: 
I heartily accept the motto - 'That government is best which governs 
least'; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and 
systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I 
believe - 'That government is best which governs not at all'; and . 
when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government 
which they will have ... 41 
Thoreau sets out not an ideological struggle against the state, but a reflective 
and largely dispassionate critique of the effectiveness of institutional 
government as a general notion. In the context of the breakdown of 
preservationism, of which Thoreau himself was a member, and the social 
movements that occurred over a century after his essay was published, the 
concept of civil disobedience is, quite literally, 'old paradigm'. It does not seek 
to do without laws or government, but to transfer the centrality of those laws 
and government from the state to the people. There is no political ideology 
present in Thoreau's essay. It is apolitical and non-ideological. A social 
revolution, such as the uprising of the students in Paris in 1968, the March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963, and the Aboriginal Tent Embassy 
established in Australia in 1972, represent not an apolitical critique of 
government generally, but a protest against government failure to resolve 
certain social issues. Failure of gover1:111ent, perceived by society, is 
commensurate with actual failure since government acting as representative of 
the people must be perceived by those it purports to represent as fulfilling its . 
defined role. Where a society perceives failure in a government, that 
government is deemed to have failed in actuality. A social movement is not 
civil disobedience; it is power exercised in the failure, absence, or much 
40 Bedau (ed) Introduction Civil Disobedience (New York: Pegasus, 1969) 
41 Thoreau, 1849. "Civil Disobedience" in ibid. 27 
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weakened state, of central authority. Furthermore, just as the concept of civil 
disobedience describes a shift in the legitimacy of government from state to 
citizenry, social movements demand the restructuring of government according 
to the values system that the social movements adopt. The aim of civil 
disobedience is not social change. 
The personal is political 
The final aspect to be examined in the context of social movements leading 
political change is that of the 'personal as political', or the conscience as factor 
for change. Values held as central to a certain social paradigm consist of theory 
as well as the perceptual experiences of its constituents: perceptual experience, 
by definition, is personal. During periods of change, challenges to those core 
values force changes within the theoretical bastion, which in turn, affect related 
experiential factors. Commonly held perceptions among groups of individuals 
create a certain reality that then exemplifies that group as a whole. In science 
this may be based on the epistemological foundations of the discipline, for 
example, the perceptual experiences of the scientific community during the 
dominance of Ptolemaic astronomy were that (a) the sun appeared to move 
across the sky on a diurnal basis and (b) that this observation was supported by 
the astronomical calculus of Ptolemy42 • In a socio-political context, collective 
perceptual experiences are based on social trends, economic factors, political 
ideology and leadership, and values systems. It is this experiential element of 
social and political change that gave rise to the phrase, coined during the rise of 
the women's movement in the 1960s and largely applicable to the values system 
that emerged from the apocalyptic era: 'the personal is political'. 
42 The example of Ptolemaic astronomy was used by T.S.Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3 rd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
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The women's movement was based on the collective perceptual experience 
of women as actors in the 'private' or 'personal' domain largely excluded from 
the 'public' or 'external' domain of politics as defined by male constructs of 
their own collective perceptual experience 43• The traditional roles of women as 
nurturers and homemakers were essentially carried out in the private domain of 
the home, while male roles were carried out in the public domain. Socially 
'meaningful' work was that which was carried out in the public domain; 
political decision-making was based on the needs and requirements of society as 
viewed in the public domain. At a social level, women operated within the 
unseen and therefore unconsidered private domain while political decisions 
were designed with the public, and therefore male-dominated, domains as the 
benchmark. The women's movement sought to liberate women from the 
invisibility of the private domain and claim equal 'public' standing with men: 
The rediscovery of our early perception of ourselves and our own 
sexuality entered politics - not as a theoretical question but as a 
passionate and practical demand ... This helped us to connect a 
sense of femaleness to our sense of ourselves as political animals.44 
The concept of the personal as political, however, had, and has, far wider 
ramifications in terms of the broad range of social movements as agents of social 
change than just the liberation of women from the private domain of political 
disenfranchisement. 
Given that a social movement comprises a large number of individuals 
acting together for a common purpose, that is, sharing common perceptual 
experience, it follows that the personal experiences of the members of a 
movement become factors in social and political change. The common personal 
perceptual experiences of women led to a political movement that manifested in 
public and politically-motivated acts such as women chaining themselves to 
43 Rowbotham (1973), op cit.; also Plum wood Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: 
Routledge, 1993) 
44 Rowbotham (1973), op cit. 23 
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public bars45 and bra-burning. Where the women's movement brought personal 
perceptual experience into the public domain1 it also became central to other 
social movements and there was considerable correlation between the 
experiential perceptions driving social mobilisation across a number of issues. 
Papadakis notes the proportionately high involvement of women in the peace 
and anti-nuclear movements and suggests the plausibility that the 
11 
commitment of women in the peace movement is related to the burden of 
bringing a child into a world whose future existence depends on the success or 
failure of the threat of nuclear war ."46 The continuing commitment of women1 
disproportionately to men1 to environmental issues is indicated in the 
demographic statistics of groups surveyed for this thesis and presented in 
Appendix 1. In the context of the case study for this thesis1 the Snowy campaign 
was also largely driven by women. 
Burgmann observes that the involvement of women in campaigns against 
war has historical roots and cites the Women's Peace Army and Women's 
International League for Peace and Freedom during World War 147 • In terms of 
social movements and the values they represent, the affinity between the 
women's movement and the peace and anti-nuclear movements extends to a 
protest of all forms of violence. 
Feminist analyses also suggest that patriarchy and masculinity are 
not only responsible for the everyday violence endured by women 
but also for militarism in general. This sentiment is expressed in 
feminist anti-militarist slogans that question the aggressive 
behaviour of nation-states and their leaders, such as 'Take the Toys 
45 Merle Thornton and Elaine Dignan famously chained themselves to the public bar of the 
Regatta Hotel in Brisbane in 1965 to protest the law preventing women from drinking in public. 
Dr Kay Saunders (1999) described this as "the first really important social act of defiance of 
women" (http:/ /www.abc.net.au/n1/relig/enc/stories/s68263.htm) 
46 Papadakis (1984) op cit. 135 
47 Burgmann (1993) op cit. 
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from the Boys', and in Senator Janet Pow ell's recent comment that 
the Gulf War was 'testosterone-driven'.48 
Peterson and Runyan further noted that, "perhaps the newest form of women's 
political action is in the area of saving the environment."49 When it is 
considered that the environment and environmental health are closely related to 
human health, and that this is a basic and primary security concern for women 
globally50, it is hardly surprising that women are in the vanguard 
of environmental campaigns. In the case of dammed rivers, such as the Snowy, 
there are added spatial and temporal elements of loss and the traditional role of 
women as carers. 
The personal fear of many people of nuclear war and their opposition to the 
war in Vietnam, stemming, in many cases, from graphic images in televised 
news broadcasts, was collectively brought into the public and political domains 
as a social reaction to the personal fear and repugnance of war, both actual and 
potential. Conscientious objection to war is a matter of personal choice and 
ethics: a person's choice to refuse a state directive to participate in military 
service is a private choice and dependent upon that person's beliefs, moral 
sense, opinions and other affective indicators. Religious beliefs may be a factor, 
but equally could fear of death or injury. In many anecdotal cases, particularly 
with regard to the two world wars, conscientious objectors were accused of 
cowardice, but the choice and the right to make that choice, nevertheless, 
remained personal, a matter of conscience and unquestioned in the public 
domain. During the period of the social movement uprising conscientious 
objection moved from the personal domain to the public as 'draft dodgers' 
publicly burnt their draft cards, thus making a political statement of a personal 
decision and a collective statement of perceptual experience. 
48 ibid 231 
49 V.Peterson and A.Runyan, Global Gender Issues (Westview: Boulder, 1993) 142 50 B. Reardon, Women and Peace: Feminist V isions of Global Security (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993) 
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Nature, environmentalism and political evolution 
If the notion of conscience driving moral decisions at a personal level, and 
perceptual experience linking conscience with social change is evident at the 
fundamental level of social values such as peace and social security, it is more 
complex when applied to the nature of ecology. The preservationist values 
established in the era of ecological thought characterised by the writings of 
Thoreau and Leopold held nature to be of intrinsic value and therefore worth 
preserving for that reason alone, and also of value to the human 'soul' as a place 
of reflection, relaxation and retreat. There was a consciousness of the 
interrelationship between humankind and nature and, on a personal level, 
individuals such as those writers who defined the preservationist body of 
thought, believed the preservation of wilderness to be right. This does not 
necessarily accord to the belief that nature itself is morally considerable,· but that 
it is moral to consider the worth of nature. There was not only a consciousness 
about nature, but a conscience in the most literal sense of the word: where the 
prefix 'con' is understood to mean, definitionally, combination or union, the 
human conscience represents a union between human subject and scientific or 
rational object. In the environmental context, the science of ecology drawn in 
combination with the moral sense of humankind. 
The publication of Silent Spring changed the nature of the consciousness 
from a belief in the worth of nature to an awareness of its fragility and 
limitations. This awareness also sharpened the focus of the human conscience 
with regard to the moral standing of nature and the morality of human activities 
within the broader concept of the environment. Apocalypticism underlined 
ecological consciousness with an admonition and a caution: the collective 
human conscience had every reason to feel guilty about the condition of the 
natural environment. For every poisoned river and chemical dump there was a 
direct human cause. The degradation of nature was seen as a direct reflection of 
the degradation of the human conscience. The preservationist view of nature, 
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had been positive and self-affirming but asymmetrical, that is, nature existed as 
areas of wilderness and pristine bushland entirely separate from human 
activities: humans related to nature on human terms; nature, being non-human, 
could not relate to the human sphere. Nature was not perceived as being the 
river into which chemicals from a paint factory were dumped, or the peri-urban 
countryside marked for development as a housing estate. Development, 
industry and economic activity belonged in the public domain, while nature, 
essentially, was private. 
The ecological consciousness that arose with the social movement period 
altered the collective perceptual experience of nature dramatically and 
irrevocably. Human consciousness of nature changed from that of a place - real 
or imagined - apart from human civilisation, to the place wherein all civilisation 
exists. Ecology, at this point, ceased to be simply the science of the 
interrelationships between living things and became fully understood as the 
total sphere of human existence: The Environment. Whereas as individuals, all 
humans held a consciousness of nature as a personal perceptual experience, as a 
society, there was no collective conscience that held certain activities of human 
civilisation to be morally right or wrong in regard to the interrelationship 
between humankind and the environment. The environment simply existed as 
a resource to be harnessed or tamed, admired or developed according to 
requirements, while nature, or wilderness, was perceived as having both 
intrinsic and extrinsic value and therefore worth preserving. Nature as the 
private domain of personal consciousness, in order to be saved from inevitable 
doom, of necessity had to become the domain of the public (guilty) conscience. 
Environmentalism as a social, and therefore public, ideal, replaced ecology as 
the understanding between humankind and nature. 
Environmentalism, as collective conscience, was the green manifestation of 
the personal becoming political through a social movement. Preservationist 
socio-political doctrine and practice failed to adequately answer the questions 
that arose as a result of Silent Spring because the environment had been 
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perceived only in the private and essentially non-political domain as nature. 
Theodore Roszak argues that an unchecked individually-based ideology has 
itself allowed for the excesses of Marxism: 
It is the excesses of the individual which have at last generated the 
vindictive excesses of the collectivist ideologies. The bourgeois 
tradition of individualism has taught us to regard all concern for the 
self as ... "selfish". Whether we regard selfishness as a vice or a 
precious right, it has for generations been the whole moral content of 
self-awareness. There has seemed no way to be interested in the self 
that is not an expression of "self-interest" in the crudest, Social 
Darwinian sense. Individualism has laid a dark and stubborn curse 
upon all forms of self-discovery, making them seem feeble apologies 
for social injustice, political elitism.51 
While Roszak argues in favour of a communitarian model in the monastic 
tradition, the modern social movements moved towards politicisation of the 
issues in the public domain where institutional governance was weak, rather 
than cooperative and community-based problem solving. 
The environment movement, in socialising, politicising and publicising the 
personal domain of nature, was the collective response to the apocalyptic 
predictions of Carson, Hardin, Ehrlich and others. The collective response, 
however, was not itself rooted in science or rationality. Social movements are 
essentially a collectively voiced public response to the inability of the central 
governing authority to address a certain crisis within the socio-political 
paradigm and are not necessarily rational in the objective, scientific sense. The 
green bans of the New South Wales BLF were political, not scientific. This is the 
underlying reason they appear as an aberration within the left-wing ideology of 
the trade union movement. While the aim of the green bans was without doubt 
the conservation of natural and historical areas, the values on which the 
methodology was based were the left-wing ideals of the ownership of the means 
51 Theodore Roszak Person/Planet (New York: Anchor Books, 1979) 105 
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of production. Whilst this was achieved in the context of the environment 
movement during a period of social change and institutional weakness, it was 
not sustainable as a left-wing ideal during the later period of green 
democratisation and integration. Ecology, as the science of the 
interrelationships between living things, did not exist as part of the 
environment movement except as the catalyst for broad social awakening. 
Environmentalism and political process 
By the mid-1970s, the values of the social movements were influencing 
political decision-making and the political bureaucracy was beginning to reflect 
the changing needs and demands of society. The election of the Whitlam 
government in Australia in 1972 became the catalyst for change, with the 
immediate withdrawal of Australian military personnel from Vietnam, 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and 
the establishment of a Women's Affairs section in the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and subsequent appointment of a Prime Minister's 
Assistant on Women's Issues. The formation of green political parties from 1972 
saw the beginning of the transition from the disorder of mass social movements 
to a new order of green democratisation; a transition signified by the election of 
the first Green parliamentarians in West Germany in 1979. The acceptance into 
social and political institutions of values such as gender and racial equity, 
rejection of war, and the moral consideration of the environment represented a 
strengthening of the central institution necessary for governance and legislative 
decision making. Where the values represent a socially-driven solution to 
previous social instability, their influence on governmental structure indicates a 
lessening of direct public political participation and a return to centralised 
authority. 
The shift from apocalypticism to green democratisation and integrationism 
was complete in Australia in March 1983, with the election of the Hawke Labor 
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government in Australia on a promise to override the Tasmanian Government 
under external affairs legislation to prevent the damming of the Franklin River 
in the state's wild south-west region. Ironically, these were the same powers 
invoked by Chifley in 1949 to place the Snowy Mountains Scheme under 
Commonwealth control in order to facilitate the damming of a river. The 
environmental campaign to save the Franklin from the pro-development nexus 
of the conservative state government led by Premier Robin Gray and the 
powerful Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission became the most famous 
environmental campaign in Australia. At its height in the early 1980s the 
campaign became international news and environmental activists from all over 
the world joined the blockades. In 1982 there were over 1200 arrests, including 
Bob Brown and Christine Milne, both later elected to the Tasmanian Parliament 
as Green Independents (later the Tasmanian Greens), and the campaign 
generated such unprecedented public support that Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser was forced to declare the area a World Heritage site as an interim 
measure52• The 1983 High Court ruling that the Federal government's external 
affairs powers II allowed Federal legislation giving domestic effect to 
international treaties, such as the World Heritage Convention, to prevail53" was 
a highly significant environmental victory. It raised the Franklin River to iconic 
status, and also drew to a close, for almost 20 years, the era of major protests 
and social movement mobilisation in western liberal democratic states54 • 
The influence that social movement values had on liberal democratic 
ideology virtually extinguished the fire of apocalyptic discontent. The crises of 
ecological degradation, overpopulation, inequality and insecurity appeared to 
be addressed through measures such as ecologically sustainable development, 
ecological modernisation, the end of the Cold War, and anti-discrimination 
52 T.Doyle Green Power (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2000) 129 
53 Tighe, quoted in ibid. 130 
54 The pro-democracy protest movement was active in Eastern Europe until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 90s, and remains active in China despite (or perhaps 
because of) the government-military crackdown in Tiannanmen Square in 1989 
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legislative mechanisms ensuring equal opportunities for women and minority 
groups. 
Recent history in Australia with the emergence of the second wave 
of feminism, the Women's Electoral Lobby and the Women's Party, 
the environment movement, the Australian Green Party, the peace 
movement, the indigenous people's campaign for reconciliation, gay 
and lesbian rights, all demonstrate that these progressive movements 
are within the new definition of politics - local, specific, less visible 
but new forms, instituting ways of doing politics differently.55 
It is within this 'new definition of politics', represented by the Green political 
parties, that green democratisation and integrationism have assumed many of 
the values inherent in the social movements and become the means by which 
these are consol~dated in political practice through policy. From the early 1980s 
then, Green politics has presented institutionalised solutions to the crises of 
environmental degradation, security and human rights. By the very nature of 
institutionalised solutions, these represent compromise between public concern 
and political process. 
It is necessary, however, in order for social and political progress to be 
effected, that the parameters of the dominant paradigm are not held to be the 
panacea for all questions that arise. As was the case with preservationism in the 
middle of the 20th century, green democratisation and integrationism have not 
adequately addressed the range of crises that have arisen from the social and 
environmental circumstances at the turn of the century. Where 
institutionalisation saw the bureaucratisation of environmentalists and the new 
conservatism of the women's movement, that institutionalisation itself has 
created a new set of problems in areas of environmental health and social and 
economic justice that integrationism cannot address. Tarrow argues that 
55 Christine Milne MHA, 1997. "Making the difference for the new millenium", The Pamela 
Denoon Lecture, Canberra 6th March 1997 
http:/ /www.wel.org.au/ announce/ denoon/97milne.htm 
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revolutions occur in cycles when a successful challenge to the dominant political 
structure by a: 
... previously disadvantaged actor simultaneously (1) advertises the 
vulnerability of authorities, (2) provides a model for effective claim 
making, (3) identifies possible allies for other challengers, ( 4) alters 
the existing relations of challengers and power holders to each other, 
and (5) thereby threatens the interests of yet other political actors 
who have stakes in the status quo, thus activating them as 
well.56 
The strength of integrationism has become its greatest weakness: the 
drawing of an environmental agenda into policy, under the broad umbrellas of 
ecological modernisation and ecologically sustainable development, has created 
a new set of problems directly related to the functions of the political economic 
system. The so-called 'greening' of democracy that provided such policy 
mechanisms as the 'precautionary principle' and 'polluter pays' has also turned 
the environment into a marketable commodity. This is the crisis on which the 
environment movement, in a much weakened position through conformation to 
institutional principles, is now seeking resolution. Socio-politically, in many 
respects, the global situation now is similar to that of the apocalypticist era: the 
USA is engaged in an increasingly unpopular military action; nuclear weapons 
continue to proliferate in such nations as India and Pakistan, and, more recently, 
through additional weapons spending in the USA; there is increased concern 
for human rights issues; right wing political conserv~tism and populism are 
resurgent; and the earth is perceived as under imminent threat from global 
warming and overpopulation. 
While this new era has elements of apocalypticism, the scepticism that arose 
in response to the environmental doomsaying of the 1960s has resulted in more 
conservative and empirically-based predictions. Nonetheless, politically 
56 Tarrow (1998), op cit, 157 
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integrated environmentalism, while it provided short term success in 
addressing the problems of pollution and land degradation in such places as the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Germany and Japan57, has not stopped 
unsustainable industrialisation in China, unchecked oil consumption in the 
developed world, or provided a consensual global approach to greenhouse 
emissions. In the same way as the social movements began as separate 
entities and merged according to the global agenda, the current perceived crises 
of overpopulation, nuclear arms, global warming, genetic modification and 
human rights abuse are manifesting as separate movements against 
integrationism as a dominant system of. green politics. 
57 John Dryzek The Politics of the Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
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Chapter 3 
The environment as political actor and the problem of representation 
Man is by nature a political animal - Aristotle 
The preservationist context: nature without representation 
The -rise of left-wing politics in the 1960s from the right-wing dominance of 
the post~war era provided a springboard for the entry of a 'new' politics based 
on the fundamental ideology of the left. Proletarian ownership of the means of 
production has its contemporary manifestation in the righting of social and 
economic injustices and the redistribution of wealth from the top to the bottom 
of the social hierarchy. Peter Singer, taking his cue from the late animal rights 
activist and socialist, Hemy Spira, takes a broad view, believing that the left is: 
... on the side of the weak, not the powerful; of the oppressed, not 
the oppressor; of the ridden, not the rider ... That, I think, is what the 
left is all about.1 
The left does not accept that social inequalities are a natural phenomenon and 
that, no matter how wrong it may be, there is nothing that can be done. The left 
sees that situation as wrong and strives to redress it. Singer concedes, however, 
that the removal of a social hierarchy would be very difficult given that 
"hierarchical organisation of society is a common characteristic of the human 
species." 2 
Rousseau believed that the concept of inequality began when mankind 
moved from a hunter-gatherer society to an agrarian-industrial one. The 
acquisition and ownership of property led to the establishment of a workforce, 
which divided society into the owners of the means of production and those 
who provide the labour: 
1 P.Singer, A Danuinian Left: Politics, Evolution and Cooperation (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
1999) 8 
2 ibid. 39 
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But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of 
another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man 
to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property 
was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became 
srnilipg fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, 
and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow 
up with the crops.3 
While Rousseau accepts the inevitability of social inequities as evolutionary, he 
veers close to the reason the environmental movement has become aligned with 
the left, which, when considered in conjunction with Singer's broad view, sees 
nature as subject to the same inequalities with which human society organises 
itself. The difference is that while human society can choose to either accept or 
seek to redress injustice, nature has no choice. Rousseau's 'vast forests' became 
'smiling fields' without any arboreal consultation, and if mankind had to water 
the resultant fields 'with the sweat of his brow', that was his choice. In much 
the same way as socialism speaks for the downtrodden and exploited masses of 
humanity, seeking to break the capitalist bonds, environmentalism speaks for 
that aspect of a holistic community that is not able to speak for itself: nature. 
This chapter will examine the problem of the political representation of 
nature focusing on the emergence of the modern environment movement as a 
values-based social movement, the political ideology of ecologism, left-wing 
ideology, and the' greening of democracy'. To this end, it will be necessary to 
draw a clear distinction between ecology and environmentalism in terms of 
political aims, capacity for realising political objectives, institutional framework 
and ideology. The developments that have occurred within the green 
1novement itself and how these directly relate to and influence the socio-
3 Jean Jaques Rousseau, 11 A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of 
Mankind", The Social ~ontract and Discourses, trans. G.D.H.Cole (London: J.M.Dent& Sons Ltd., 
1973) 83 
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political revolutions that have shaped contemporary environmental thought 
will also be examined. 
The question of the political representation of nature is a political and 
ethical conundrum that will be addressed from the premise that the decision to 
afford political standing to the environment is (a) essentially anthropocentric, 
and (b) permanent and immutable. We cannot now hypothesise a 
contemporary theory of politics that does not involve some relativity to the 
environment if only for the simple reason that the environment, as argued by 
Jonathon Porritt, "provides the context within which all politicians operate." 4 
The environment has been inextricably bound to politics since the 19th century 
when preservationist era protagonists appealed to the American government to 
set aside areas of wilderness for either its own sake or for the recreational 
benefit of humans, and "preunification German lander and private business 
associations regulated water and air pollution."5 The constitution and rationale 
of ecological and environmental representation in political fora, however, have 
changed according to the rise of environmental crises, precipitating shifts in the 
dominant systems of thought and practice. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the predominant epistemological approach to 
nature during the preservationist period was through the study of ecology. The 
parameters that were set provided terms of reference whereby nature was 
deemed valuable for both its own sake, clearly evident in the writings of Muir 
and Thoreau, and also for the benefit of humans as both problematic and 
panacea to industrialisation and urbanisation. Ecology was the interface 
between the two modes of thought. It gave scientific weight to the often 
transcendental and insightful writings of the forerunners of deep ecology6 and 
allowed anthropocentric environmental protagonists empirical evidence of the 
4 J.Porritt Seeing Green (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) (original italics) 
5 T.Shull Redefining Red and Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) 12 
6 M.Oelschlaeger The Idea of Wilderness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) 
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importance of retaining areas of wilderness for the benefits of humankind. The 
preservationists, however, did not presume to speak for nature. They spoke for 
themselves according to their perceptions of nature. The long-running 
ideological feud between Muir and Pinchot7, taking diametrically opposed 
positions in the argument of what was best for nature and what was naturally 
best for humanity, reflected in the later Foreman-Bookchin8 debate, was an 
extension of these perceptions. In accordance with the preservationist dictum, 
both Muir and Pinchot saw the government as best equipped and most able to 
develop and enact laws to 'preserve' (in Muir's case) and 'manage' (in Pinchot' s) 
the natural environment. Preservationist values allowed for both these views as 
ecology was, after alt a science: the way in which humankind understood and 
related. to the natural environment. 
It was according to these principles that the Snowy Mountains Scheme was 
conceived as a means of best managing a valuable resource that would 
otherwise be wasted. As discussed in Chapter 1, the dualistic nature of the 
preservationist ethic is evident in the 1958-approach from the Australian 
Academy of Science to the SMHEA to set aside the area known as Kosciusko 
Tops as a 'primitive area' that would be preserved in its undeveloped natural 
state while full-scale alteration of the natural environment occurred around it. 
It is also significant that, given the long-term use of the Kosciuszko region by 
Indigenous people, and later for goldmining, sawmilling and summer grazing9, 
the romantic concept of 'undeveloped natural state' may be arbitrarily based on 
7 Discussed· in-Hay, Mahi Currents in Western Environmental Thought (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2002) 
and Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory (London: UCL Press, 1992) 
8 M.Bookchin and D.Foreman, 1991. "Searching for Agreement: A Dialogue Between Murray 
Bookchin and Dave Foreman// in VanDeVeer & Pierce (eds) The Environmental Ethics and Policy 
Book (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1994) 238-246 
9 Most of the goldmining in the region was finished by the late 1800s; sawmilling continued 
through the 1950s (Sawmill Creek, in the National Park near Perisher Valley so named for the 
industry); summer grazing of sheep ceased in 1949 after scientists raised concerns about soil 
conservation; and summer cattle grazing ceased in 1958 as an indirect result of the Kosciusko 
Tops 'primitive area' proposal. 
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specific ecological issues, such as soil conservation10 rather than the 
environment as total ecosystem. According to Mulvaney, a large part of the 
human attraction to the High Country is its cultural associations rather than 
purely its· ecological attributes11 . It is speculative to surmise, however, that part 
of the Academy's motivation in preserving the Kosciusko Tops was for cultural 
reasons, given the sound scientific reasoning behind the proposal. 
The need for representation 
The rise of social movements and the apocalypticist era of 
environmentalism created asocial dimension to ecology. This diJ?J-ension, 
· represented by the modern environment, or 'green' movement, acknowledged 
the damage that had been done by human society to nature and sought to 
prevent further damage. This diverged from preservationism in that the early 
era sought only to preserve that wilderness that remained untouched and did 
not recognise anthropic damage already caused to both natural and human 
environments as a threat to ecosystemic health. The green movement 
essentially recognised the human element in ecology: environmental problems 
are problems of society. Furthermore, whereas the preservationists saw 
government as a powerful ally to be influenced, the apocalypticists saw 
government as a weakened enemy to be imputed. In the same way as the civil 
rights and women's movements opposed the inequities that had held those 
groups in oppression under government policy, the environment movement 
took the same approach to the political attitude towards nature. Nature as 
oppressed political actor thus became part of the social dimension of ecology: 
the broadly termed and socially inclusive' environment'. 
-
10 L.Robin, Defending the Little Desert (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1998) 
11 J.Mulvaney, 1992. "The Alpine Cultural Heritage in Perspective", in Scougall ( ed) Cultural 
Heritage of the Australian Alps (Canberra: Alpine Alps Liaison Committee,1992) 9 
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Under the umbrella of a social movement the environment was accorded a 
position that ecology could not be accorded. It could be placed within a 
politico-institutional framework and imbued with legal status through proxy 
representation. The environment became an independent entity worthy of 
discussion on its own merits rather than in connection with something else. 
'Ecology' could not be easily imagined as a unit of being; 'the environment' 
could. A broad, complex unit of being, certainly, encompassing such diverse 
subjects as· whales; rainforests, polar icecaps, native grasses, uranium mines and 
urban parks, but a sirigle unit of beirig for the purposes of political arid legal 
status nonetheless. Within the broad parameters of such a conception, the 
environment movement changed the constructs of 'ecology' to virtual 
personification, evident in such terms, popularised during the apocalyptic era, 
as 'Mother Earth', 'Spaceship Earth' and 'Gaia'. In assuming this terminology, 
and the fact that Gaia was in danger of apparent total destruction, there existed 
a need for representation of that which could not speak for itself. 
In taking the role of environmental arbiter the environment movement and 
its political alliances, take the general position that nature and humans, in 
sharing the one community, are also subject to the same laws and justice and 
that, insofar as nature is not able to defend itself in the world of human justice, 
it requires the intermediary assistance of a social movement. An ecocentric 
analysis would place human society"ih the position of conforming to nature 
rather than nature requiring legal assistance in the human world. Leopold 
alluded to this predication in "The Land Ethic" when he described an ecological 
ethic as "a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence."12 
Natural order is not subject to human control, nor is it sensitive to human 
requirements. Pre-scientific man, when confronted by forces beyond his 
control, might have attributed flood, fire, famine, drought and other destructive 
12 Aldo Leopold A Sand County Almanac Special Commemorative Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 202 
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natural phenomena to the wrath of any one or number of deities who would 
need to be appeased before conditions became benign. Modern rational man 
simply tries to alter the natural situation to make it more suitable for human 
activity. Hence, the courses of rivers are altered to provide water where it is 
'needed'; snow is artificially made when nature 'fails' to provide sufficient for 
winter sports; and vegetation 'control' by burning occurs in Autumn to promote 
growth of the 'right' species in Spring and to reduce the 'hazards' of bushfires 
and snakes in Summer. Droughts and floods are not regarded as natural cyclic 
occurrences, but risks to be 'managed' . Nature's perceived shortcomings are 
addressed with maximum application of human technology. Thus, when the 
rain falls in September instead of November and the Australian wheat harvest is 
ruined, or an unseasonal frost wipes out the Brazilian coffee crop, or millions of 
cattle on the US Western plains are lost to drought, then 'fault' can be attributed 
to nature, not humankind, who has done everything humanly possible to avert 
such disasters. In human experience and understanding, nature is anarchic and 
arbitrary. There is no concept of fairness or retribution; good is not rewarded 
nor bad punished. If it is umealistic to expect nature to conform to human laws, 
it is likely just as umealistic to expect this natural order to apply in modern 
human society. 
With the weakening of the preservationist ideology and its political practice, 
the emergence of the environment movement created a new entity, 'the 
environment', the representation of which required a new approach, perception, 
set of laws and lines of demarcation. Within sectors of the environment 
movement there is a definite demarcation between what is 'nature' and what is 
'human' and a strong perception of the mutual exclusivity and incompatibility 
of the two. The broad social framework of the newly emergent environment 
movement in the wake of Silent Spring allowed for the demarcation between the 
'natural' and 'human' realms to be represented by the contesting green 
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dialogues of deep ecology and shallow environmentalism13. Ideologically, 
almost spiritually, based, the deep ecological perspective has remained largely 
outside the socially-based movement which has recognised the need for change 
in the way humankind interacts with nature. These changes, it was apparent 
from the outset, were social and required a revolution in order to recreate a 
central institutional strength that would address the need for change and effect 
such changes through legislation. 
Green movement discourses: deep and light green 
Deep ecology sought to remove the human-nature separation and place 
humankind, environmentally, on an equal footing with all other living 
creatures. Although essentially an anthropocentric concept rather than 
indicative of a natural evolutionary process, deep ecology represents a 
deliberate and philosophical move towards accepti11g nature as the central 
arbiter of all life rather than a world dominated by human technology. So while 
accepting the fundamental differences between human and biotic communities, 
the deep ecological philosophy respects the forces at work within non-human 
communities and seeks not to alter their natural course but to cooperate with 
them as a neighbour within the environmental community as a whole. Further 
to the constitution of communities, the concept of choice is instrumental in the 
way in which humans view their relative position in the environment. A 
human agent has a moral and political choice of how and where they conduct 
their lives. A deep ecologist chooses to take a specific moral position in regard 
to non-human species, while kookaburras, tapeworms and polar bears do not 
have the capacity, either environmentally or biologically, to alter their lives 
according tq ethical or political considerations. Equality of position is a human 
13 Sessions and Devall, 1985, "Deep Ecology" in VanDeVeer & Pierce, (1994) op cit.; also 
Bookchin, 1988, "Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology" in VanDeVeer and Pierce (1994) op cit. 
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invention, not an evolutionary or natural axiom. Accordingly, Arne Naess' s 
maxim of deep ecology, the "equal right to live and blossom"14, could easily be 
translated into the elusive 'level playing field' of modern political jargon. Deep 
ecology gives each living species only the right to an equal chance at survival, 
not the guarantee that this will translate into a long and fruitful life. The 
hypothetical le-yel playing field, likewise, gives only theoretical equal 
opportunity for political agents to survive in the socio-political jungle, with no 
guarantee of success. 
In political terms, then, it could thus be argued that the opposing views of 
the deep ecologists and the social environmental movement represent a 
variance that occurred within the green movement itself. Deep ecology 
eschewed a political position, ~eaning instead towards the natural flow of 
evolution and survival wherein humankind's position is of no greater 
consequence than that of other species or ecosystems, allowing nature to strike 
its own balance. The green movement, however, saw a political position as the 
only way of liberating nature from oppression in the same way as other 
umepresented groups required liberation, thus acknowledging the lack of 
balance between nature and humankind but allowing moral considerability to 
nature. The positioning of the environment in the social democratic political 
paradigm is a means of achieving an economy to serve the best interests of all 
humankind equally and not according to wealth or class, giving rise to such 
terms as, 'green economy', 'green development', 'green employment' and, more 
vaguely, 'greening politics'. However, while these may well comprise the 
foundation and platform of Green politics, they are not an ecocentric ideology. 
The separate green discourses of deep ecology and social environmentalism 
broadly define a number of other variances within the modern environment 
14 Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary", in 
Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader, Dryzek and Schlosberg, eds (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 353 
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movement that have both advanced its standing in the political arena, and 
hindered its progress in achieving aims. In much the same way as the fable of 
the blind Indians who, when asked to describe an elephant, all described the 
part of the animal they were able to conceptualise through touch, the green 
movement also has a number of different aspects according to those 
immediately affected. 'Saving the environment' is a very broad mission 
statement, but attempts to narrow it down or concentrate on simpler and more 
tangible aims are frequently met with opposition. Such political manifestations 
of environmentalism as eco-feminism, eco-socialism, eco-anarchism, eco-
fascism, fre·e market environmentalis1n and ecologically sustainable · 
development15 coexist as conflicting discourses under a wide, green umbrella. 
These sub-categories of environmentalism reflect the eclectic nature of the 
movement. Conflicting discourses, far from weakening the structure of a 
movement, provide it with a broad theoretical base from which to proceed 
towards social change. Within the early environmental movement, then, the 
reaction to the predicted imminent ecological apocalypse was multifarious and 
universal, adhering to the single principle of reversing the ecological apocalypse 
but beyond that, creating a broad environmental philosophy on which to build 
an eco-political structure. 
Tradition and value in the creation of a political ecology 
The basis of the green movement is values. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, in establishing a political basis, the social movements assumed a left-
wing political position. Apocalypticism itself was characterised by the 
weakening of the previous institutional model built on the values of a 
conservative political position and the emergence of social movements were 
accompanied by a resurgent left in response to the weakened right. While the 
15 T.Doyle Green Power (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2000) 
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ideology of the left was appropriate to the rise of movements supporting 
equality and iiberation, it was also a convergence of a number of social and 
political factors that created the opportune set of circumstances for a melding of 
left-wing political values and the need for social change. While the ethical 
position of the environment movement opposes humankind's domination of the 
environment at the expense of other species16, the traditional position of the left 
seeks to prevent capitalism from dominating and exploiting the proletariat. In 
both positions the basic measure is the constancy of resources to sustain all 
users equally: the ideal State of Nature. Far from the idyllic Eden visualised by 
the faithful, however, life in the State of Nature, be it the environmental or 
political State of Nature is indeed, as Hobbes postulated, 'nasty, brutish and 
short'. Politically, Darwinistic thought has given capitalism its basis for 
justification of economic and political hegemony. This, according, to Peter 
Singer, has been "fatally incompatible" with the left Darwin's theory of 
evolution" dashed the left' s Great Dream ( of) The Perfectibility of Man."17 
Environmentally, it is the theory of evolution that has allowed the human 
species to ascend the food chain to its position of dominance. Every species 
began on the level playing field at the dawning of Life on Earth, but the most 
adaptable species inevitably evolved in such a way as to dominate and tip the 
balance of life in its favdur. Ironically, it is natural selection and evolution that 
have put humankind at the top of the evolutionary pecking order along with 
our nuclear weapons, carbon emissions and global free trade. A return to a 
natural order, whereby humans become no more worthy or important than any 
other species, is, in fact, a contradiction in evolutionary terms. 
This is not to say, of course, that the human species cannot, or should not, 
look to values inherent in nature in order to address problems of their own 
making. Towards the end of the 20th century, with several hundred centuries of 
16 J.Porritt (1984) op cit; also Brown and Singer, The Greens (Melbourne: The Text Press, 1996) 
17 Singer (1999), op cit., 24 
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societal and technical development behind us, human predictions were that life 
within the biosphere would be unsustainable into the future unless we changed 
or altered the course of technical and industrial advancement. The United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was established in 1972 to address the 
growing body of scientific evidence that the future of human development was 
not ecologically sustainable. Industrialism, rather than a yardstick of human 
achievement, began to be regarded as having grown beyond the earth's capacity 
to maintain its expansion. 
Who, then, if anyone, is best qualified to speak for nature? While it is 
beyond question that the human species has a duty of care to the planet that 
supports us, what is not clear is how this duty should be executed or expressed. 
The green movement has generally assumed the task of representing nature, but 
the movement itself is a highly complex system and no single view within that 
system can be taken as representative of the movement as a whole. The very 
concept of representation of nature, also, is constantly haunted by the spectre of 
anthropocentrism, with humanity acting according to what is best for humans 
rather than nature or taking a patriarchal approach in presuming what is best 
for nature. With the weakening of the preservationist approach and the social 
revolution that followed, social movements sought to speak for, and liberate, 
oppressed groups of humans. It is a relatively simple theoretical task to 
recognise the suffering of other humans and act on their behalf to end that 
suffering or inequity, it is a quantum leap to recognise suffering and inequality 
in an unquantifiable concept and presume to speak on its behalf. Western (and 
many Eastern) religious traditions unashamedly take an anthropocentric view 
and assumes that what is good for humanity is good for nature, but in so doing, 
it draws a clear distinction between what is human and what is nature. Given 
that much of human culture is based on religion, it is relevant to examine the 
influence of religious values on environmentalism in terms of representation. 
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The influence and role of religious tradition 
There is a strong and vexatious connection between religion and 
environmentalism which has been instrumental in the alienation of nature from 
the realm of mankind. The Judaeo-Christian belief, enunciated in the Book of 
Genesis, that mankind has dominion over the natural environment is held by 
many to be fundamental to the view of the environment as a collection of 
resources for human use: 
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created 
them; male and female he created them. 
And God blessed them, and God said to them, 
'Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have 
dominion over the fish of the sea a..11.d over the birds of the air, and 
over every living thing that moves upon the earth.'18 
Passmore, drawing upon a dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus in 
Plato's Republic, points out that while the Old TestarrLent dictate has been 
interpreted as giving mankind absolute rights to the non-human environment 
and precludes the rights of non-human animals, an increasingly popular 
interpretation is that of the analogy of the shepherd, who tends his flock with 
only the well-being of his charges in mind19. Under this interpretation, mankind 
is given stewardship of the environment which he must nurture for the ultimate 
beneficence and judgment of God. Singer refutes this point, referring back to 
Genesis, where the dictate of dominion is repeated to Noah after the deluge 
wherein "the rest of creation was nearly wiped out to punish man for his 
wickedness" 20: 
And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them, Be fruitful 
and multiply, and replenish the earth. 
18 Genesis 1:26 
19 J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature (London: Duckworth & Co, 1974) 9 
20 P.Singer, Animal Liberation (London: Pimlico, 1995) 187 
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And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast 
of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth 
upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands 
are they delivered. 
Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as Lhe 
green herb have I given you all things.21 
Instilling the fear and dread of mankind into every non-human species on earth 
does not appear to be entirely in the spirit of a good shepherd tending his flock 
for the animals' well-being. Despite arguments that a love of all species is 
central to Christianity22, it remains that with the sole exception of St Francis of 
Assisi, there is no evidence in the Judaeo-Christian tradition that mankind has 
ever regarded, or been required to regard, nature as anything other than a 
storehouse of resources to be used exclusively for huinan ends and to which 
storehouse humans alone have been handed the key. 
Humankind, not ecology, is the foundation stone of Christianity, if not the 
broader Christian ethic as espoused by such writers as Linzey and Passmore. 
The com1.ection between Christianity, the Christian-based Western tradition in 
regard to the standing of nature and its political position is philosophically 
extrapolated by Kant, who wrote of mankind that: 
... [a]s the single being upon earth that possesses understanding, he 
is certainly titular lord of nature and, supposing we regard nature as 
a teleological system, he is born to be its ultimate end.23 
This accords with post-industrial and capitalist humankind's view of the 
purpose of the environment being purely for the benefit of the human species. 
Suppose, however, that we do not regard nature as a teleological system, but 
. -
. 
rather as one based on deontic logic? This would infer that humans have an 
21 Genesis 9:1, quoted in ibid. 
22 Rev.Dr A.Linzey, 1990. "For God So Loved the World", Between the Species, Vol.6 No.1, 
reprinted ill Van De Veer & Pierce (eds) (1994) op cit. 
23 Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, quoted ill Passmore (1974) op cit. 15 
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inherent duty towards the environment, and that, furthermore, actions 
involving nature would be based upon the constitution of 'right' as opposed to 
what would produce the best outcome. Deep ecologists might regard the 
environment thus;· as acting in the interests of goals or outcomes would impose 
a long-term value judgment on what constitutes 'good' in the context of nature 
which, as an entity, has no provision or ability itself for acting on the grounds of 
foresight or of morally judging a set of potential outcomes of that action. 
Eckersley points out that: 
... it is problematic to invoke a presumed telos in nature as a 
justification for social ecology or indeed any political theory, since 
even if we assume that such a telos accorded with the picture of 
modern science ... this does not in itself tell us why we ought to 
follow it.24 
Acting from an ethical obligation or duty, on the other hand, would remove the 
need and relevance of anthropocentric goals-oriented value judgments and 
place ethic:al action in the same temporal and spatial planes as the environment 
itself: that is, the present. 
The green political movement of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has not 
fully addressed the original concerns of the environment movement insofar as 
presenting an' alternative' politics was the aim of the early movement25, and 
has, instead, focused its attention on forming strategic alliances with the aim of 
electoral success26 . While the participants and followers of green politics may 
regard this as a logical step in the long road to political representation of the 
environment, it has not introduced anything original into political theory, but 
"merely presented the old project of modernity in a new guise."27 Beyond the 
24 R.Eckersley (1992), op cit. 155 
25 D.Hutton, "What is Green Politics?", in Hutton ( ed) Green Politics in Australia (North Ryde: 
Angus & Robertson, 1987) 3 
26 I.Bluhdorn, 1997. "A Theory of Post-Ecologist Politics//, Environmental Politics Vol.6 No.3, 
pp.125-147 
27 ibid. 128 
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rhetoric, there is little of substance to justify any claim that the Greens have 
transcended the traditional left-right political spectrum but rather that they do, 
in fact, rely on alliances. Much as these alliances may be based on ethics of 
justice and environmentalism, while they remain rooted to the liberal capitalist 
political system, they are irremovable from either left or right. Only the position 
on the spectrum can be altered. 
Values and alliances in the Snowy case study 
The focus on values - the value of the river as a riparian ecosystem, a place 
of beauty, a focal point for a number of towns, a physical presence - as opposed 
to value - the economic value of the river in generating hydro power or 
providing irrigation, and a strong sense of the present, were keys to the Snowy 
River campaign. George Seddon believes that the chronicling of the Snowy 
River is made difficult because, "(the river) has no historical, social or political 
reality; parts of it have mattered a great deal in various ways at various times, 
but only as a part of a different fabric." 28 This division of the river into parts, 
however, denies any constancy in human relationship with the Snowy, 
facilitating the rational, development-oriented approach towards it as an 
economic resource. Seddon sees the river as neatly compartmentalised into 
sections that have meaning for specific purposes rather than the flowing, living 
whole, which, from source to mouth has been of immens~ significance for a 
wide and diverse region. How can a dam have historical, social or political 
meaning for only a section of a river? While the people of old Adaminaby and 
Jindabyne lost their towns and connection with the land and the physical 
presence of the river as the lakes were flooded, downstream from the Jindabyne 
Dam the river was also lost as it dwindled to less than 1 % of its original flow. 
28 G.Seddon, 1997, Landprints: Reflections on Land and Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 51 
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The loss of the river at Dalgety and further downstream was felt every bit as 
acutely as it was in the towns that were relocated during the construction of the 
Snowy Scheme. 
In seeking change to the situation brought about by the harnessing of the 
river, the Dalgety community drew on the values that they, as a community, 
saw in the river. These were not influenced by political or green movement 
ideology, but by a temporal and spatial relationship that was immediate. It was 
important that the river was restored for its ecological health, but also for the 
benefit of the communities from Jindabyne to the Tasman that had lost their 
relationship with the river when the dam was built. In discussions and 
interviews with the women who ran the campaign, issues such as· 
intergenerational justice, environmental health and the importance of the river's 
_ presence to the community surfaced as key values. A further key that emerged 
was the fact that, as women with family commitments, they were simply unable 
to drop everything and focus entirely on lobbying and campaigning. Chair of 
the DDCA, Jo Garland, commented almost apologetically that she was unable to 
go to Sydney to lobby or attend meetings as her husband works full time and 
therefore couldn't be expected to care for their young children during her 
absence.29 Of necessity, this focus on home, family and community kept the 
campaign in a spatial and temporal relationship with its subject. Campaigns 
that are played out in courts, boardrooms or legislative chambers are less likely 
to have the full support of the community they affect. 
Much of the success of the Snowy campaign rests in its extra-political 
approach wherein a local issue, albeit of national significance, and local values, 
albeit with universal application, were maintained as the only driving forces. 
Institutional politics, represented by the governments involved in the Snowy 
negotiations, was the authority to which the campaign appealed for legislation 
that would save the river, but the ideology that drives politics - left, right or 
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green - was never a driving factor in the campaign itself. Alliances were made 
with all stakeholders at various points of the campaign. These alliances were, in 
essence, 'political' in that they were formed as a means to an end, but unlike the 
green movement or green politics, the extra-political approach of the campaign 
allowed the alliances to operate beyond the left-right basis of the political 
· establishment. 
Left-right-green: finding a balance 
Whilst it has been my contention that environmentalism is not an ideology 
per se, and can therefore be grafted onto existing ideologies, it is important to 
note the arguments of Dobson30 and Vincent31 that ecology has transcended the 
limitations of science to become an ideology itself. In terms of the equivocal 
nature of the question of environmental representation, the implication of an 
ecological ideology removes the necessity for political representation. 
Ecologism, thus defined, represents itself. There are two major perceived 
weaknesses with this view with regard to both the environment movement and 
with the period of green politics that emerged as a result of the movement. In 
the first instance, an ecological ideology which formed to represent the 
environment would still require humans to speak on its behalf. The concept of 
'ecological thinking'32, that is, an ecocentrically-based social theory of total-
environment stewardship, may approximate t~e social aspects of ecologism to 
form the basis of a post-political ecology (to be discussed further in Chapter 8), 
however, its ideological basis is questionable insofar as it does not proffer 
specific normative political and social ideals and methodology. 
29 Interview with Jo Garland, April 2002. Transcript in possession of author. 
30 A.Dobson Green Political Thought 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 1995) 
31 A.Vincent, 1993. "The Character of Ecology" Environmental Politics Vol.2, No.2, pp 248-276 
32 M.Mulligan and S.Hill Ecological Pioneers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and 
D.Russell, 1990, "Social Ecology and the Greening of the Australian Mind", A keynote paper 
presented at the Inaugural Green Seminars, Sydney, February 1990 
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The importance of nature, and the crux of the ecocentric view is, according 
to Dobson, 11 the recognition ... that there are natural limits to human 
aspirations" and the II strong sense in which the natural world is taken as a 
model for the human world"33. The interdependence and interrelationships 
between species within ecosystems, and between ecosystems is the model used 
largely by the green movement for human social and political arrangements. 
Political environmentalism, or 'ecologism' in Dobson' s terminology, sees the 
ideal organisation of the human world as a democratic and equal society based 
on tolerance and tradition.34 Nature, according to this view, far from being 
competitive and hierarchical, is II pacific, tranquil, lush - and green."35 This is a 
long way from the Hobbesian view of life in the 'state of nature'. Both views, 
however, are simply 'views' of how nature might be. Neither are experienc~s of 
how nature is, and it is here that the supposedly ecocentric ideals of the green 
movement blur considerably with anthropocentric visions of utopia. Through 
recognition of environmental holism and the value of each species within that 
whole including themselves, and as the only species that has a sense of the 
future, mankind can assume the role of moral agents for the Earth. Given this, I 
would contend that the ideology of green politics is based largely on power 
relations and competitiveness, rather than holism, and is therefore not 
necessarily ecocentric in its approach to politics. Indeed, it owes much of its 
underlying politicisation to the existing power relationship between the left and 
the right and the dominant liberal-capitalist system. 
The second perceived weakness in the theory of ecological ideology is in the 
context of the socio-political system under which it operates. It remains that, 
within the liberal-capitalist political system, the green movement has been most 
successful in achieving its ends when it has worked within the parameters of 
33 A.Dobson Green Political Thought, second edition (Routledge, Lon don, 1995) 24 34 ibid 24 
35 ibid 24 
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the dominant political system. As a social movement, environmentalism co-
opted the scientific discipline of ecology, and simplified a range of issues to one 
overarching premise: the health of the planet and its long-term ability to sustain 
life depends on human action. In order to achieve a positive environmental 
outcome, the green movement has worked first against, during the 
revolutionary period, and secondly within, the liberal-capitalist structure. Any 
ideology has remained thus far peripheral to the issue-action-outcome 
mechanics of the movement that has driven environmental policy and thought 
for the past four decades: "Ecology is seen to transcend ideology altogether and 
with it the traditional terms of political debate."36 By adhering to a specific 
ideology which, as Vincent points out, transcends political debate; the green 
movement would risk completely disengagi!)g from the political decision-
making process. 
Despite this, however, the left-right political spectrum, which defined the 
parameters of global politics over the 20th century, initially presented the 
emerging environment movement in the 1960s and its successors, the green 
parties, with an ideological conundrum. Even while the Greens drew a 
sizeable proportion of their supporters from the left through the radical protest 
movements37, to fully embrace the ideology of the left would, on the one hand, 
mean compromising many of their own ideals, and on the other hand, risk 
alienating any supporters who drifted in from the right. The green movement 
has, since its political debut in the 1970s, promoted and highlighted its 
differences from the mainstream political parties and ideologies. Through the 
use of such terms as "new politics"38 and "anti-party party"39 the Greens have 
36 Vincent, op cit 249 
37 Lynn G.Bennie et al, 1995, "Green Dimensions: The Ideology of the British Greens", Green 
Politics, No.3, pp 217-239 
38 Brown and Singer (1996) op cit., 92 
39 P.Kelly, "Towards a Green Europe, Tovvards a Green World", Nonviolence Speaks to Power 
(Honolulu: Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, 1992) published electronically: 
http:/ /www2.hawaii.edu/uhip/ green.bet 
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pursued an identity away from the political establishment. Environmental 
activist and founder of the German Greens (Die Griinen), the late Petra Kelly, 
coined the slogan, "neither left nor right but ahead"40, to encapsulate the 
differences of the green ideology, which, while political in nature sought to 
position itself apart from the hierarchy and system. The practice of politics by 
slogans, adopted enthusiastically by the Greens, may aid in the recruitment of 
new members and appeal to a media hungry for the 5-second sound-bite, but it 
does not necessarily stand up to scrutiny of its substance. "Neither left nor right 
but ahead", at one level places political representation of the environment apart 
from human politics, yet at the same time seeks to redefine the concept 
of politics while keeping an adversarial difference between conflicting 
ideologies. ~nstead of a linear left-right political spectrum the Greens have 
imagined a triangular structure with themselves at the apex. 
The left-right index is itself an indicator of political ideology. Singer 
believes the gradual departure of social democracy from the traditional ideals of 
the left has resulted in the substantial weakening of the left' s position. This, he 
believes, can be used to propagate a new politics, the focus being "not so much 
with the left as a politically organised force, as with the left as a broad body of 
thought, a spectrum of ideas about achieving a better society."41 Based on the 
general notion that the theory of evolution is not so much 'survival of the 
fittest', as survival of those most able to adapt, and coupled with the left' s belief 
in the malleability of human nature "because it has provided grounds for 
hoping that a very different kind of human society is possible"42, Singer 
proposes a red-green politics in which "we could seek to encourage a broader 
sense of our interests, in which we seek to build on the social and cooperative 
side of our nature, in addition to the individualistic and competitive side." 43 
40 .b.d 1 1 . 
41 Singer (1999) op cit. 6 
42 ibid, 24 
43 ibid, 43 
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Despite Singer's view, however, and the fact that the environmental 
movement, like the peace and women's movements, grew from the radical left, 
the social democratic view of nature has been more one of conservation and 
preservation of resources for the sake of, firstly, a social democratic economy 
and secondly, future generations of humans. In Australia, the preservation of 
areas of wilderness for the sake of non-human ecosystems was a priority for 
social democratic governments in the last two decades of the 20th century, most 
notably the 1983 election promise, later honoured, of the Hawke Labor 
government to save the Franklin River. In many cases, however, it has been 
tempting to take the cynical point of view and argue that declarations of 
wilderness protection are not so much for the sake of non-human ecosystems as 
for the sake of political survival of the party most able to adapt to public opinion 
in favour of the environment. 
From the 1980s, attempts to enjoin the political establishment and the 
environment movement have been made through alliances or coalitions 
between social democratic and green parties. From the position of the Greens, 
alignment with social democrats affords 'mainstream' electoral credibility 
among voters who may otherwise regard environmental politics as too radical 
or marginal as well as a broader social and economic platform, while for the 
social democrats it provides a strong environi-inental platform. Theoretically, at 
least, such coalitions should be successful at both electoral and policy levels. 
However, in instances of red-green alliances, the -expectations of green party 
membership on their elected members, and lack of ideological compatibility in 
decision-making have affected the flexibility of both parties and thus of 
government as a whole. This has also resulted in internal problems, particularly 
within the Greens, and the creation of procedural and semantic obstacles that 
have at times overshadowed more pressing issues. The next chapter will 
examine in detail red-green alliances, specifically the Tasmanian Labor-Green 
Accord of 1989-91, the SPD-Die Griinen coalition in the German Bundestag in the 
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1990s to the current time, and the recent Labour-Green alliance in the New 
Zealand parliament. Where the Greens are the moral agents acting in the 
interests of nature, social democrats act in the interests of nature when it, in 
turn, suits the interests of the human population. This has meant that both 
parties have had to compromise their positions, and while the concept of 
political compromise may sit comfortably with a more traditional party, a 
significant proportion of the Greens' membership takes an uncon1promising 
ecocentric view44 and regards anything less as 'selling out' for political 
expedience. This brings into focus the question of the fundamental suitability of 
an ecocentric ideology for political purposes. 
The term, 'political purposes', is essentially outcomes-based, ·and refers to 
the results obtained from political process. Given that practical politics seeks to 
optimise conditions and promote behaviours to reflect the ideological basis of 
the group, party or individual that holds power at any given time, it follows 
that 'political purposes' will be those optimised conditions and resultant 
behaviours. There are two problematics in this with regard to ecocentrism. 
Firstly, the basis of ecocentrism consists in equity and diversity among species; 
secondly, ecocentrism does not ·afford manipulation of conditions for a specific 
outcome. This is not to say that an ecocentric ideology should not be a 
consideration in political practice, but in terms of political purposes, the 
socially-based anthropocentric environmentalism, is far more acceptable and 
easily moulded to suit existing ideologies. In terms of the question of political 
representation of the environment according to existing ideologies, it remains 
that the green movement is consistently perceived, both from within the 
movement itself and by its opponents, as politically left-wing. While the 
political purposes of the green movement may be best served by left-wing 
ideology, it is relevant to question what left-wing political purpose is served by 
such an alliance. 
44Bemlie et al (1995) op cit. 
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It would be wrong to assume that the ideological and political alliance 
between red and green is a natural phenomenon or that it represents all aspects 
of both. In consideration of achieving political purposes, there is greater 
strength in unity. The green movement and left-wing political parties have, 
through campaigning together on specific issues, achieved mutually acceptable 
outcomes. Increasing public awareness and concern for environmental issues 
has raised the political profile of the environment as a legitimate political actor, 
and the' green vote' is a strong electoral incentive to political parties seeking to 
win or maintain power. It is important to note, however, that chasing the' green 
vote' is not purely the prerogative of left-wing parties, and that parties of the 
right have frequently adopted environmental positions and implemented 
policies designed to enhance their electoral chances, and while many red-green 
alliances have foundered on compromised ideals and ideological 
incompatibility, the notion has arisen of alignments between the green 
movement and the parties of the conservative right. 
Politics, perhaps surprisingly, has provided considerable common ground 
between greens and conservatives. In 1999, German Green Environment 
Minister, Jurgen Trittin, stated in an interview that," on the basis of his 
experience, there was no longer much to choose between the SPD and the CDU 
(Christian Democrat Union)" 45, and that as a result, "the Greens should no 
longer be in thrall to the Social Democrats but should be prepared to consider 
the Christian Democrats as potential coalition partners." 46 With the broadening 
politicisation of the green manifesto to encompass a social agenda, and the 
traditional concern of the left with labour, industry and big government, the 
connection between democratic socialism and environmentalism, however 
traditional it may be, is not necessarily a natural one. The weakened position of 
the left, and the subsequent blurring of the distinction between social democrats 
45 C.Lees, 1999, "The Red-Green Coalition", German Politics, Vol.8 No.2, 174 
46 'b'd 1 1 . 
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and conservatives has opened the door for green-conservative alliances along 
such policy lines as decentralisation and targeting specific issues of 
environmental concern, rather than the 'big picture' favoured by social 
democratic governments. There is also a startling similarity between the Greens 
and the New Right in their tendency to take the high moral ground and insist 
on certain standards of behaviour from communities. Combined with a 
'greener than thou' approach is the rampant populism and attention-getting 
outbursts which, at the German land level, has been a confusing oscillation 
between SPD alignment and conservative SPD opposition. Kolinsky suggests 
that the conservative reaction of the Greens against the SPD, even while the 
latter has been in government, was, in the early days of Green representation in 
government, an attempt at establishing a party identity separate from the 
democratic socialists47. This manifested, for example, in Bremen, as support for 
private schools; and in Baden-Wtirttemberg as opposition to regional schools in 
favour of village schools "to provide a more balanced environment" - a 
suggestion previously made in the 1950s by the CDU.48 
Eckersley disputes the link between environmentalism and the conservative 
position on ecocentric grounds. Whilst admitting certain superficial 
commonality between the Greens and conservatives in such areas as caution in 
embracing new technology, conserving things of value as a link with the past, 
and also the possibility of tracing some green political thought back to 
conservative roots, she rejects the idea that these form a common pool of 
political ideology.49 German (CDU) Chancellor Kohl, and British (Conservative) 
Prime Minister Thatcher both contributed to the development of their nations' 
environmental policy through creation and strengthening of environmental 
ministries, but, from an ecocentric perspective; there still exists a gaping canyon 
47 E.Kolinsky, Parties, Opposition and Society in Wes t Germany (New York: St Martin' s Press, 1984) 
322 
·
43 ibid 323 
49 R.Eckersley (1992) op cit. 21 
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between such political actions as these,· and the ideology that gives 
environmentalism its "distinctly radical political edge"50, especially when 
viewed against the Thatcher government's economic rationalist, pro-nuclear, 
militaristic and pro-development policies. Critiques of social democratic-green 
alliances, and the validity of claims that conservative"'."green alliances are 
environmentally and politically viable will be examined in Chapter 4, however, 
this recalls the distinction between political purposes and the ideologies 
underpinning political discourse. In implementing environmental policy, a 
government is not representing the environment in the first instance. It is 
representing its own interests and the interests of its constituents. If there were 
more votes to be gained in taking an anti- or neutral-environment stance, many 
- it is speculative to suggest all - go_vernments would take that direction rather 
than try to convince the electorate of the benefits of environmentalism. Where 
conservative parties have led social democrat parties in environmental policy, 
the outcome has been based on conservative ideology, not ecological ideology. 
The comparison between the approaches taken towards the environment 
and resource management by social democrat governments across the political 
paradigms before and after the rise of the green movement is evident in the 
differences between the Chifley and Hawke governments' managerial 
approaches to efficient use of water resources in the SMHEA. In the former case 
optimal efficiency was measured in services and agricultural productivity; in 
the latter, the coefficient was economic. In neither case was the environment 
considered as an agent of significance. 
The nezu representation 
In 1991 the Hawke Labor Government announced plans to corporatise the 
SMHEA as a result of a review of the Authority's managerial and institutional 
so ibid 22 
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efficiency. At the time of the announcement, the concern of the three 
governments involved, those of the Commonwealth, New South Wales and 
Victoria, was the Authority's ability to compete in the National Electricity 
Market, established under the National Competition Policy51 . The first 
parliamentary mention of the review was in May 1991, when the Member for 
Fraser (ACT), Mr John Langmore, put a question to the Minister for Resources, 
Mr Alan Griffiths, asking if the ACT was to be included in the review of the 
Authority and if, as a result of changes to the institutional structure the cost of 
electricity to ACT consumers would rise52. There was no indication at that point 
of environmental concerns. The Snowy Mountains Scheme was completed in 
1974. The presence of the SMHEA in the Shires of Cooma-Monaro and Snowy 
River was, and is, regarded positively in terms of employment, local economy 
and tourism. The lakes of Eucumbene and Jindabyne have provided a summer 
tourist attraction for the region to complement the popularity of winter sports in 
the mountains and the environmental impact on the national park is apparent 
only along the pipelines, situated away from the main roads to the ski resorts. 
In addition, the Authority maintained all the access roads around the lakes, as 
well as many within the Kosciusko National Park in cooperation with the 
National Parks and Wildlife Service. On May 14th 1991, in response to 
Langmore' s question, the Minister for Resources concluded: 
. .- . · I think everyone in the House vvould agree that an important 
scheme such as the Snowy, with the massive investment that the 
, 
Australian people have placed in it, does require a commitment by 
everyone to ensure that over time the necessary refurbishment takes 
place to ensure that the Snowy goes into the next century as an 
important entity in its own right, and, perhaps even more 
51 Snowy Water Inquiry Issues Paper (Sydney: Snowy Water Inquiry, 1998) 
52 Langmore, recorded in Hansard, House of Representatives, 14th May 1991, p.3627 
107 
importantly, as possibly a central component of the emerging 
developments in terms of the national electricity grid.53 
The Hawke government was Australia's first (and last) environmentally 
conscious Federal government in terms of proactive environmental decisions 
and actively courting the green vote. In 1991, however, the issue surrounding 
the corporatisation of the SMHEA was not environmental except in terms of 
continued supply of hydro-electricity in a competitive market. Any ecological 
damage that had occurred as a result of the scheme was unavoidable and the 
result of a less environmentally-enlightened age. Green politics was making 
optimistic progress in 1991, with Western Australian Greens Senators Dee 
Margetts and Christabel Chamarette holding the balance of power in the Upper 
House. Five Green Independent MPs in the Tasmanian parliament, led by Dr 
Bob Brown, a key figure from the Franklin campaign and Tasmanian MP since 
1983, had formally supported the state Labor government in an alliance since 
1989. In 1990 the 'green' vote had handed Prime Minister Hawke his fourth 
term of office and the outlook for environmentalism in Australia was positive. 
With such heightened environmental consciousness, how was it possible for the 
announcement of corporatisation of the Snowy to pass by the environmental 
organisations, Green parties and environmental activists without anyone 
mentioning the state of the Snowy River and the opportunity to redress the 
ecological damage that had been done? 
By the time the Snowy Hydro Corpora_tisation Bill 1997 passed the Lower 
House of the Federal Parliament, the environmental issues of the Snowy River 
were enshrined in the legislative debate. It was not due to the environment 
movement, however, that the Australian Government Bills Digest 70 notes 
concerns regarding: 
• the timing of the legislation (ie. prior to the environmental study); 
53 Griffiths, recorded in ibid. 
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• the handing over of control to a corporate entity for 75 years with a 50 year 
renewal option; 
• the flow rate of the Snowy River; 
• the likelihood that if any changes are made t_o in<::rease the water flow rate, 
compensation must be paid to the corporate entity/ private company; and 
• the effect on the native fish population.54 · 
The campaign to save the Snowy River that started in 1991 at the time of 
announcement of intent to corporatise the Snowy was initiated and 
implemented at local community level. In this it was similar to the early 
environmental campaigns, but unlike those for the Little Desert or Colong 
· Caves, this was a campaign to restore a damaged ecological system, not protect 
an undamaged one from development. The political representation of nature 
had, in this case, failed to recognise that a problem existed, and in its place was 
a social representation: a post-political construct of nature. 
54 Australian Parliamentary Library, 1997-98 Bills Digest 70 
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Chapter 4 
Red-green alliances: green democratisation and integrationism 
If we don't do the impossible, we shall be faced with the unthinkable - Petra Kelly 
The mainstreaming of nature: contextual background 
The key to the allegiance between environmentalism and left-wing politics 
has been a consistent overlap in ideological approach to the interface between 
the human-nature dualism. Hay argues that it is democratic socialism which, in 
fact, is the least suited to an eco-political approach1• However, the overlapping 
green-red ideologies in respect of the equal right of all people to work of a 
"socially useful and ecologically benign nature"2 have provided the platform for 
advancement of environmental issues under the general auspice of post-Marxist 
politics. Formal and informal red-green alliances have been a function of 
politics in Western Europe and Australasia for over a decade: Hay's 
observation concerning the incompatibility of the two has been balanced in 
practice by Petra Kelly's observation about achieving the impossible .. 
This chapter will explore these red-green alliances, the improbabilities 
surrounding their very existence, and the ecological and political philosophies 
underpinning them. Additionally, it is intended to propose a case for the 
alliance of environmental politics with the left-wing against the scenario of an 
alliance with the right-wing. Specifically, I will examine red-green alliances and 
coalitions that have existed in Germany, Tasmania and New Zealand, against 
the Tasmanian Green-Liberal alliance. A comparative analysis is not believed to 
be relevant due to the different natures of the alliances: the German alliance 
(1998-2002 and reelected 2002) is a formal coalition national government in a 
1 P.Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Though t (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2002) 255-259 2 J.Mundey, "From Red to Green", in Hutton (ed) Green Politics in Australia (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1987) 119 
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Federal state, Tasmania's (1989-1991) was a formalised written alliance at state 
level, while New Zealand's (1999-2002)was an informal alliance at national level 
in a non-federal state. While there are certainly grounds for some comparison, 
and these will be explored, the analysis will largely concentrate on each 
according to its strengths, weaknesses and future potential. 
The influence of the ecological concerns raised in the 1960s and 70s on the 
general political agenda of the 1980s and 90s signalled the mainstreaming of 
environmentalism: the democratisation and integration of the green movement. 
While it is important to note that this was not the sole prerogative of social 
democrat parties or of the political left, the centrality of the liberal-capitalist 
economy to right-wing political ideology has ensured commodification of the 
environment, rather than integration or democratisation as an issue of 
independent standing. The independence, perceived and actual, of 
environmentalism as both political issue and political actor is the crux of this 
chapter. 
Social democrats and greens: antagonists or allies? 
The ambiguity of an issue that is at once mainstream and radical is 
illustrated in the relationship between the US Democrat Party and the US 
Greens and its effect on the outcome of the 2000 US Presidential election. On 
Thursday, November 9th, three days after the ballot, the Sydney Morning Herald 
published an article entitled, "For the Democrats, the Nader candidacy was 
unsafe at any speed"3• Written by a Washington correspondent, the article laid 
the blame for the close result and likely victory for Bush squarely at the feet of 
the Green Party candidate: 
Nader's role was most decisive in Florida, the election-winning State 
where, had Mr Nader not been a candidate, a substantial proportion 
3 Y.Abraham, 2000, "For the Democrats, the Nader candidacy was unsafe at any speed", The Sydney Morning Herald, 9th November 2000, p.9 
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of his 94,000 votes would have gone to Mr Gore, making him the 
clear winner in the State -and the country. 
Mr Nader's votes in Oregon would also have been enough to award 
that State to Mr Gore. 
Mr Gore would also have won a clear majority of the popular vote 
nationwide had Mr Nader not been there.4 
According to this line of argument, the Greens, using a loose combination of 
social democrat ideology and populist campaign tactics essentially delivered 
victory by default to the candidate least likely to listen to or act on any of their 
concerns and, incredibly, seemed quite proud to have done so. Australian 
Greens Senator Bob Brown endorsed the approach taken by the US Greens in a 
media release two days after the US election, stating that: 
... it was inspiring fl:lat US consumer advocate Ralph Nader had 
stood up to the two big parties. He had resisted calls to stand down 
so that he did not harm the chances of Democrat candidate Al Gore, 
regarded as the lesser of two environmental evils compared to 
Republican George W. Bush.5 
Given that Nader's policies included economic and social reforms to 
address the problem of poverty and homelessness, universal health care and 
higher wages as well as greater emphasis on environmental issues6, all issues 
closely aligned to social democrat policy, his equally adversarial approach 
towards both Bush and Gore seems somewhat self-defeating. One of Nader's 
most frequently quoted campaign lines was, "If you vote for the lesser of two 
evils you end up with the evil of two lessers" 7 • Unacknowledged in this 
statement is the logic that the lesser of two evils is nevertheless better than the 
greater, and may be more likely to be open to negotiation on matters of Green 
policy. 
4 
.b.d 1 1 . 
5 AAP, 2000, "ALP should heed Nader lesson: Brown", The Australian, 9th November 2000 6 Ralph Nader's 2000 campaign website has a detailed account of policies and issues 
http://www.votenader.com/ issues.html 
7 Abraham, 2000, op cit. 
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This brings into question the Greens' perception of themselves as a political 
party and their standing in relation to the social democrats and conservative 
parties. On July 24 th 2000, the Sierra Club, the environmental organisation 
founded by 19th century American preservationist, John Muir, formally 
endorsed Democrat candidate Al Gore as its preferred candidate in the 
presidential election. In 1998, the Australian Conservation Foundation had 
similarly backed the ALP in the Australian Federal election. Why would 
national, non-government environment organisations endorse social democrat 
candidates and parties instead of the Green parties and candidates that purport 
to best serve the environment? Both Nader and Brown have been scathing in 
their criticism of the social democrats, placing them in the same political 
category as the conservative parties. In a media release on November 9th 2000, 
Brown's office highlighted aspects of the Nader presidential campaign, drawing 
a comparison with Australia: 
Ralph Nader has made a feature of: 
• political integrity, including ending corporate largesse to 
political parties; 
• voter choice, instead of big party indifference, on issues 
like consumer protection, workers' rights, electoral reform 
and closing the gap between rich and poor; 
• giving the environment the importance Mr Gore once 
attributed it. 
In Australia the Labor and Coalition parties want to bury the same 
. issues. The Greens' role is to get them on the agenda for the next 
election.8 
Overlooked in this statement is any thought as to the most effective means 
for achieving this aim, as well as the fact that getting such issues 'on the agenda' 
for an election is considerably different from the more complex and long-term 
8 Ben Oquist, Media Officer for Bob Brown, http:/ /news.greens.org.au/fulldoc.php3? title=N ader%2 7 s+ Message+to+ A ustralia&a u thor= Ben +Oquist&date=973688400 
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task of actually achieving reform. The non-government environmental 
organisations, in their support of social democrat candidates, have taken the 
line of least resistance, that is, aligned with the liberal, social democrat ideology 
with the intention of using the weight of the green social movement to influence 
government policy. Logically, the Sierra Club saw that asking Mr Bush to give 
to the environment "the importance Mr Gore once attributed it", would 
undoubtedly be a far more difficult task than asking Mr Gore to do the same 
thing. The Green Party, on the other hand, viewed both Bush and Gore as 
equally undesirable and their own candidate, Nader, as the only one who could 
deliver the 'green' agenda. It would not be unreasonable to assume that many 
environmentalists and environmental organisations in the US regard the Green 
Party as unrealistic and out of touch in their political approach. 
If the Greens do not wish to align themselves electorally with the social 
democrats, what is their ideological position and how does this affect formal 
and informal red-green alliances? Nader's 'defiance' in rejecting calls for him to 
stand aside to maximise Gore's chances, and Brown's statement that the 
Australian Greens are not 'in the business of aiding Labor to get to the next 
election', certainly appear, on the one hand, to reject any notion of common 
ground, much less a formal alliance between the Greens and social democrat 
parties. On the other hand, however, Brown was the leader of the Tasmanian 
Greens during the term of the Labor-Green Accord in Tasmania from 1989-91. 
Dalton relates the notion of ideology in social movements to identity, 
pointing out that the identity created by a specific social movement organisation 
subsequently influences such factors as its mobilisation of members, selection 
and solution of issues, options in forming alliances and political tactics9 • This 
directly correlates social movements with politics; a theory supported and 
evidenced by the political performance of the women's and peace movements 
over the past three decades. The environment movement, however, appears 
9 R.Dalton, The Green Rainbow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) 13 
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with a multifaceted identity that has proved to be highly problematic in the 
transposition from social movement to political arena. Rejecting both 
conservative and social democrat allegiances while drawing membership more 
from the left than the right1° and at the same time stating that their aim is 
nothing short of government11 has been an obstacle to the furthering of the green 
political cause. This approach also obscures the reality within the political 
system whereby, finding themselves equally rejected by this minority party, 
conservative and social democrat parties will act together to marginalise the 
Greens12, thus excluding them from the decision-making process at all levels of 
government. In these instances, by working against the established political 
parties, the Greens effectively negate their own political standing. 
Dalton further points out that "a group's ideology also provides the focus 
for political action."13 Can a group without a tradition of ideological standing be 
an effective political actor? The Greens' oft-asserted claim of 'doing politics 
differently' has no basis in practical application because, firstly, the statement 
does not indicate what action will substitute for politics in the political arena, 
and secondly, it rejects the established premises on which political action is 
based without offering a sound alternative. The statement has as much practical 
credence as would a football team that claimed to play football differently-
they would soon find they had no one to play against. The environment 
movement in its role as a social movement as opposed to a political party, on 
the other hand, has aligned with the social democrat ideology, as evidenced by 
the Sierra Club and the ACF, without fear of the environmental ideology being 
subsumed by political factors. As social movement organisations aligned with 
political parties, these environmental groups are far more effective in practical 
10 Bennie, Franklin and Rudig, 1995, "Green Dimensions: The Ideology of the British Greens", Green Politics (ed. _W.Rudig) Vol.3, pp.217-239 
11 B.Brown, quoted in AAP (2000) op cit. 
12 For example, the brief ALP-Liberal alliance after the failure of the Tasmanian Labor-Green Accord and the ALP-Liberal 1998 electoral 'reform' in Tasmania, both designed to marginalise the Greens. 
13 R.Dalton, op cit. 13 
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and political terms than the Green Party, which operates within the political 
system but, unless directly aligned with another party, without the basis of the 
social democrat ideology that has become the political strength of such groups 
as the ACF and the Sierra Club. In the European parliament, the Green groups 
hold 47 seats and occupy the wedge of seats to the right, physically and 
symbolically, of the socialists in the chamber14 • This symbolism is what Belgian 
government Green MP, Mrs Isabelle Durant, calls "the banalisation of green 
politics."15 By moving into the political system, the green movement has had to 
put aside the political weaponry that makes it a potent force outside that 
system: "confrontation and the rule of no compromise."16 • 
For their part, social democratic governments in Australia, the UK and 
Germany have claimed success in bringing environmental groups and 
developers to the negotiating table to acknowledge and resolve environmental 
problems, fostering a perception that the traditional party of social justice is also 
the natural party of ecological consciousness. With the appearance of 
environmental issues on the agendas of most governments and the 
mainstreaming of green politics, social democrat parties are painting themselves 
an increasingly noticeable shade of green. The perception of the social 
democrats as green is itself interesting when considered against environmental 
gains made by, for example, Pieter Winsemius of the right wing Netherlands 
government during the 1980s, David Pearce for the Thatcher government, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's formation of the German environment ministry, and 
in Australia the Howard government's National Heritage Trust funding for 
environmental projects. It is questionable, however, whether the designation of 
specific policy instruments used as 'trade-offs' or electoral levers represents the 
integration of the environment into mainstream politics, which involves a more 
directional paradigmatic shift such as the 'greening' of the ALP in Australia and 
14 
"Greens grow up", The Economist, August 7th 1999, Vol.352, Issue 8131, p.37 
is 'b'd 1 1 . 
16 'b'd 1 1 . 
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the German Social Democrat Party (SPD) and the Greek Socialists (P ASOK) in 
the early to mid-1980s. 
Green democratisation and integrationism, in terms of environmental 
representation in the political sphere, have been most commensurate with the 
aims of the green movement when designed and implemented by left wing 
parties traditionally more concerned with labour and economics than the 
environment. Over time the aspects of their policies most approved by the 
environmental movement have become linked with issues of social justice and 
internalised in the party platform. In 1989, Norwegian voters rated the 
environment as their second most important issue: at that election the green 
party polled only 0.4% of the vote while the Socialist Left "increased its number 
of seats in the parliament from six to 17" .17 In the light of these, the question 
that arises is whether the Greens have become superfluous to the cause of 
environmentalism in the political context. The concept of ecological 
modernisation and the absorption of environmental instruments into 
government policy may, in fact, be taking green politics out of the hands of 
green parties. 
Alliances 1: The Tasmanian Labor-Green Accord, 1989-91 
The Tasmanian Greens, formed in 1972 as the United Tasmania Group 
(UTG), claims the distinction of being the world's first green party18• It 
developed from the environmental protest movement in direct response to the 
proposed flooding of Lake Pedder in Tasmania's central south-west as part of 
the Tasmanian government's hydro-industrialisation development strategy. 
Significantly, for the purposes of examining red-green alliances, the UTG Lake 
17 A-I Jansen and P.K.Mydske, "Norway: Balancing environmental quality and interest in oil", Governance and Environment in Western Europe, K.Hanf & A-I Jansen, eds (Harlow: Longman, 1998) 186 
18 Brown and Singer The Greens (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 1996) (original italics) 
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Pedder campaign was preceded in 1971 by the first of the New South Wales BLF 
'green bans'19• The link between Marxist political ideology and environmental 
awareness and stewardship was already established in practice through the 
Communist-led BLF when the environmental movement took its first steps in 
formal politicisation through a party based on a 'New Ethic': 
We, citizens of Tasmania and members of the United Tasmania 
Group, 
United in a global movement for survival ... 
Undertake to husband and cherish Tasmania's living resources so that 
we do minimum damage to the web of life of which we are part 
while preventing the extinction or serious depletion of any form of 
life by our individual, group, or communal actions; 
And we shall ... change our society and our culture to prevent a 
tyranny of rationality, at the expense of values, by which we may 
lose the unique adaptability of our species for meeting cultural and 
. lch 20 envuonmenta ange. 
The 'New Ethic' of the United Tasmania Group was based on a combination 
of broad social movement values and the specific beliefs of the newly-emergent 
environmental movement, drawn from such sources as the writings of Carson, 
Commoner, Hardin and the Club of Rome's The Limits to Growth, that the 
natural environment was in danger of collapse as a direct result of humankind's 
depredations. Pamela Walker states that the New Ethic was essentially "a 
philosophy and values identical to what would soon be known as 
environmentalism."21 Basing a political party on a system of ethics and values 
was seen as a radical departure from the incumbent politico-economic 
institution, which was perceived to have sacrificed social values, for example, 
those of the labour movement, for those of a more fiscal and electoral nature. 
19 Burgmann and Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1998) 20 Brown and Singer, (1996) op cit. 69 (original italics) 
21 P.Walker, "The United Tasmania Group: An analysis of the world's first Green party", in Hay, Eckersley & Holloway (eds) Environmental Politics in Australia and New Zealand (Hobart: Board 
of Environmental Studies University of Tasmania, 1989) 165 
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By using the words 'ethics' and 'values' in their titles and charters (the 
establishment of the UTG was followed within months by the New Zealand 
Values Party, reformed as the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand) the early 
Green parties immediately sought to distance themselves from the monolith of 
normative politics. In politicising the issue of the environment, the UTG made 
the first step towards the integration of the environment into policy and while 
the party itself was relatively short-lived, it formed the initial framework for a 
political construct of nature. 
In 1980, as the campaign by the environmental movement to prevent the 
damming, for hydro-electricity, of the Franklin River in the south-west 
Tasmanian wilderness was accelerating, Dr Norm Sanders was elected to the 
Tasmanian parliament. Sanders, elected as a member of the Australian 
Democrats, was a prominent activist in The Wilderness Society, the group 
leading the Franklin campaign, and his election, based solely on the Franklin 
issue22, gave the environmental campaign its first voice within the political 
system. He was also the first politician to take and promote as a political 
alternative the equally adversarial approach towards both conservative and 
social democrat parties, tagging the "Labor and Liberal parties together under 
the label 'Laborials"'23• In 1983 Sanders resigned from parliament in disgust at 
the treatment of protesters at the Franklin blockade: he was replaced by Dr Bob 
Brown, director of The Wilderness Society and the man widely credited with 
starting and leading the ultimately successful Franklin campaign2\ as a Green 
Independent. Brown's election, coming soon after the entry of Green Party 
22 J.McQueen, The Franklin: Not Just a River (Ringwood: Penguin, 1983) 23 P.Hay "Green politics 'in the system': assessing the obstacles to Labor/Green power sharing", in Pakulski and Crook (eds) Ebbing of the Green Tide? Environmentalism, Public Opinion and the Media in Australia (Hobart: School of Sociology and Social Work, University of Tasmania, 1998) 109 
24 McQueen (1983) op cit.; Bonyhady Places Worth Keeping (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993); 
Fullerton Watershed (Sydney: ABC Books, 2001) 
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representatives into parliaments in Switzerland, Belgium25 and the German 
lander of Bremen, represented the Australasian formalisation of the green 
political movement: green democratisation. 
There are two major points of reference regarding the passage of the 
Tasmanian Greens from a single independent representative in 1983 to a formal 
governing alliance in 1989: firstly, the widening of the Green political agenda to 
include issues of social and economic justice as well the environment; and 
secondly, their acceptance, at least in principle, of the social democrat ideology 
embodied in the ALP. This is notwithstanding the comments made by Brown 
quoted earlier in this chapter that strongly reflect the approach taken by Sanders 
in 1980 towards both major political parties and which will be referred to again 
later in respect of the future of green parties and the politics of the environment. 
The aim of the apocalypticist environmental movement was to change the 
direction of human development away from ecologically destructive practices 
towards a more holistic concept of human-nature interaction. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the early environmentalists of this period were frequently 
unrealistic and simplistic in their approach, ignoring issues of social class and 
producing II extremely illiberal political prescriptions'' .26 The formation of the 
UTG indicated a significant widening of the focus of the environment 
movement in its establishment of party principles based on issues, not only of 
concern for the natural environment, but also of social equity and justice: 
The 'New Ethic' finished with an affirmation of democracy and the 
power of the law, 'as long as that power is not used unfairly to 
advantage or disadvantage any individual or group in the 
• I 27 commuruty. 
25 The world's first Green parliamentarian was Daniel Brelaz, who was elected to the Swiss parliament in October 1979. He was followed by 9 Belgian Greens elected to national parliament in 1981 and 28 German Greens to the Bundestag in 1982. 26 P.Hay (2002) op cit. 261 
27 Brown and Singer (1996) op cit. 69 
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The dual streams of thought resulted in a political confluence that combined, 
ideologically, both the environmental concerns and ecological background of 
the green movement with the political experience and social history of the left. 
In practice, however, the combination was not necessarily a smooth 
amalgamation. During the Franklin campaign in 1983, four Tasmanian Hydro 
Electric Commission workers, acting on the industry-based fear that a win for 
the protesters would result in the loss of their jobs, attacked the newly elected 
Member for Denison and Australian of the Year, Bob Brown, who "escaped 
serious injury only by seizing a wheel brace wielded by one of his assailants" .28 
This type of confrontation has become a feature ?f many hotly contested 
environmental campaigns, particularly in forests where threaten~d and actual 
violence between forestry industry employees and environmental campaigners 
is not uncommon. The spectre of unemployment in industries where job 
security is already tenuous is a powerful motivating force. Pro-industry 
campaigns deliberately obscure the line between the environmental movement 
and the political Green agenda, arguing simplistically that the environmental 
. agenda is anti-employment29, even while elected Green members are arguing in 
parliaments for social equity and state regulation of industry to protect jobs.30 
Vv orkers, the traditional supporters of the left, have been used consistently 
by the corporate sector to oppose the integration of the environment into 
mainstream politics, maintaining an ideological wedge between the Greens and 
the working class by insisting that the Greens are concerned only with the 
environment. The Greens have also challenged the traditional left-wing 
foundation of class-based politics, by campaigning on issues that transcend the 
socio-economic divide between socialism and capitalism: "Ecological 
28 Bonyhady (1993) op cit. 52 
29 J .Huxley, "Timberrr! Axe falls as the old mill finally logs off after 52 years", Sydney Morning Herald, 17.6.98, p.5; J.Raison, 11Why some critics can't see the w ood waste for the trees", Sydney Morning Herald 25.9.01, p.14; D.Kitney, "CSR, Baral form vehicle for saw mill operations", Australian Financial Review 17.2.00 
30 Brown and Singer (1996) op cit. 
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exterminism is in the interest of no class or genera."31 This wedge has been well 
driven by right-wing politics through exploitation of the working class. In light 
of this, the wedge is not one of conflicting green-left political ideology, but 
rather between the left and the right where capitalism has used workers and the 
threat of unemployment to push the corporate agenda. This was recognised by 
such early campaigners as Jack Mundey and will be examined in more detail 
later in this chapter in relation to an alliance of Greens with the right-wing as 
opposed to the left-wing. 
The Tasmanian Labor-Green Accord of 1989 was predicated on the 
principles inherent in green democratisation and integrationism, in which 
environmental issues became absorbed into the policy platforms of the 
established political parties and governments. The environmental battlefield of 
the Franklin in 1983 delivered victory to both the green movement and the 
Hawke Labor government, made Bob Brown the country's best-known 
environmentalist and gave the future Tasmanian Greens a politico-institutional 
foothold. After the 1986 state election Brown was joined in the Parliament by 
fellow Green Independent, Dr Gerry Bates, and in 1989 the election of Christine 
Milne, Dianne Hollister and Lance Armstrong, along with the re-election bf 
Brown and Bates, gave the Green Independents one seat in each of the five 
electorates, denying outright government to either major party. Although both 
the ALP and the Liberal party "had said they would not deal with the Greens 
after the election"32, neither party held sufficient seats in the 35 seat Lower 
House to form a majority government. The Greens entered into discussions 
with the leaders of both major parties, finally agreeing to a "formalised 
arrangement known as the 'Labor-Green Accord"'33, giving Labor leader 
Michael Field the 18 seats necessary to form minority government. 
31 J.Warden, "Greens, New Politics and Parliament", in Haward and Larmour (eds), The 
Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord: Public Policy 1989-92 (Canberra: Federalism Research Centre, 
1993) 15 
32 Brown and Singer (1996) op cit. 7 4 
33 P.Hay (1998) op cit., 103 
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Other than reference to "a raft of social, democratic and environmental 
reforms in return for the guarantee of office"34 agreed to by Field, Brown and 
Singer do not specify functional details of the red-green alliance. Implicit in 
their explanation is the fact that it was the former Liberal government led by 
Robin Gray that had been responsible for the anti-environment developmental 
and hydro-industrialisation policy agenda of the 1980s, after coming to power in 
1982 at the height of the Franklin campaign. Also implicit are suggestions of 
institutional corruption within the Liberal-corporate nexus. Walker, however, 
states that the 'hydro-industrialisation' of Tasmania in the 1970s was entrenched 
in both the major political parties35 and that the UTG' s enduring legacy remains 
that of "providing the initial political socialisation, education and_ mobilisation 
of Tasmania's environment movement ... [and the challenge to] the orthodoxy 
that characterised the policies of both Tasmanian political parties."36 This being 
the case, the 1989 Accord represents a significant shift in both the political and 
environmental paradigms. This shift, which resulted in the convergence of the 
green movement and Labor politics, reflected a general global movement 
towards the politico-institutionalisation of the green movement and the 
greening of institutional politics. In the Tasmanian example, Burton reduces 
this convergence to four stages: 
(1) 1967-76, a period of institutional resistance, as environmental 
issues emerged onto the agenda; (2) 1976-81, a period of tokenism 
following the departure of 'development-at-any-cost' Premier, Eric 
Reece; (3) 1982-84, a period of polarisation and backlash against the 
environment movement following the defeat of the Franklin Dam 
proposal; and (4) 1984-87, a period of co-option and adoption of 
. t ls 37 some conservation movemen proposa . 
34 Brown and Singer (1996) op cit. 74 
35 P.Walker (1989) op cit., 171 
36 ibid. 172 
37 B.Burton quoted in K.Crowley (1987), 11 Accommodating industry in Tasmania: Eco-political factors behind the electrona silica smelter dispute", in Hay, Eckersley & Holloway (eds) (1989) 
op cit., 45 
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The absorption of some proposals of the environmental movement, the 
hallmark of the integrationist approach, however, represents far less political 
risk for parties of either left or right ideology, than entering into a formal 
agreement with a minor party regarded as anathema to many within the major 
parties. That this was the case in 1989 in Tasmania provides a significant point 
of analysis in terms of the wider green political agenda of social and economic 
justice. 
The Australian Labor Party has long been regarded as the natural 
government of Tasmania, whose labour-intensive economy based on natural 
resource exploitation has relied on a government with a strong economic and 
labour policy platform38 • Significant also in terms of the composition of the 
parliament are the use of the Hare-Clark system of proportional representation 
and the small size of the Tasmanian political system: the former favouring 
minor parties and independents, and the latter often resulting in minority 
governments. The 1989 election of five Green Independents, one from each of 
Tasmania's five multi-member electorates under the Hare-Clark system, and the 
return of Labor's worst result (in Tasmania) since the 1930s of 34.7% 
represented a change in direction on a number of levels. Former Premier 
Michael Field attributes the slump in ALP support to two- main factors: 
Fairness voters left because the Labor Party didn't seem to be 
sufficiently committed to jobs, and the quality of life voters left 
because Labor didn't seem to have sufficient commitment to 
environmental issues. The lack of self-definition and conflict over 
the environment meant that Labor was divided and lacking in 
direction. 39 
Field's assessment, based on the election of 17 Liberal MPs after seven years of 
pro-industry policy by the previous Liberal government, and only 13 Labor 
38 K.Crowley, 2000, "Disenfranchising the Greens: Labor's Electoral Reform Strategy in 
Tasmania", paper presented to APSA Conference, Australian National University, October 2000 39 M.Field, 1997, "Progressive government in minority: a contradiction in terms?", Legislative Studies, Vol.11 No.2, 64 
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members would appear justified. The election of the five Greens also supports 
his assumption that Labor - and Liberal - had not demonstrated sufficient 
concern for environmental issues. Post-materialist values, first represented 
politically by the UTG in the 1970s, were, and continue to be, problematic for 
traditional labour/ capital-based parties. 
The formation of a Labor minority government based on their lowest ever 
vote and supported by an emerging party riding a wave of electoral 
endorsement was more a matter of government by default than government by 
approval. While the Liberal Party won more seats than either the ALP or the 
Greens, more voters (51.8%) did not want a Liberal government than did. 
Equally true, however, is that fact that 64% of voters preferred not to have a 
Labor government. That the Greens supported Field in government rather than 
Gray, despite the plunge in Labor support, is due to a number of factors, 
notwithstanding Gray's withdrawal from negotiations in the face of a 
"backbench revolt"401 but it is also an indication of a political similitude between 
left-wing labour values and post-materialist 'green' values. Hay believes that 
for the Greens, the only "realistic option . .. [is] some form of alliance with the 
traditional party of labour. 1141 The informal alliance between the Tasmanian 
Greens and the Liberal Party after the 1996 election, which allowed the Liberals 
under Tony Rundle to form minority government, can be seen as a political 
anomaly and will be discussed later in this chapter. However, anomalous or 
not, it nonetheless points to the totality of the integration of green political 
ideals into the political system in the late 20th century. 
The minority Labor government that formed under the Labor-Green Accoi:d 
was not a coalition. Despite the Liberal Party's assertions during the 1992 
election campaign that the state economy had stalled largely as a result of the 
Greens in government, this was not the case42• The Accord delivered 
40 Haward and Smith, 1990, "The 1989 Tasmanian Election: The Green Independents Consolidate", Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol.25, pp.196-217 4 1 P.Hay, (1998) op cit., 103 
42 Hay and Eckersley (1993) op cit. 
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government to the ALP in return for a written agreement, as part of the terms of 
the Accord, on specific reforms and policy, and an unwritten expectation that 
the Greens would be consulted on matters of policy development and 
implementation. The ink had barely dried on the Accord, however, before the 
ALP, believing itself to be "under no obligation to take up any part of the Green 
agenda that was not specifically written into the Accord document"43, proceeded 
to govern as though they held the majority in their own right. 
The Accord in practice is widely regarded to have been a failure, and 
certainly the political fallout from the experiment appears to support that view. 
It ended after two and a half years of acrimony between Premier Field and 
Greens Leader Bob Brown, a no confidence motion in the Education Minister by 
the Greens (upheld by the Liberal opposition), a hostile Upper House, anti-
Green dissent on the streets, instability in government and further alienation of 
Labor's core support44 • It did, however, deliver on several of the Greens' key 
issues, with the doubling in size of the Western Tasmania World Heritage 
Wilderness and consumer protection laws, both enacted within the first twelve 
months of the government's term. Although the strongly conservative, anti-
Green Upper House blocked reform in gay laws, Aboriginal land rights and 
'death with dignity'45 ( euthanasia by omission rather than commission), and the 
ALP reneged on several of their agreements, the Accord placed the Greens' 
progressive reforms firmly on the political and governmental agenda. At the 
ensuing 1992 election, the ALP vote plummeted to an all-time low of 28.9% and 
the Greens vote dropped to 13.4%, still sufficient to enable them to hold all five 
seats. The Liberal Party, under the leadership of Ray Groom, formed majority 
government and immediately announced that the economy was the major 
priority, thus relegating environmental issues to the political backburner. 
43 ibid.91 
44 Crowley (2000) op cit. 
45 Brown and Singer (1996) op cit. 
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The question, is not whether the Accord was a success or a failure, but 
whether it was a necessary or useful mechanism of green democratisation and 
integrationism. In order to address this, it is necessary to take into account the 
specificities of the Tasmanian political situation and the temporal and spatial 
placement of the red-green convergence, both locally (Tasmania) and globally in 
relation to political and parliamentary process. The move from environmental 
activism towards green democratisation began, on a local scale as well as 
national and insofar as the formation of the UTG preceded that of the New 
Zealand Values Party by two months, global, in Tasmania in 1972. It was a 
further ten years before the election of Australia's first Green parliamentarian 
and _another seven before the Greens gained a position of politico~institutional 
power in Australia through the Labor-Green Accord. The Tasmanian economy, 
heavily reliant on resource extraction, has always been the central issue for 
successive state governments, and provision of employment is a function of that 
centrality. In a political and economic climate dominated by traditional labour 
and capital based parties, the emergence of environmentalism and a party based 
on post-materialist values was perceived as a threat, not only to the political 
institutions, but to the state economy and the livelihoods of the working 
population. ''The environmental movement in Tasmania has generally focused 
on 'extra parliamentary' processes"46, and in the seventeen years between the 
inception of the UTG and the execution of the Accord, it was these processes 
that delivered success on the Franklin campaign and the Wesley Vale Pulp Milt 
and were instrumental in Labor's reinvention of itself, after its 1982 defeat, in a 
slightly greener light. The green light went out shortly after the signing of the 
Accord, but by then environmental policy was already entrenched. 
Green democratisation and integrationism, represented by ecological 
modernisation and the 'greening up' of traditional capital and labour based 
politics, is less defined in Tasmania, with its long economic reliance on resource 
46 Haward and Smith (1990), op cit., 197 
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extraction, than in jurisdictions where 'quality of life' and post-materialist 
values have emerged as political issues. The principles of this green political 
approach are evident, however, not just in the presence of the Greens in the 
state legislature, but prior to that in such organisations as The Wilderness 
Society, formed specifically to oppose the hydro-industrialisation of the south-
west wilderness after the flooding of Lake Pedder, and every bit as political as 
the Greens. It was the strength of the organised campaign and the extra-
parliamentary processes that bridged not only Bass Strait, but social and 
political divisions, resulting in Federal ALP' s pre-election promise to override 
state government legislation. The presence of first Dr Sanders and then Dr 
Brown in the Tasmanian Lower House provided a local focus for _the campaign 
and tangible evidence that environmental issues were electorally viable. 
To date it would appear that the convergence of the ecological and socialist 
ideologies ensures that it is the social democratic parties towards which the 
Greens are more likely to lean. Political history of the past three decades in 
Australia certainly indicates that the ALP has been more inclined towards 
environmental policy integration than the Liberal Party, and the 'grassroots' 
democracy style of administration advocated by the Greens sits more easily 
with the ALP view of rank and file membership than with the Liberal style of 
executive leadership. Distribution of Greens preferences also strongly indicates 
that the vast majority of Greens voters favour the social democrats47, a fact 
which, evidenced by the Accord, leads to the ALP and the Greens competing for 
the same electoral turf and as a result trying to discredit one another on points 
of departure. This fact alone indicates a considerable political and ideological 
overlap in terms of the green-left convergence and integrationism. Former 
Tasmanian Premier Michael Field acknowledges that the Greens and Labor 
share much the same constituency, pointing out, in terms of the Accord, that: 
The Greens couldn't really have the Labor Party appear to be 
47 Haward and Smith (1990) op cit., 208 
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performing too well without risking sections of their vote moving to 
the Labor Party. In middle class areas of the State the vote was 
progressive but split between Labor and Green 48 . 
Crowley concurs, pointing out after the 1998 Tasmanian election that "the Labor 
Party ... has always been struggling with how to overcome the desertion of the 
Green intelligentsia as its constituency."49 The most effective answer has been to 
accede to the Greens, including the 'extra-parliamentary' green organisations, in 
matters of environmental policy and the wider 'green' agenda of social and 
economic justice. 
The Accord failed to produce this overlap, instead accentuating and 
exacerbating the ideological differences between the two parties and the 
personal cliff erences between Field and Brown. While the presence of elected 
representatives of the environmental movement, in the form of the Greens, in 
conjunction with the extra-parliamentary processes of the green movement, 
have been able to guide, cajole and in some cases, inculcate, government 
towards integration of the green agenda within their policy frameworks, the 
Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord did little in terms of facilitating this process. 
The process of integration itself was already entrenched prior to the 1989 
election through the policy platform of the ALP50, and the dissolution of the 
Accord, functionally in 1990 and absolutely in 1992, saw the reintroduction of 
executive-style government with an emphasis on industry and development as 
a means of kick-starting the ailing state economy. The Greens were made the 
economic scapegoat by both major parties and the political integration of the 
environment proceeded in the form of the more bureaucratic and institutional 
processes of environmental impact assessments and policy development. 
48 Field (1997) op cit. 65 
49 K.Crowley, 1998, "Greens Decimated in Tasmanian Election", Earthbeat, ABC Radio National interview, 5th September 1998, transcript 
http:/ /www.abc.net.au/m/ science/ earth/ stories/ s12~41.htm 50 P.Hay (1998) op cit 
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Alliances 2: The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, 1999 - 2002 
The New Zealand Values Party formed in 1972, two months after the United 
Tasmania Group. It is tempting to immediately draw comparisons between the 
two parties and the circumstances of their formation, and this will be done, but 
only in the limited context relevant to this thesis. With this in mind, the Values 
Party (later the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand) and its relationship with 
the NZ Labour Party provides a much clearer example of green democratisation 
and integrationism than the UTG (reincarnated as the Tasmanian Greens), 
whose strained relationship with the ALP was compounded by unique 
economic factors. The proposed flooding of Lake Manapouri in the South 
Island of New Zealand for hydro-electricity in the 1960s was the first major 
campaign to galvanise the emergent NZ environmental movement. Opposition 
to wilderness destruction through hydro-industrialisation, however, is much 
where similarities between Values and UTG stop with regard to the emergence 
and early rise of the respective parties. The Values Party did not form as a 
direct result of the ultimately successful Save Manapouri campaign, rather 
growing, some years later, from a groundswell of discontent among the young, 
largely university educated, post-materialist generation51 : 
New Zealand is in the grip of a new depression. 
It is a depression which arises not from a lack of affluence but almost 
from too much of it. 
It is a depression in human values, a downturn not in the national 
economy but in the national spirit.52 
Environmental issues had been part of the New Zealand political agenda 
since the 19th century when a concern about clear-felling of forests "and the 
51 S.Rainbow, 1989, "New Zealand's Values Party: The Rise and Fall of the First National Green Party", in Hay, Eckersley and Holloway (eds), (1989) op cit. 52 Introduction to the Values Party 1972 manifesto, quoted in R.Wilson, From Manapouri to_ Anamoana: the battle for New Zealand's environment (Auckland: Earthworks Press, 1982) 186 
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prospect of timber famine" 53 precipitated the Forest Act 187 4, 1885, 1921-22. Up 
until the 1970s however, environmental legislation had been piecemeat dealing 
with discrete and isolated concerns as they arose as problems and therefore 
addressing each issue after the fact and with no apparent thought to the 
ecological relationships between them. The interrelationships between 
humankind and nature were still the premise of ecology and not part of the 
socio-political mechanisms of government, although Biihrs points out that it 
was during the 1960s that "the term environmental policy was coined to express 
the need for a comprehensive and integrated government response to 
environmental problems, given their interdependence."54 The rise of the Values 
Party, as indicated by their name, was recognition of the nature-society 
relationship not as a dichotomy but an ecosystem incorporating a system of 
values transcending the traditional economic and administrative preoccupation 
of government. The environment movement, along with the women's, peace 
and anti-nuclear movements were included in Values as part of a broad-based 
inclusive and participatory politics55 • Unlike UTG there was no single catalytic 
event to provide the springboard for a new politics, although the compounded 
effect of environmental degradation, from air pollution in Christchurch and 
hydro-industrialisation in the Otago region to logging on the west coast and 
water pollution in Auckland Harbour, were instrumental factors in New 
Zealand's green democratisation and the values enshrined in the new party. 
The 1980s were politically characterised in both Australia and New Zealand 
by centre-left Labour governments with strong economic growth agendas. The 
governments of Bob Hawke and David Lange respectively oversaw financial 
deregulation, increased emphasis on establishing an antipodean presence in the 
53 Dixon et al., 1989, "Changing Environmental Administration in New Zealand: Advance or 
Retreat?" in Hay, Eckersley and Holloway (eds) (1989) op cit., 145 54 T.Biihrs, "Environmental Policy", in Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics in Transition (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997) 287 (original italics) 
55 D.Downes, 2000, "The New Zealand Environmental Movement and the Politics of Inclusion", Australian Journal of Political Science Vol 35, No.3, pp. 471-491 and R.Wilson (1982) op cit. 
131 
global economy, although this was more the case in Australia than in New 
Zealand, and a growth in domestic employment. Both governments blamed 
their conservative predecessors for excesses in spending and protectionist 
policies that saw domestic employment markets shrink and, in New Zealand 
particularly, the domestic economy stall to crisis point. This was also the 
consolidation period of integrationism, with environmental issues gaining 
higher priority on government agendas indicating a progressive mainstreaming 
of the green agenda, and green democratisation with, for the first time federally 
in Australia, candidates elected to the Senate on specific green issues56 • As 
discussed previously, one of the first acts of the incoming Hawke government in 
1983 was to deliver on its pre-election promise to overturn Tasmanian 
government legislation on the damming of the Franklin. Similarly, Prime 
Minister Lange reversed the economically crippling so-called II think big" course 
of former Prime Minister Muldoon57, delivering on a pre-election promise in 
establishing a new Ministry of the Environment following from an 
Environmental Forum in 1985 and over the next few years enacting legislation 
on the wider 'green' social justice agenda in such areas as anti-nuclear policy 
and homosexual law reform. In a political climate dominated by economic 
growth, however, the Values Party all but disintegrated. Its electoral successes 
of the mid-1970s, when it won a creditable 5.3% of the vote in the 1975 election, 
which, under the first-past-the-post (PPP) electoral system did not result in any 
seats, dwindled to 2% in 197858 and .19% in 198159 • During the 1980s Values 
remained on the political fringe, visible at local level with some successes in 
56 Jo Vallentine (Nuclear Disarmament Party) 1984 and 1987; Dr Norm Sanders (Australian 
Democrats) 1985; Robert Wood (NDP) 1987 (subsequently disqualified under the provisions of 
the Electoral Act 1918); Irina Dunn (NDP) 1988 
57 S.Rainbow (1989) op cit. 
58 The 1978 NZ election saw a massive backlash against the conservative Muldoon government. 
Under the FPP electoral system, a vote for a minor party is, essentially, a 'wasted' vote, and 
many former and potential green voters abandoned Values at that election in an attempt, 
unsuccessful, to remove Muldoon. This occurred again, with the same result, in 1981. 59 Wilson (1982) op cit., and C.Dann, "Greens in Time and Space: The History of the Green 
Party" on the Greens NZ website, 2002, http:/ /www.greens.org.nz/about/history.htm 
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local government elections, but only nominally still in existence at national 
level: In 1990, under the new name of the Green Party of Aotearoa New 
Zealand which acknowledged the merger of Values with a number of non-party 
aligned green groups, the party re-emerged to contest the 1990 general election, 
"winning 7% of the total vote"60• 
The left-green political convergence that occurred in New Zealand was far 
more pronounced than in Tasmania, where environmental, rather than political, 
issues dominated the rise of the UTG. Early membership of the Values Party 
was dominated by left wing supporters, many of whom were politically 
experienced, who had become disillusioned with the flagging left-wing values 
of the Labour Party61 • While the socialist core of the party was concentrated in 
Christchurch, their views on a class-based politics, according to Rainbow, were 
not necessarily shared by the broader membership: 
John Stewart, the Party's main strategist and national organiser 
(1976-78), tried to tie the socialist analysis that was predominant in 
Christchurch together with the environmental emphasis of the 
majority of the Party but without success. The tactics and traditional 
leftist rhetoric of the 'Christchurch Cabal' simply served to alienate 
many of their fellow Party members.62 
The early attempt at ecosocialism was a failure, not because it lacked substance 
or ideology, but rather due to lack of tradition. As Dann notes, "it was very 
difficult having to invent Green politics before the term 'Green' was even 
coined"63 • At the same time, however, the Labour Party was also undergoing 
change, incorporating many of the changes that have come to characterise the 
Green Party: a more participatory style of party structure and a policy platform 
reflecting many of the post-materialist values that had attracted the young, 
educated and professional sector to the Values Party resulted in Labour 
60 Dann (2002) op cit. 
61 Rainbow (1989) op cit. 
62 ibid. 177 
63 Dann (2002) op cit. 
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membership increasing during the 1970s, coinciding with the decline of Values 
after its early peak in 197564 • The left-wing ideology of the Values Party, 
however, has provided a firm political standing for the modern Green Party, 
with current co-leader, Jeanette Fitzsimons, saying that even though the basis of 
green politics is the slogan 'neither left nor right but ahead', she regards herself 
and the Party as occupying a political position considerably to the left of the 
current Labour Party65 • 
The red-green alliance in New Zealand was the result of a number of 
factors, both structural and ideological. In 1991 five centre-left minor parties 
(Liberal, Democrat, Mana Motuhake, New Labour and Green) formed the 
Alliance. Rainbow writes that the Greens' decision to join the Alliance was 
based on the common 'worldview' of the involved parties: 
The Alliance unites people who are vehement in their opposition to 
the free-market economic policies that have dominated New Zealand 
public policy since the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 
1984. The Alliance parties are united by their estrangement from the 
dominant spirit of the age as well as from established channels of 
in£1 d 66 uence an power. 
An alternative view of the motivation for the Greens to join the Alliance is that 
the Greens were not sufficiently confident in electoral system changes to resist 
the attempt by New Labour to neutralise what was clearly its main competitor 
for the centre-left electorate, and while there was some reluctance within the 
party to the concept of the Alliance, there was nonetheless sufficient willingness 
to go ahead67 • In 1993 the New Zealand electorate decided by referendum to 
end the PPP electoral system in favour of mixed member proportional system 
(MMP), which allocates seats on the basis of a single-member electorate and a 
64 Rainbow (1989) op cit 
65 Interview with Jeanette Fitzsimons and Rod Donald, Ashburton NZ, 18th May 2001, transcript 
in possession of author 
66 S.Rainbow, 1995, "Greens within an Alliance: The New Zealand Experience", Environmental 
Politics, Vol.4, No.3, pp 475-480 
67 T.Bale and C.Dann, 2002, "Is the Grass Really Greener?", Party Politics Vol.8 No.3 
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compensatory party quota. The first election was held under the new system 
was in 1996, resulting in a centre-right coalition government of the conservative 
National Party and the populist New Zealand First Party; two Greens were 
elected under the Alliance banner. 
The Greens membership of the Alliance lasted until 1997 when they 
withdrew in order to field their own list for the 1999 election, a move which saw 
Green co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimons narrowly win her electorate of Coromandel 
and the Green Party overall narrowly exceed the 5% threshold required for 
representation under the MMP system, resulting in seven members of the Green 
list taking their seats in the New Zealand Parliament. Prior to the election, 
Labour and the Alliance had come to an agreement to form a coalition 
government. In the event, the Labour-Alliance coalition fell two seats short of 
majority government and governed with a guarantee of support on confidence 
and supply from the left-wing Green Party. This guarantee resulted in some 
concrete gains for the party, but the relationship was not without its stresses 
and strains68 • These became obvious during the election campaign of 2002, 
especially over the issue of genetic engineering, and were crucial in the 
reelection of the Labour-led minority government, which then negotiated a 
similar agreement, not with the Greens, but with a centre party. 
As was the case in Tasmania during the Accord, the NZ Green Party 
between 1999 and 2002 was not part of a coalition and was not in government. 
Unlike the Tasmanian Green Independents, however, there was no formalised 
agreement with the governing coalition. It is important to note, however, that 
the Greens and Labour negotiated a 'cooperation agreement'. This falls short of 
a guarantee on confidence and supply, but is nonetheless significant69 • Dann 
6s 'b 'd 1 1 . 
69 'b 'd 1 1 . 
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points out that the world's first two green parties grew out of a common 
distrust of the Labo( u)r Parties: 
In the origins and development of these two parties we can see the 
key themes of the new Green politics developing. These include: 
(1) the reaction against labour parties and politics for being 
(initially) pro-growth and (latterly) pro-globalist; 
(2) a continuation of the 'new politics' of the new social 
movements (including both policies and styles of activism); 
(3) the critique of industrialism and consumerism; 
(4) developing global awareness and connections, and 
participation in global networks.70 
This, of course, raises the inevitable question of why the Greens tend to align 
with Labo(u)r? There are obvious parallels between conservatism and 
conservationism, which will be analysed more fully later in this chapter, and, as 
summarised by Dann above, obvious contradictions between a politics of 
environmentalism and the left-wing. The cooperative association between the 
NZ Green Party and the Labour-Alliance coalition is based on a synthesis of 
'new politics' values and 'old left' ideology. It is significant that the move 
towards a values-based post-materialist politics to challenge the Labo(u)r 
parties occurred at the same time as the 'old left' parties were remodelling 
themselves within a capitalist framework. Additionally, while the social and 
economic justice agenda has paved common ground between green and red 
alliances, much of the common ground between Labour and the Greens was 
essentially environmental. In the lead-up to the 1999 election Labour 
announced policy to end native logging on the west coast of the South Island, 
representing a major gain for the Greens, as was Labour's promise of a Royal 
Commission on GE/GM. The main divergence between the parties, prior to 
Labour's announcement that the GE moratorium will be lifted in October 2003, 
7
° C.Dann, (2000) "From Earth's Last Islands: The Global Origins of Green Politics", 
unpublished thesis, (Christchurch: Lincoln University) 240 
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occurred over changes to the Employment Relations legislation where the 
Greens pushed for a more pro-union portion. Clearly, while Labour is willing 
to come to the negotiating table on environmental issues, they are less willing to 
allow Green input in their traditional area of labour economics71 • 
Based on the premise that the 'political community' consists in human 
society as well as the institutions of government, then green democratisation 
(where the environment gained institutional representation within the liberal 
democratic structure) and integrationism (where environmental issues are 
integrated within government policy and its supporting bureaucracy), 
developed from a view that the existing political approach had ceased to 
adequately meet social needs in respect of the environment. These needs, as 
evidenced during the period of revolution that preceded green democratisation 
and integrationism, included a more broad-based approach to policy that 
recognised the complexity of the human-nature interrelationship as well as 
more equitable government provision of social services in terms of health, 
education and social welfare. The rise of Values and the UTG in New Zealand 
and Tasmania during the early 1970s signalled the emergence of this new · 
'green' political direction. Neither party survived in its original form past the 
1970s, although Values remained active at local level, but green democratisation 
and integrationism proceeded where the actual parties left off, having by that 
time provided the bridge between institutional politics on the one side, and the 
politics of social movements on the other. 
The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord was, in these terms, a failure. It 
delivered some tangible results, but the antagonism generated between the ALP 
and the Greens during this time was a factor in the 1998 'reform' of the 
Tasmanian Lower House from 35 to 25 members and a raising of the quota 
necessary for election: effectively a bi-partisan move to eliminate the Greens 
from the Tasmanian Parliament. Green democratisation and integrationism, 
71 It is relevant that while the Greens view the GE issue as primarily environmental, Labour view 
it as economic in terms of employment and trade. 
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while less accepted in the resource-dependant Tasmanian economy, were 
progressing due to electoral necessity while the written terms of Accord were 
inflexible and did not allow for the natural integration of environmental policy 
means, rather, presuming to force environmental measures on a ·government 
disinclined to be either sympathetic or manipulated. Hay argues further that 
the Accord in practice showed the Greens to be every bit as 'old politics' as the 
ALP in their approach to dealing and negotiating72 despite the 'new politics' 
rhetoric. The 1999-2002 agreement of support on confidence and supply 
between the NZ Greens and the Labour-Alliance coalition was relatively and 
comparatively successful possibly because it was not a formal written 
agreement, therefore allowing for flexibility in execution. In this situation, the 
Greens are afforded access to government but remain autonomous and 
unbound in terms of negotiation. Integrationism, under this arrangement, 
occurs more through consensus and instrumentality on both sides rather than 
coercion. 
Alliances 3: Die Grunen-SPD Coalition, Germany, 1998-2002 · 
The German Green Party (Die Grunen) formed in January 1980 as a 
"heterogeneous alliance of activists from diverse political backgrounds, but who 
shared a deep discontent with the 'party cartel"'73, and the first party to use the 
term 'green'. The German green movement differed from its Australasian 
counterparts in two major respects: (1) it was largely the product of the anti-
nuclear and peace movements of the 1960s; and (2) the green movement itself 
was more organised as a cohesive political force. Frankland and Schoonmaker 
state that the Greens "represent an organizational experiment" in combining 
grassroots activism with electoral politics74 • After an initial electoral failure in 
72 Hay (1998) op cit. 108-109 
73 E.G.Frankland and D.Schoonrnaker, Between Protest and Power: The Green Party in Germany (Boulder: Westview, 1992) 1 
74 ibid.2 
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the 1980 federal election, despite successes during the same period at state 
(lander) level, the party regrouped and consolidated, taking 28 seats in the 1983 
federal election with 5.2% of the vote under proportional representation. The 
emergence of the Greens was not sudden, having campaigned actively at local 
and lander level as a fractured alliance of separate branches since the mid-1970s 
and, as a loosely-bound alliance of green groups they contested the 1979 Euro 
elections, winning a creditable 3.2% of the vote. The appearance at federal level, 
however, of a party whose members were street activists and protestors, 
ignored the customary codes of dress in the parliamentary chamber75, and 
whose politics were overtly anti-establishment, raised some consternation. The 
Greens were variously suspected of being proto-nazi and subversively 
communist76• After some early ideological conflict between the 'new left' and 
the conservative wings of the party, the Greens established themselves as a left-
wing post-materialist alternative to the established political institution. 
It is the nature of political parties, as opposed to social movements or 
pressure groups, to aspire to power through winning political office. 
Consequently, it is the goal of winning political office that is the predominant 
motive behind the formation of coalitions77 • Where one party can win sufficient 
seats in a parliament to allow it to assume government in its own right, it is 
highly unlikely that a coalition would form or be maintained78 • Political power, 
within the liberal democratic framework, is vested in institutional party 
75 J oschka Fischer, current leader of Die Grunen, drew attention on entering the Bundestag as an 
elected member in 1983 when he turned up in running shoes and a sports jacket. The nature of 
the Greens' image as different from the political establishment is perhaps best represented 
currently by NZ Green MP, Nandor Tanczos, a Rastafarian who w ears dreadlocks and a hemp 
suit in parliament. 
76 Frankland and Schoonmaker (1992) op cit. 
77 C.Lees, The Red-Green coalition in Germany: Politics, personalities and power (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000) 
78 The exception is the federal Liberal-National coalition in Australia, where the Liberal Party 
held sufficient seats to govern in its own right from 1996-98. Maintaining the formal coalition, 
however, ensured continued National Party support when the Liberal majority was eroded in 
1998. 
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structures as rational actors that behave according to conventions. Given this, 
such early assertions of Die Griinen as being the "anti-party party"79 appear 
somewhat incongruent with the entry of the party into coalition government at 
federal level with the SPD in 1998; an incongruity that goes right to the core of 
green political philosophy. The status of Germany as one of the world's more 
advanced 'green' nations in environmental policy and a leader in ecological 
modernisation80 also raises the question of the need, in terms of the green 
agenda, for the Greens to enter into a coalition government which has, in the 
four years of its existence, threatened on several occasions to destroy the Greens 
and the government. The conundrum of the Greens, to pursue power and risk 
compromising principles, or to eschew power and risk compromising their 
political agenda, is fundamentally interwoven with green democratisation and 
integrationism. The electoral fortunes of Die Griinen during the 1980s and early 
90s were a direct reflection of the mainstream political integration of 
environmental policy. At the 1990 federal election the Greens failed to reach to 
5% quota and lost their parliamentary representation. Papadakis points out that 
this result did not indicate a "fundamental decline in environmental interest .. . 
a key determinant in the poor performance by the Green Party was the ability of 
established parties to adapt to and co-opt the green agenda. 1181 
The rise of the Green Party in Germany, as in other countries, has been very 
closely associated with a rise in post-materialist values. These values, 
represented by the social movements of the apocalypticist period, were 'owned' 
to an extent, by the generation born after the Second World War, the 'baby 
boomer' generation. It was this generation that was entering adulthood at the 
time of the social revolutions, and, in many respects formed the vanguard of 
79 P.Kelly, "Towards a Green Europe, Towards a Green World", Nonviolence Speaks to Power (Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, Honolulu, 1992) published electronically: http:/ /www2.hawaii.edu/uhip / green.bet 80 J.Dryzek The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
81 E.Papadakis, Environmental Politics and Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 66 
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sweeping social change. The emergence of the Green Party as the political 
manifestation of these values is significant in the wider context of post-
materialism. The appearance of Die Griinen in the Bundestag in 1983 not only 
raised concerns about their inherent political proclivities, but also a certain 
amount of scepticism about their future as a long-term political party. The 
demise of the UTG after their 1975 electoral failure, and the decline of the 
Values Party after their drubbing in 1978 may have indicated to German 
sceptics that Die Griinen was not a serious contender for political credibility. 
History, however, has proved otherwise. The political manifestation of post-
materialism represented (and represents), for many voters who were members · 
of social movements, activists or protestors during the period of social 
revolution, a political symbolism of their beliefs. Inglehart' s work on the impact 
of values on political orientation indicates that, while post-materialist values are 
more typical of younger people, there is evidence of a trend towards a gradual 
generational movement towards post-materialism: 
We find stable intergenerational value differences. This implies that, 
other things being equal, we will witness a long-term trend toward 
postmaterialist values as one generation replaces another. A good 
deal of intergenerational population replacement has already taken 
place from 1970 to 1986. During these years, most of the 1886-1905 
birth cohort died off. They were replaced by a much more numerous 
cohort born after 1955. In 1970, the postwar generation comprised 
only 20% of our sampling universe, those citizens over 15 years of 
age; in 1986, it constituted about one half.82 
This being the case, and also noting that the leaders of all three Green parties 
examined in this chapter were born in the immediate post-war ('baby boomer') 
era, the long-term future of the Greens as a values-oriented political party seems 
beyond question. 
82 R.Inglehart, "Political Value Orientationn in Jennings and van Deth (eds) Continuities in Political Action (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1989) 79 
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Prior to the 1998 German Federal election which saw the Greens enter into 
coalition with the SPD, they had been coalition partners in several lander 
governments, the first being the red-green coalition in Hesse (1985-87), where 
Joschka Fischer held the post of environment minister. There was, however, 
within the party structure, a fundamental opposition to the 
'parliamentarisation' of the Greens, with many members believing that the 
integration of the Greens into the institutional process, and especially to II share 
overall governmental responsibility with other parties" was a compromise of 
basic principles83 • This feeling ultimately became the polarising factor that 
divided, and still divides, the German Greens into the two factions of realos and 
fundis, with the former believing that the best way to change the system is to do 
·so from a position of influence within, and the latter taking the activist approach 
of no compromise and no deals. By the mid-1980s, the realos "were eager to 
experiment with modes of cooperating with the SPD, including formal 
coalitions"84, but in so doing, risked alienating the fundis who saw this move as 
tantamount to destroying the basic premise of the 'new politics' and post-
materialist values. 
Appraisal of the German red-green coalition in the light of the growth of 
post-materialist politics and in a climate of green democratisation and 
integrationism poses yet another question: that of the nature of political power 
and whether its acquisition in the form of the traditional institutional 
framework is a necessary factor in effecting political and institutional change. 
If, as already implied, the raison d'etre of political parties is the pursuit of elected 
office; and if, as also noted, the catalyst for the rise of 'new politics' in the form 
of green parties was discontent and disillusion with the traditional parties of the 
left, it follows that green parties reinvent the concept of political power 
according to the anti-establishment principles embodied in their policy and 
83 Frankland and Schoonmaker (1992) op cit. 153 
84 ibid. 153 
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procedural platform85 • This, to a greater or lesser extent, has been the case with 
the New Zealand Greens, who are applying their values to decision-making 
within the fixed liberal democratic framework. It would also be the case with 
Green parties in countries or regions where PPP electoral systems make it 
virtually impossible for minor parties to win office. In the case of the UK Green 
Party, for example, a definition of the concept of 'power' to include, for 
example, exertion of influence on policy-making, or promotion of 
environmental issues through politico-institutional processes must be 
acknowledged as valid reasons for a minor party to contest an election. The 
application of post-materialist values to the formation of coalitions must 
therefore also be valid. Lees, while stating that the assumption of political office 
is the dominant motive behind the formation and durability of coalitions, 
questions whether this is the sole reason and argues that: 
... within the context-rich environment found in European party 
systems, it is essential to include a 'policy dimension' and, in the case 
of Red-Green coalitions, environmental policy can be assumed to 
play an important role. It is the policy area most closely identified 
with the Greens and is at the core of their own self-identity and of 
external perceptions of them.86 
The formation of alliances between Greens and social democrat parties, then, 
rather than being founded on political ideology, exists instead in the context of 
post-materialist politics and as a direct extension of green democratisation and 
integrationism. The fact that to date, however, formal red-green alliances have 
been fraught with trouble would indicate that commonalities in policy direction 
are not a sufficiently solid foundation for a durable governing relationship. 
The issues of nuclear power and the military involvement of NATO in the 
Balkans illustrate the difficulties and moral ambiguities faced by Green parties 
attempting to drive a liberal-capitalist government policy agenda while holding 
85 M.Blakers (ed) The Global Greens (Canberra: The Australian Greens and the Greens Institute, 2001) 
86 Lees (2000) op cit., 8 
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to post-materialist principles. Nuclear disarmament and peace are cornerstones 
of the European green movement. They are the issues that galvanised the 
movement in the 1960s and led to the formation of the European Green parties 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They are also the issues that have created the 
most internal conflict within Die Grilnen since their entry into coalition 
government in 1998. After the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, the issue of 
phasing out nuclear power in Germany was elevated to the top of the Green 
agenda, with Red-Green coalitions and SPD governments at the lander level 
adopting strong stances with '"phasing out-oriented' implementation of nuclear 
regulation."87 The Greens' 1998 party-endorsed election campaign document: 
... set out a very strict commitment to phasing out nuclear ene_rgy in 
Germany. The Greens expressed their commitment to an immediate 
'exit' (Ausstieg) from nuclear energy, and promised to use all available 
administrative, economic and legislative means to implement such a 
1. 88 po icy. 
The Greens' series of compromises on this commitment, resulting in a policy 
that will see nuclear power stations phased out over the next 32 years89, is partly 
the result of their position as 'junior' partners in the coalition government and 
partly that of the reality of political institutionalisation. Their perceived 
capitulation on this issue both alienated the party membership and 
environmental and anti-nuclear groups, and weakened their credibility as a 
party of strong principles. 
Likewise, the 1998 vote in support of the US-led NATO bombing of Kosovo 
also threatened both coalition stability and the internal policy of Die Grilnen. 
The civil war in the Balkans and Chancellor Schroder's commitment to US 
President Clinton that it would support NATO strikes against Milosevic' s 
Yugoslavian army placed Die Grilnen leader and German Foreign Minister, 
87 W.Rudig, 2000, "Phasing Out Nuclear Energy in Germany", German Politics, Vol.9 No.3, pp.43-
80 
88 ibid. 54 
89 'b'd 1 1 . 
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Joschka Fischer, in the extremely difficult position of both handling 
responsibility for II maintaining the Federal Republic's 'Atlanticist' stance, which 
had been the cornerstone of German foreign polity in the post-war era" and 
being "the senior politician in a party with serious misgivings about the 
planned NATO action." 9° Fischer's support for Schroder was vehemently 
opposed by Environment Minister, Jurgen Tritten (Die Griinen), and "Fischer 
had reason to fear that the Kosovo crisis would provide his opponents within 
the party with the opportunity to split with the SPD and retreat back into the 
comfortable certainties of opposition."91 While both the nuclear power and 
Kosovo issues were resolved within the government through sound liberal-
democratic political process, both were viewed by Greens party members and 
green groups as direct compromises of principles by a party that was, in fact, an 
"institutionalised social movement"92• It is significant to note, however, that 
Fischer succeeded in arguing persuasively in the uniquely German context that 
in taking a pro-NATO stance the Greens and the coalition were also taking an 
anti-fascist position. 
These examples point to an inherent structural weakness in both the 
ideological and policy components of the coalition framework in relation to the 
nature of the Greens as the 'anti-party party', which brings us back to the 
concept of power and the question of whether the acquisition of power in its 
traditional political context is a necessary function of green politics. The 
German red-green coalition has placed the Greens in a position whereby it is 
politically obliged to govern not for its grassroots membership base, but for the 
mainstream German community. This, of course, is the fundamental tenet of 
parliamentary democracy and while the fundis will argue that green principles 
are in the best interests of the German population both now and in the long-
90 Lees (2000) op cit. 128 
91 ibid. 129 
92 Rudig (2000t op cit.46 
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term, it is the short-term decisions that prove the party's political and electoral 
credibility. It is therefore not just the concept of power that the Greens need to 
redefine according to their party principles, but the nature of democracy itself. 
This question is hardly novel. The perceived inability of traditional democratic 
institutions to deal with a looming ecological crisis, leading, ultimately, to the 
undermining of political stability93 was central to the view of the apocalypticist 
social revolutions that gave rise to the green movement and has challenged 
political scientists and green political theorists for at least two decades. The 
greening of democracy, in the form of Green parties, 'new politics' and the 
election of Green members, leading to the integration of environmental issues 
into the liberal democratic policy agenda, represents paradigmatic shift. In 
Germany this was evident in the entry of Die Grilnen to the lander parliaments 
and the Bundestag in the 1980s, and the subsequent move of the German 
government towards such environmental measures as the precautionary 
principle and ecological modernisation. The shift of the Green parties from 
'minor party' status to coalition partners and government represents the 
integration of the political product of the green movement itself. 
The Green-right scenario: Liberal Party and Tasmanian Greens, 1996-1999 
After the irreconcilable dissolution of the Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord 
in late 1991, the Liberal opposition guaranteed Field's minority government 
support on confidence until an election could be held. Premier Field returned 
early from his summer holiday and immediately advised the Governor to call 
an election for February. The Labor Party, facing certain defeat, promised there 
would be no more deals with the Greens, and that they would prefer to sit in 
opposition than enter into a minority arrangement94 • In the event, this 
declaration proved to be unnecessary, as the conservative Liberal Party, under 
93 B.Doherty and M.de Geus, Introduction in Doherty and de Cues (eds), Democracy and Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 1996) 11 
94 Field (1997) op cit. 
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the leadership of Ray Groom, won a majority of seats in a Labor rout. The 
Greens held all five seats, although their vote dropped to 13.4%, and the media 
portrayed them as the "big losers" of the election95 • During the next election, in 
1996, both Labor and Liberal ran anti-Green scare campaigns designed to attract 
voters to the major parties and away from the spectre of minority government 
with the Greens. Both parties promised not to deal with the Greens, with Labor 
candidates signing a pledge to that effect96 • The result was Liberal 16 seats; 
Labor, 14 seats; Greens, 4 seats; and 1 Independent. The Liberal Party, under 
new leader, Tony Rundle, immediately began talks with the Greens leader, 
Christine Milne to establish a "multi-party forum to explore more innovative, 
consensus-based mechanisms for government."97 
A former Convenor and campaign manager for the NZ Green Party, in an 
email ·discussion about the left.::right political allegiances of the Greens, agreed 
that the New Zealand and German parties would certainly identify as left: 
"but", she added, "Tassie is a law unto itself."98 This observation is significant 
not only in the analysis of the Tasmanian government in the closing few years of 
the 20th century, but also in relation to the questions raised about the concept of 
political power to a party that believes its source of political legitimacy to be 
grassroots democracy. Crowley points out that it "is little known that the 
greens in Tasmania are not only well aware of the electoral advantages of the 
state's Hare-Clark system of proportional representation, but have long sought 
the balance of parliamentary power."99 They have twice been successful in this 
aim. Former Premier Field, in a somewhat scathing critique of the 1996-99 
Liberal-Green minority government, paints the Greens as conservative 
apologists and political opportunists: 
95 Hay and Eckersley (1993) op cit. 
96 Crowley, 1996, "The Tasmanian State Election 1996: Green Power and Hung Parliaments", 
Environmental Politics Vol.5, No.3, pp 530-535 
97 ibid. 535 
98 C.Dann, pers. comm., quoted with permission 
99 Crowley (1996) op cit. 532 
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In 1996, the Greens supported the Government's right-wing Budget 
which was to see another 1,000 public servants removed from their 
jobs; they supported the expenditure of $1.2 million on a road over 
which they spent last summer in the trenches and were in fact 
arrested; they supported another $150,000 in policing the same road 
which was one of the last symbols of the environmental cause in 
Tasmania; and they withdrew an amendment to a Government bill, 
giving the go-ahead to environmental exemptions for a mining 
d 1 100 eve opment. 
· Speaker of the House of Assembly during the time of the Liberal minority 
government, Frank Madill, however, quotes statistics that tell a vastly different 
picture to the Green-sanctioned bulldozing of the Tasmanian environment that 
Field describes: 
From the beginning to late in October 1996 there were 45 divisions. 
The Liberals and the Greens voted together on 18 occasions; the 
Greens and the Opposition voted together on 21 occasions; and the 
Liberal Government and the Opposition voted together on four; and 
on two occasions there were conscience votes. So in fact, on the 
strength of divisions, at a quick glance one would say that the third 
party is certainly more supportive of the Opposition than it is of the 
Government.101 
While it must be noted that neither of these writers is entirely neutral in his 
assessment of the Greens in the Tasmanian Parliament, the point remains that 
the Greens, in nominally supporting a conservative government, assumed a 
position of power from whence they exercised a considered approach to 
decision-making on an issue-by-issue basis. Madill further points out that in 
terms of parliamentary process, the informal alliance of the Liberal government 
of Rundle supported by the four Greens provided "good Parliament": 
100 Field (1997) op cit. 63 
101 F.Madill, 1997, "Love and hate under the Hare Clark", Legislative Studies, Vol.11, No.2, pp 68-74 
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There is very little time-wasting in the Tasmanian Parliament at the 
moment, compared with the 10 years that I was there. There is no 
filibustering; there are no repeated quorum calls; there are no late 
night sittings ... There is a lot less aggravation; there is no name-
calling ... There is no use of the gag. There has been no curtailment 
of debate at all, except by mutual agreement. There has been no real 
disruption of Parliament ... 102 
The absence of the personality clash between Field and Brown that dominated 
during the period of the Accord must go some way towards explaining the 
more efficient and genial parliamentary process and should not be discounted. 
However, the more flexible terms of the minority government compared with 
the wholly inflexible Accord also allowed the Greens to exercise their values 
within the existing political structure in the same way as the NZ Greens in their 
alliance with the Labour government. 
Crucial to this analysis is the fact that in Tasmania both major parties have 
pursued similar policies of development and have consistently placed issues of 
economy above all else. The sight of Liberal and Labor competing for a 
relatively small constituency in a state with perpetual problems of 
unemployment and battling the green movement over the environment has 
been a feature of Tasmanian politics since the early 1970s. The small size of the 
Tasmanian Parliament, the electoral system and the policy agenda of the major 
parties has meant, for the Greens, that their mere presence in the Parliament is 
not sufficient to ensure green policy: they must be in a position to exert power. 
It is this, not a hidden conservative agenda, that led to the Liberal-Green 
alliance of the late 1990s, and it is this same factor that led to the Liberal-Labor 
electoral reform of 1998 aimed at eliminating the Greens from political 
representation103 • The reduction in the size of the House of Assembly, from 35 to 
25 members created a subsequent increase in the quota required for members to 
102 ibid. 69 
103 Crowley (2000) op cit 
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be elected. The move, which necessitated changes to the Tasmanian 
Constitution Act, was widely criticised by political scientists but supported by 
the business community104• An election was called immediately following the 
passage of the legislation and, as predicted, the Greens lost ~Jl but one seat with 
Labor winning sufficient seats to govern in their own right. 
The willingness of both major parties to act to disenfranchise the party 
which had allowed both to govern at different times is indicative of the 
perceived threat posed by environmentalism to the traditional resource-based 
Tasmanian economy. In the 2002 election campaign both major parties focused 
once again on the issue of employment: 
Job creation has held the focus at the start of week three of 
Tasmania's election campaign. 
And the pressure is building on the Liberals to show in detail how 
much their policies will cost. 
Labor and the Liberals agree that 12,000 jobs can be created in the 
next term of government but the two major parties differ on how it 
will be done. 
The Liberals say a stimulated small business sector is the key, while 
Labor is looking to big picture items including natural gas, Basslink 
and the new Bass Strait ferries. 105 
Given the parallel policy dimensions of the conservative and social democrat 
parties in Tasmania, the question of convergent political ideology with the 
Greens is an entirely hypothetical case. The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord 
and the 1996-98 alliance with the Liberal Party could both be regarded equally 
as politically aberrant and opportunistic by both the major parties. Green 
democratisation and integrationism is evident in the environment policies of 
both parties, but the 1998 electoral 'reform' designed to exclude the Greens from 
104 'b'd 1 1 . 
105 
"Jobs hot topic during third week of campaign" ABC news, 9th July 2002, 
http:/ /abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s602113.htm 
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the political process indicates that environmental policies exist only insofar as 
they are necessary to maintain electoral credibility and not as a means of 
effecting long-term change to resource-extractive economic development. 
Ideological similarities between the Green parties and left-wing parties 
have enabled red-green coalitions and alliances to function despite points of 
departure on issues of political methodology. Green democratisation and 
integrationism, evolved from the social revolutions of the 1960s and 70s, has 
provided a policy direction commensurate with both sides. Neither ideology 
nor policy alone has proved a sufficiently solid basis for cooperative and 
productive execution of government. Further, it is the wider green agenda in 
issues of social and economic justice that has afforded the Greens the political 
strength needed to form alliances with left-wing parties and define their 
distinction from right-wing parties. Integration of environmental policy across 
the political spectrum in the past two decades has blurred those distinctions. 
That the Greens formed out of discontent with the left-wing and centre-left 
parties they have since joined in government indicates a politics that has 
allowed the traditional parties of labour to reinvent themselves, if only 
superficially in some cases, along the ideological lines of the green movement. 
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Chapter 5 
Issues of social and economic justice: 
the correlative integration of social welfare and ecology 
The grass is always greener over the septic tank - Erma Bambeck 
Social issues, environmental campaign: the Snowy in social justice 
Insofar as appearances are valid indicators of such things, Dalgety does not 
give the impression of a hotbed of radical discontent. A tiny township with a 
population of less than 100, it is situated well away from the major roads that 
carry the tourists to the Snowy Mountains for the skiing in winter and 
watersports and bushwalking in summer. The post office closed over a decade 
ago along with the service station. The general store now acts as a postal 
agency, there is one hotel and a caravan park, the latter belonging to the Snowy 
River Shire Council and managed by a lessee. The road between Dalgety and 
the nearest town, Berridale, was sealed in 1999, and the sealing of the road to 
Jindabyne, about 45 kilometres away, was completed in 2000. There is only one 
sealed road within the town precinct, the others pitted with potholes and 
erosion gullies. The local school has two teachers and about 30 students, most 
coming from properties in the Dalgety-Numbla Vale region. It is not an affluent 
region; the land is marginal at best and the local economy highly vulnerable to 
seasonal fluctuations. Average annual rainfall is around 350 millimetres, 
compared to Jindabyne which receives around 700 millimetres. The biggest 
non-farm related business in the Dalgety area, the Snowy River Winery, about 
15 kilometres from town, is relocating its cellars and restaurant to Berridale in 
order to attract more passing trade. Where Jindabyne and Adaminaby are 
known as the towns that were relocated to make way for the Snowy Scheme, 
Dalgety is known only obscurely as having once been considered as a possible 
site for the national capital. To anyone passing through Dalgety- and these are 
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rare - the town would appear as an example of rural poverty: the dying 
country town. 
Councillor Richard Wallace, current Mayor of Snowy River Shire, is a fifth 
generation grazier from a property at Numbla Vale, a locality to the south-west 
of Dalgety township. In order to bring the council's attention to the appalling 
state of the Dalgety town water supply, drawn from the Snowy River, in 1999 he 
took a sample of the water to a council meeting. The water was brown and 
opaque. This had been the situation for over a year. With the water supply 
unsuitable for domestic use, most town residents simply installed rainwater 
tanks and bought water during the dry periods. While the water supplies in 
Jindabyne and Berridale were considered very good, and the council already 
had plans for major structural upgradings to the water supply at Adaminaby, 
Dalgety had been consistently overlooked. Councillor Neen Pendergast 
describes the Dalgety community as "fair dinkum people - they very seldom 
come to council with any complaint, and when they do, you can be sure ifs 
something pretty serious. They look after themselves.',i 
The Dalgety and District Community Association (DDCA) formed in 1991 
as a vehicle for the local community's self-reliance. In the wake of the post 
office closure, the Snowy River Shire Council had announced plans to close 
down the caravan park, situated on the bank of the Snowy River, and local 
residents, angered at the decision to close a viable business in a town that 
desperately needed all the business it could get, refused to accept the decision. 
Jo Garland, current president of the Association, remembers the day the "entire 
town stormed the council chambers in Berridale'1 2, presented the then Mayor, 
Councillor Keven Burke, with a petition, and demanded that the council 
reconsider its decision. Council did reverse the decision and appointed a new 
manager of the caravan park, Paul Leete, who subsequently became President of 
the DDCA and later the Snowy Alliance. While the DDCA originally formed as 
1 Discussions with Neen Pendergast between July 1999 and January 2001 
2 Interview with Jo Garland, April 4th 2002, transcript in possession of author 
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a local progress association, Garland recalls that the Snowy loomed as the 
dominant issue from the start3 • The federal government had announced its 
plans to corporatise the SMHEA, and it was recognised locally that this would 
be the only opportunity to save the river, and that no progress would be 
possible in business or other areas until and unless there could be progress in 
restoring the river. Against the government, the SMHEA, the National Farmers' 
Federation, the National Party, the irrigators' lobby and, initially, the Jindabyne 
community4, the DDCA galvanised and emerged as the driving force behind a 
campaign that was essentially environmental, but implicit throughout the 
campaign are issues of social justice. 
This chapter will examine the interrelationship of social and economic 
issues with the environment in the context of green political history using the 
Snowy River campaign as an example, and will also consider the 
interrelationship from ecosocialist and ecological perspectives. Environmental 
justice, broadly defined here as the ideal of a II democratic and egalitarian society 
composed of livable communities"5, is essentially the values-based interface 
between ecology and society. It will be used as an umbrella term to refer to the 
juxtaposing of nature and society covering such issues as the redistribution of 
resources currently inequitably distributed. Of necessity, environmental justice 
is linked with issues of social and economic justice, as the equitable distribution 
of resources is essentially "the politics of the 'commons"', and would thus "be 
the aim of a 'green' government". 6 
The level of awareness of environmental issues in contemporary society and 
the social normality attached to such activities as recycling, water and energy 
3 
.b.d 1 1 . 
4 Many Jindabyne residents, including the locally influential Chamber of Commerce, initially 
opposed increased flows in the Snowy River fearing that it would affect the water levels in Lake 
Jindabyne. SMHEA engineers later assured them that this w ould not be the case and the 
Jindabyne community supported the campaign in the final years. 
5 C.Foreman, The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice (Washington : The Brookings 
Institution, 1998) 4 
6 D.Wells and T.Lynch, The Political Ecologist (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 124 
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consciousness and reduction of greenhouse emissions, makes it relatively easy 
· to pinpoint when they were introduced as recommended practice and became 
generally accepted as routine actions. Provision of infrastructure such as 
recycling bins, as well as education programs aimed at promoting reductions in 
the consumption of water and energy are now commonplace across urban 
Australia. While community action on, and support for, environmental 
initiatives has become regarded as socially and ecologically responsible over the 
past three decades, opposition to measures that may impact negatively on the 
corporate machine remains strong in much of the business and industry sector. 
Integration of environmental policy into the political agenda has required 
governments to balance the demands of the electorate against the profit-
imperative of the liberal capitalist economy and the economic backing and 
benefits of multi- and transnational corporations. It is necessary, then, that this 
examination of issues of social and economic justice also considers the 
integration of green policy in relation to the global economy and the green 
movement's approach to the concept of globalisation, balanced against the 
introduction of a globalised green politics7 and social 'grassroots' acceptance of 
environmental measures. 
To reprise Porritt, "The state of the planet provides the context within which 
all politicians operate" .8 Drawing a line from this statement, the state of the 
planet provides the context for politics generally, and must be reflected in the 
instruments of politics and justice if the challenge of the environmental 
movement is to be effectively met. Moreover, politics and the institutions of 
government provide the only decision-making authority for environmental 
issues and as issues become more complex, that authority must expand to 
accommodate them9 • Political decision-making is most comfortable in the 
traditional areas of social and economic policy. Environmental legislation, in its 
7 M.Blakers (ed), The Global Greens (Canberra: The Australian Greens and The Green Institute, 2001) 
8 J.Porritt, Seeing Green (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1984) 25 (original emphasis removed) 9 D.Wells and T.Lynch, 2000 op cit., 111 
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earliest stages, was piecemeal and concerned primarily with human well-being 
within these traditional legislative areas. Regulatory acts on pollution and land-
clearing and the creation of national parks10 were aimed at maintaining 
environmental amenity for society. At this point the state of the environment 
was not considered in terms of its intrinsic value, long-term health or the 
complexity of its interrelationship with its human tenants except as a means of 
sustaining human life and livelihoods. Thus, problems were dealt with as they 
arose on an ad hoc basis with little or no attention to the cause-and-effect chain 
of long-term environmental modification. Technological advancements had 
provided human society with means by which nature's shortcomings could be 
addressed and the state of the planet was viewed not in the context of the total 
environment, but in terms of where it could be more productively utilised. 
It was under the auspices of the preservationist ethic that on October 17 
1949, the Governor General, William (later Sir William) McKell, announced that 
the Snowy Mountains Scheme was "the great conservation scheme for 
Australia." 11 The constitutional sleight of hand used by Prime Minister Chifley 
and his Minister for Works, Nelson Lemmon, to assume Commonwealth control 
of the Scheme in 1949 was vigorously opposed by Opposition Leader Menzies12, 
who accused the government of: 
... brushing aside the states and for assuming a power which ... it 
did not possess: and for enacting legislation therefore tainted with 
serious constitutional illegalities.13 
The constitutional issues pertain specifically to Section 100 of the Australian 
Constitution, which states that: 
The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or 
commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to 
1
° For example, the London Clean Air Act 1956 (UK); Scenic Preservation Act 1903 (NZ); Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 (NZ); Yellowstone Park Act 1872 (USA) 11 L.Wigmore, Struggle for the Snowy (1vfelbourne: Oxford University Press, 1968) 124 12 It is to be noted that Menzies, as Prime Minister, supported the Scheme 13 Collis, Snowy: the Making of Modern Australia (Sydney: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990) 38 
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the reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or 
• • • 14 rrngation. 
The background material prepared for the Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Bill 1997 
cites the Franklin Dam Case as the most recent High Court challenge to sl00, 
suggesting that: 
... the primary purpose of sl00 was to safeguard the rights of a State 
and its residents to the use of waters in rivers used for interstate 
trade and commerce including navigation and shipping.15 
Given that the provision of water for hydro electricity could be regarded as a 
"trading activity", it could follow that the building of a dam is "a preparatory 
act of trade and therefore, presumably, the law enabling the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme to proceed was a law with respect to 'trade or commerce'."16 The same 
co;nstitutional interpretation would be held to give ~he irrigators a constitutional 
right to the waters of the Snowy under the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Power Act 1949. 
The equitable distribution of a resource being a fundamental tenet of 
environmental justice, the campaign to save the Snowy was founded on 
. principles of social justice as much as it was on ecological integrity. This was 
expressed clearly in the Snowy Alliance's submission to the Senate Finance and 
Public Administration Legislation Committee, and noted in the committee's 
report (October 1997) on the provisions of the Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Bill 
1997: 
We are concerned that control of a large slab of south eastern 
Australia's water will be placed in the hands of a company ... that 
will fight vigorously to maximise the profits, resource availability 
and use at the expense of the environment and community values. 
14 Australian Constitution (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, updated to 
January 1998) 
15 
"The Commonwealth of Australia V. Tasmania: The Tasmanian Dam Case (1983)", quoted in 
Bills Digest No.70: Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Bill 1997 (Canberra: Australian Parliamentary 
Library, 1997-98) 
16 'b'd 1 1 . 
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The people along the Snowy River are fearful that corporatisation 
legislation will set up a priority for profit on power generation ahead 
of other more valued users. These fears are exacerbated by the 
proposal in the New South Wales legislation to grant an 
unprecedented 75 year water licence to the corporatised body, with a 
50 year option to renew .17 
The concerns of equitable resource distribution are reflected in the Issues Paper 
for the Snowy Water Inquiry (1998), which states: 
All the rivers under consideration by the Inquiry, including eastward 
and westward flowing rivers, are important to the communities 
established on them. Any change in flows will add to or reduce 
social values including heritage, cultural and localised community 
issues, depending on the river. For example, within the eastern part 
of the Snowy Mountains and in the Snowy River catchment, 
environmental flows may enhance social values.18 
While the DDCA strongly maintains that its focus for the past 11 years has been 
on the ecology of the river, underpinning that focus has been more complex 
issues of social justice, based on the inequitable use of the Snowy's flow for 
irrigation to the west of the mountains at the expense of the communities to the 
east: a concern first raised in the 1940s when "many from the long lamented 
"Cinderella of the Commonwealth" as Councillor Leo Barry dubbed the region, 
... felt as if they might be left out as they began to fear the loss of the upper 
Snowy flows to the west of the range."19 
Justice and law: anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches 
The 1960s heightened social awareness that the Earth's resources are not 
infinite and that those that are renewable may not be renewable in the average 
17 .b.d 1 1 . 
18 Snowy Water Inquiry: Issues Paper (Sydney: Snowy Water Inquiry, 1998) 20 
19 G.Byrne, 2001, "The Cinderella of the Commonweatlh: A Short History of the Snowy River 
Region's Loss of the Upper Snowy Region1 ' , (Snowy Alliance website: 
http://www.snowyriveralliance.com.a u / reports .htm) unpaginated 
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human lifespan, or even in the lifespan of the human species was not welcome 
. news during a period of economic boom and population growth. Which, of 
course, was the whole problem. The post-war population boom and rapid 
industrialisation had resulted in unprecedented consumption of resources and 
production of waste products and by-products. In a social climate where there 
was a perception that the political process had ceased to address the concerns of 
society and new answers were being sought, the realisation of an impending 
ecological crisis came as further evidence to the rising social movements of the 
inability of existing political institutions to provide for rapid and wide-ranging 
social change. 
The catalyst that gave rise to the modern environmental movement also 
challenged the political hegemony and social credibility of the government-
corporate nexus. Defined by a zero-sum game, the industry-environment 
dichotomy creates a tension between corporate governance and the green 
movement. The negotiations and compromises required for environmental 
policy are a function of this tension. Further, issues of social and environmental 
justice are not confined within the specificities of domestic policy, nor restricted 
to a specific timeframe or to the current generation. Intergenerational justice 
and cross-national and international approaches to fair and equitable 
distribution of wealth are central to social and economic justice20; so too is the 
question of the rights of humankind to a managerial approach towards the 
environment, the recognition of the intrinsic value of nature and the role played 
by governments in ensuring its protection. Environmental justice is not simply 
a matter of conserving natural resources: it is a complex and open-ended 
process that challenges such concepts of sovereignty, capitalism, power, 
economic growth, and democracy itself. 
A working definition of the concept of justice is necessary in order to 
delineate between social and economic justice and the legal and political 
20 Foreman (1998) op cit. 
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instruments of maintaining law. Of importance here is distributive rather than 
retributive justice, the former concerned with equity and fairness while the 
latter with punishment or corrective actions. Importantly, any definition of 
-justice is also inextricably linked to ethics, and these can be dependent upon any 
number of social and cultural factors. John Rawls states that ''justice is the first 
virtue of social institutions"21, while Low and Gleeson point out that "in justice, 
[how] we ought to behave socially is connected with how we perceive that 
society actually is structured."22 For the purposes of a definition for social and 
economic justice in the context of political ideology, I will presuppose the 
structure of the liberal-democratic society and its attendant institutions as the 
definitional political framework, as it is within this ideological ~d institutional 
structure that the evolution of environmental politics, including its associated 
ethics in relation to both the environment and society, has occurred. 
Taking this as the starting point, the example illustrated by the late 
H.C.Coombs describes the difference between law and justice thus: 
The process [of aboriginal displacement] begun in 1788 continues 
inexorably in our times. It is those lands, previously thought useless 
to white people, which are now being meticulously prospected and 
within which mining developments are occurring and are proposed. 
We have nov\r decided that the reservation of land 'for Aboriginal 
use and benefit' and even the recognition of Aboriginal title are to be 
interpreted as subject to the proviso that they must be available to 
white-controlled enterprises for such purposes as we consider in the 
'national interest'. The processes by which this phase of the 
occupation of Aboriginal land is being completed are justified by 
Acts of Parliament. .. 23 
Even while it is recognised that the colonisation, occupation and exploitation of 
21 J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 3 22 N.Low and B.Gleeson, Justice, Society and Nature (London: Routledge, 1998) 29 (original italics) 23 H.C.Coornbs, The Return of Scarcity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 137 
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aboriginal land without the permission or agency of the original owners is 
unjust, it is facilitated by Acts of Parliament which enshrine these actions and 
their motives as legally permissible. The use of terms such as 'national interest' 
imply that the extraction of natural resources by whatever means and from 
whatever lands, regardless of cultural significance or Indigenous sovereignty, is 
justified by the social and economic dominance of the colonisers over both land 
and original owners. The law is enacted by the few for the intended (and 
indirect) good of the many under the aegis of the liberal capitalist profit-motive, 
while justice remains unrealised and, in the case of Native Title, highly 
contentious. This example is also indicative of the systemic separation of the 
lower social strata from the natural environment under liberal democratic law. 
This point will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter, but it is of 
value to point out at this stage that the concept of justice is an aspect of the 
human-nature interrelationship and it is this point that is at the heart of this 
chapter on social and economic justice. 
The legal structure of the liberal democratic system is based on the state 
control of the instruments of legitimate coercion24 • Laws are justified in their 
universal applicability as being in the best interests of the society they serve: 
Law is a set of universal rules which applies equally to all, and 
represents rational-legal authority in society, as formulated by its 
duly chosen political elites.25 
No one is considered to be above the law, and those who are outside it are 
'brought to justice' for the good of society. Following Locke, the state is given 
the role of "protection of property, along with other private rights such as the 
right to personal security."26 Accordingly, there are laws against the taking of 
life and liberty, property theft, intimidation and assault and a range of other 
24 P.Dunleavy and B.O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1987) 180 
25 ibid. 180 
26 M.Fisk, The State and Justice: An essay in political theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 80 
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actions against the individual. Similarly, following Hobbes, there is an 
assumption that the state is "free to distribute wealth and organize trade as it 
will, provided only that it does not lose legitimacy in the process."27 There are, 
thus, laws against certain anti-social behaviours and crimes against the state. 
Laws, however, while based on the precepts of justice, are not necessarily of 
themselves just, or readily accord with the concept of ethical standards expected 
within a liberal society insofar as that refers to the rational foundation for moral 
judgment28 • While relatively recent laws preventing discrimination or 
vilification on grounds of race, religion, gender or sexual orientation protect and 
uphold the rights of certain groups, other groups and individuals are rendered 
effectively legally invisible or remain unprotected. For example, _the 
International Council of Jurists recently condemned Australia's laws in relation 
to the mandatory detention of child refugees as being in violation of the United 
Nations covenant protecting the rights of children. Despite this breach of 
international justice, Australian law, enacted by a government seeking 
reelection at a time of heightened concerns about national security, required that 
all refugees and asylum-seekers be detained regardless of their age. In a further 
example, the 'stolen generation' will forever stain Australia's history in terms of 
injustices perpetrated by law. Laws enacted for political gain, either for a 
government or an individual, are seldom just, in the Rawlsian sense of 
determining social arrangements that best facilitate equality in distribution of 
• · 29 JUStlce. 
How, then, does justice accord to nature? According to Lu, 
v ibid. 80 
Justice is the hallmark of human society, for outside of it lies only a 
vast morally incoherent world where justice has no meaning. Thus 
justice, like all virtues and vices, is particular to humanity, and while 
we may metaphorically use the language of justice to define acts of 
. 
28 J.Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 29 Rawls (1999) op cit. 
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the gods or fate or nature, in the end it is only human beings who 
can be just or unjust.30 
In relation to the environment, humans and human society can deliver justice 
on two levels: firstly, and on the basis of the environment encompassing and 
defining all human activity, justice refers to the equal and equally conditional 
rights of all peoples with respect to nature and natural resources; and secondly, 
in our duty towards nature as having moral considerability and intrinsic value. 
The concept of 'rights' is central to our notion of justice. Midgley points out that 
rights are not enshrined in law, and indeed, the reason for invoking them is 
frequently to "change laws so as to embody them."31 Further, while the concept 
and application of universal human rights is highly complex, the concept of 
rights for non-human nature remains abstracted by the limitations of human 
understanding. Rawls regards the subject as standing outside the parameters of 
a theory of justice32; Passmore argues that while there is a 'right' way for 
humans to treat animals, animals of themselves have no rights33; and Singer 
believes that it is" ethically indefensible" to discriminate against members of · 
non-human species simply on the basis of their non-humanness34 • Distributive 
justice, as a universal concept, must have universal applications, and insofar as 
the natural environment and non-human species are, in ecological and ethical 
considerations, interrelated with human life, it follows that there should be 
universal obligations in respect of nature as having moral considerability. 
Social and economic justice are functions of a society wherein all citizens 
have equal rights and access to the basic services expected within that society. 
3
° C.Lu, 1998, "Images of Justice: Justice as a Bond, a Boundary and a Balance", The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, Vol.6, No.l, pp 1-26 
31 M.Midgley, "Duties Concerning Islands", in Elliot and Gare (eds) Environmental Philosophy 
(St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983) 171 
32 Rawls (1999) op cit, 441 
33 J.Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature (London: Duckworth, 1974) 117 
34 P.Singer, "Ethics across the species boundary", in Low (ed), Global Ethics and Environment 
(London: Routledge, 1999) 146 
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Athanasiou cites environmental historian, Robert Gottlieb35, who describes the 
early movement for environmental justice as comprising: 
... the female-led municipal housekeeping movement, which 
focused on issues like sanitation, public health, and food and 
nutrition; the muckraker-inspired urban reform organizations and 
settlement houses, which led the push for better housing, for new 
regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, and 
for improving the harsh conditions of industrial labor; and the 
"sewer" socialists, who helped revolutionize municipal governance 
over the urban environment.36 
The equitable and sustainable use of both natural and human environments 
underpins environmental justice on local and global scales. Bulla.rd writes that: 
Hazardous wastes and 'dirty' industries have followed the path of 
least resistance. Transnational corporations and governments 
(including the military) have often exploited the economic 
vulnerability of poor communities, poor states, poor nations and 
poor regions for environmentally unsound, unhealthy and 'risky' 
and unsustainable operations.37 
Within the liberal democratic political system, the parties on the centre and left 
have claimed social and economic justice platforms as their own, with the ALP 
long having dropped socialism from its discourse and replacing it with social 
justice38 • The adoption of the political rhetoric of social and economic justice is 
associated with the principles of participatory democracy and ecological 
sustainability, and while the election of social democratic governments in no 
way assures the application of universal human rights in respect of such 
35 R.Gottlieb, 11 An Odd Assortment of Allies: American Environmentalism in the 1990s", in LaMay and Dennis (eds), Media and the Environment (Covelo Ca.: Island Press, 1993) 36 R.Gottlieb, quoted in T.Athansiou, Divided Planet: The Ecology of Rich and Poor (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1998) 21 
37 R.Bullard, "Environmental justice challenges at home and abroad", in Low (ed) (1999) op cit. 33 
_ 38 D.Adams, "Social Justice" in Haward and Larrnour (ed-s") The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord: Public Policy 1989-92 (Canberra: Federalism Research Centre, Australian National University, 1992) pp. 87-97 
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principles, it has served as a useful ideological tool for left-wing and 'new left' 
political parties. 
Nature and the political economy: the ecosocialist challenge 
In 1842 Karl Marx became the editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, a major 
Rhineland newspaper "which represented the rising middle class of Cologne"39 • 
At that time, the issue of the theft of wood from forests was particularly 
predominant in the public domain and came to represent to Marx the inequities 
within the capitalist system: 
. In taking up the issue of the theft of wood Marx was not addr.essing 
a minor issue. Five-sixths of all prosecutions in Prussia during this 
period had to do with wood ... What was at issue was the 
dissolution of the final rights of the peasants in relation to what had 
been the common land- rights that had existed from time 
immemorial but which were being eliminated by the growth of 
industrialisation and the system of private property. Traditionally 
the people had had the right to collect dead wood ... which enabled 
them to heat their homes and cook their food. Landowners, 
however, increasingly denied the ordinary people the right to dead 
wood along with everything else in the forest. ... 
The poor were thus denied any relation to nature - even for their 
survival - unmediated by the institutions of private property.40 
The relationship of humankind to nature is at the core of environmental justice, 
and ownership of, or personal access to, nature is a key determinant of personal 
wealth and social status. In Britain the Royal Family owns a vast personal estate 
of some 19,000 hectares of park or woodland, some of which is accessible to the 
public but 'managed' by royal staff. Additionally, the Monarch is granted 
ownership of the 120,000 hectares of the Crown Estate, much of which is 
39 }.Foster, Marx's Ecology (New York: Monthly Review press, 2000) 66 
40 ibid. 66 
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agricultural land plus the seabed around the UK. In Japan, a nation with a very 
high population density and heavily reliant on trade imports of food due to 
insufficiency of agricultural land, the affluent and social elite can belong to golf 
and country clubs at membership fees in the millions of yen. In Hawaii the rich 
can own private beaches and in Australia ownership of off-road recreational 
vehicles that facilitate greater access to nature rivals that of sports or traditional 
luxury cars as symbols of wealth or status. At the other end of the scale, the 
denial of access to nature is an indication of very low social status. 
The exclusion of the German peasantry from the Prussian forests to which 
they previously had unrestricted access, and the redefinition of their collection 
of dead wood as 'theft' was held by Marx to be not a matter to be resolved in 
law, but through examination and reform of the political economy41 • Over a 
century later, the modern environment movement grew from the belief that the 
impending ecological crisis was also due to the nature of the political economy, 
which had systematically removed human society from the environment. 
Central to the ecological critique of the political economy is the reliance on 
technology for economic growth and expansion42 • Technology, in turn, is reliant 
on natural resources for its growth and expansion. In order for the political 
economy to continue to create wealth, it is necessary for the consumption of 
natural resources to not just be maintained at a certain level, but to increase. 
Simultaneous to the consumption of natural resources is the production of 
waste as a by-product of technology. The Aral and Mediterranean Seas, the 
Rhine, Danube, Mississippi and Murray Rivers, New York's Staten Island, the 
Philippines' 'Smokey Mountain', the air over Mexico City, Los Angeles, Hong 
Kong and London, even the vast reaches of outer space all bear testimony to the 
volume of waste produced by technology as a by-product of economic growth 43• 
41 ibid. 67 
42 B.Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: A.A.Knopf, 1971); R.Grundrnann, Marxism and 
Ecology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); L.Brown, Eco-Economy (New York: Norton & Co.Inc., 
2001) 
43 C.Ponting, A Green History of the World (New York: Penguin Books, 1991) 
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The systematic detachment of human society from the environment, however, 
ensured that from the industrial revolution to the apocalypticist revolution, 
most waste produced remained largely invisible. The invisibility of waste, 
including 'social waste' such as the so-called social underclass, refugees and, in 
some cases, the elderly or disabled, lies at the very crux of social and economic 
justice 44. Economic growth, technology, human-nature separation and 
ecological depredation developed concurrently and exponentially. 
The Marxist criticisms of the emergent environment movement in the 1960s 
and 70s were based along class lines. Contemporary Marxists accused the social 
movement of only recognising the environmental depredations of capitalism 
when it directly threatened the lives and livelihoods of the bourgeoisie, and that 
the proletariat had been suffering under the yoke of economic growth and its 
attendant environmental effects since the industrial revolution. From the time 
of the wood 'thefts' in the Prussian forests, the poor had borne the brunt of the 
liberal capitalist economy as it removed them farther and farther from nature 
and made them increasingly reliant on technology to which they had only 
limited, if any, access. Grundmann describes two reactions of contemporary 
Marxists to the environmental problematic: 
The first is the orthodox reaction which claims that ecological 
problems are the result of the workings of the profit principle and of 
the institutions of private property. The second reaction claims that 
Marxism has concentrated too much on the exploitation of man and 
the domination over man, thereby neglecting the aspect of exploiting 
and dominating nature.45 
Eco-Marxists believed that the solution to the social inequities inherent in 
capitalism and evident in the ecological crisis lay in the: 
... transformation of the relations of production combined with the 
development of a better theoretical understanding of nature and 
44 R.Tennant-Wood, 2001, "Taking out the garbage: the sociology of waste", paper presented to 
Wastebusters and Organics 2001 Conferences, Ashburton NZ, May 2001 45 R.Grundmann, op cit. 48 
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further advances in technology so that a complete social mastery of 
nature can be attained for the benefits of all, rather than just the 
privileged capitalist class.46 
While this view retained the fundamental elements of classical Marxist doctrine, 
it extended the definition of the oppression of the working class to include 
oppression and exploitation of nature. Thus, only a political and economic 
revolution could redistribute environmental amenity equitably. Nowhere, in 
the eco-Marxist doctrine, is the concept of the intrinsic value of nature afforded 
credence47 • It concentrates on the reunification of humankind with nature to 
better and more equitably utilise natural resources. 
The concept of economic justice from the point of view of the environmental 
movement, however, was far more complex and interwoven with a broader 
social perspective. The decline of the conservative political and social paradigm 
of which preservationism was a part resulted in a period of social revolution, 
but from the outset, the environment movement was connected to and with 
other social movements which regarded Marxism as part of the problem rather 
than the solution. The anti-nuclear and peace movements, for example, were 
equally as critical of both sides of the Cold War48 for the proliferation of arms 
and support for the war in Vietnam, and the later nuclear disaster at Chernobyl 
in 1986 heightened the suspicion with which industrialisation behind the iron 
curtain was regarded. Marxism, even in the context of environmental justice, 
still focused on the instrumental value of nature to human society and ignored 
the basic premise of the green movement, which is that the ecological crisis is 
global and not related to any one political ideology. While a revolution in 
46 R.Eckersley, Environmentalism and political theory: Towards an ecocentric approach (London: UCL 
Press, 1992) 82 
47 ibid. 82 
48 It can be (and frequently is) argued that the former Soviet Union was not Marxism, per se, but 
'state capitalism'. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the line drawn between the liberal 
capitalist economy and the state-controlled capitalist economy is polemical and not relevant in 
terms of the green critique that both are equally responsible for the environmental depredations 
of industrialism. 
168 
labour relations would redistribute the flow of global capital, it would not 
address the means whereby capital is produced. 
In order to address this conundrum the ecosocialist critique regarded the 
capitalist economy, based on a single profit-making premise, as not only 
promulgating the ecological crisis associated with industry, technology and 
profit-motive, but also as having usurped the very movement that once 
challenged its hegemony. The green movement's apparent incognizance of the 
role of power relations in achieving socio-political change was, according to the 
ecosocialist view, the key weakness in the movement's approach to 
environmental justice. The promise of ecosocialism, then, was to deliver 
environmentalism back to the movement and into the control of the working 
class, the radical left and the social(ist) revolution through a decentralised, 
ecologically benign, reform economy. 
Ecological modernisation, from the ecosocialist perspective, is simply 
capitalism writ green: the integration of environmentalism into liberal-capitalist 
politics as a means, not of ensuring resource conservation, intergenerational 
justice or ecological sustainability, but of maintaining the socio-political status 
quo in perpetuity. Ecosocialism raises the question as to whether these political 
parameters are equipped to deal with the wider social concerns posed by the 
potential collapse, not of society, but of the environment upon which society 
depends. In the context of the ecosocialist critique of green democratisation and 
integrationism, the flaws in the capitalist approach to the green movement's 
agenda are that it has failed to address the core concern of the left: social and 
economic justice. The distribution of the world's wealth, derived from 
resources that have been progressively and systemically denied to the poor and 
divided among the rich, is such that the divisions of class retain their relevance 
in terms of the ownership and access to nature of the rich as when Marx wrote 
about the separation from nature of the rural poor in 19th century Germany as 
being indicative of the social injustice of capitalism. 
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Faith in science and faith in the market: the paradox of integrationism 
Social and economic justice are inseparable from ecology in terms of their 
interconnectedness with the holistic view of human society as an ecosystem 
within, and dependent upon, the natural environment. While this view is a 
socially and empirically reasonable assumption to make now, forty years after 
the spectre of an impending ecological crisis was raised as an issue of social 
importance, at the time the concept of challenging humankind's dominance of 
nature was somewhat threatening. The publication of Carson's Silent Spring 
marked a watershed, not only in the development of environmental thought, 
but also in the understanding and role of science, which, in the development of 
environmental politics over the past four decades, has been both complex and 
paradoxical. The faith of society in science to deliver answers and solutions to 
the ecological crisis being wrought by industrialisation is balanced against the 
faith of industry in science to develop new technologies to market in response to 
consumer demands for environmentally friendly industry to counter the effects 
of the mass-consumer market, and so forth. Further to this, the potential social 
and economic ramifications Carson's work were quite obvious to the chemical 
industries, which collectively attempted to discredit Carson and prevent the 
book from reaching the market49 • The fact that Carson was a scientist lent 
weight to her findings and marked the beginning of an age where science could 
be used both to prove and disprove environmental claims. 
Where the science of ecology had entailed, since its development as a field 
of scientific study in the 1860s, the understanding of the interrelatedness of the 
natural environment and all species, it was not until the 1960s that this was 
really extended to include the human species. The end of the preservationist era 
and the subsequent social revolution lay open to question all measure of 
previously unquestioned phenomena and unresolved questions. Around the 
49 J.Stauber and S.Rampton, Toxic Sludge is Good for You! (Momoe: Common Courage Press, 
1995); and T.Athanasiou, (1998) op cit. 
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time Carson published her text, the results of scientific developments such as 
space exploration, oral contraception and television were contributing to the 
emerging social definition of the 1960s. The fact that many scientific 
developments would have undesirable long-term consequences was not 
investigated at the time. Science and technology existed as instruments to 
advance society and further remove it from nature, not to reveal that nature was 
being systematically destroyed by the very advancements being made. The 
instrumental view of science was itself largely a development of the 20th century. 
Coombs wrote that while Bacon predicted in the 1r century that the "study of 
nature would transform our mastery over it"50, until the 20th century: 
... scientists were concerned to observe, to describe and to 
understand what mankind encounters when confronting nature, 
rather than to answer the question, 'What must I do to achieve a 
desired result?' .51 
The challenge of the environment movement to science and technology was not 
the question of what must be done to achieve a certain result, but of what must 
be done to ensure that those results are in the best interests, not just of society, 
but also of nature itself and, crucially, the long-term future of a society reliant · 
on nature. 
It is ecology and the role of science in modern politics and society that is the 
crucible of the Greens' view of a new political model. The political model 
envisaged by the Greens, whereby an ecological politics can be posited apart 
from ( or ahead of) the left-right linear spectrum, presupposes a basis of 
acceptance of ecological issues, including that of the role of nature, in the 
political sphere. Social and economic justice, as extensions of an ecological 
politics, must be recognised in relation to the overarching aims and applications 
of ecology in its contemporary form. In order to draw this connection, I will 
return to the development of socialism and the thesis of Marx, developed from, 
50 H.C.Coombs, (1990) op cit. 61 
51 ibid. 61 
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among other observations and beliefs, the alienation of the poor from nature. In 
1844 Marx wrote: "Natural science will in time incorporate into itself the science 
of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: 
there will be one science."52 Whereas, however, Marx's concept of science and 
humankind was somewhat Darwinian in outlook, the reality, observed by Marx 
in later writings53, was that science became the agent of production, and 
therefore, of capitalism. The paradox of science, in relation to society and 
politics, has always been its relationship with industry and production. Until 
the 1960s, the position of science in the role of industrialism was unchallenged: 
science enabled technological progress. The publication, in the 1960s and 70s of 
a number of texts by scientists warning of the environmental degradation 
wrought by scientifically-endorsed industry posed a threat, not only to the 
standing of science and its practitioners in relation to technological integrity, but 
to the dominant industry-politics nexus. 
Since the emergence of the environmental movement, spearheaded, as it 
was, by empirical, knowledge-based scientific findings, science has frequently 
been thrust into a role for which it was completely unprepared: that of political 
agent. While industry is reliant on its scientists to maintain progress in 
technological advancement, society is also reliant on them to keep the non-
scientific community informed of the environmental risks associated with 
industry. Many governments, furthermore, in accordance with the demands of 
the green movement, green politicians and social concerns, have adopted the 
'precautionary principle', which preempts science on the basis that lack of 
scientific evidence in a given area of industry or development does not abrogate 
political responsibility in the event that future findings prove there to be an 
inherent social and environmental risk. Industry, governments, and 
environment and community groups call for 'independent' scientific studies to 
52 Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", quoted in H .Rose and S.Rose (eds), The 
Political Economy of Science (London: Macmillan Press, 1976) 4 
53 Specifically, The Grundrisse (A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) (1859) and Capital (1867) 
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be carried out on contentious developments, while the independence of these 
reports remains questionable depending upon the commission of the particular 
study. The adage, 'who pays the piper calls the tune' is frequently cited in 
relation to such studies as environmental impact assessments and reports into 
government developments. 
The scientific community, however, has become constrained by the 
limitations of its own paradigm, the purpose of which, for the period of green 
democratisation and integrationism, has been to provide technological solutions 
for the problems of technology. In terms of green politics and in relation to 
social and economic justice, Rose and Rose state that: 
Knowledge of the social separated from the natural becomes 
idealism, knowledge of the natural separated from the social 
becomes mechanical materialism- itself a form of idealism.54 
In order for science to correlate and communicate with the changing social and 
economic view of the ecological crisis, the challenge is not how best to address 
problems such as climate change, soil erosion and degradation, dryland salinity 
or the HIV/ AIDS pandemic, but how to resolve the cause and prevent their 
recurrence. Rather, however, science has become locked into a cycle of 
economic dependency on government and industry. Thus, integrationism has 
not simply integrated environmental policy into the mainstream policy agenda, 
but has also integrated science into economic development, whereby scientific 
research is used to justify government policy, verify the approach to be taken on 
certain issues, or determine which government priorities. In much the way that 
Renaissance artists relied on the patronage of the church or wealthy families, 
providing, in return, commemorative (and frequently flattering) works of art for 
their patrons, the contemporary scientific community is often at the behest of 
the state or major corporations, providing, in return, sound, empirical (and 
frequently flattering) data to support government or corporate policy direction. 
54 Rose and Rose (1976), op cit. 7 
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Paradoxically, while providing the basis for technological and industrial 
development, science is also providing the environmental warnings on which 
the green movement predicates its priorities and political activities. Far from 
the grim predictions of the apocalypticist era, however, integrationism and the 
application of the precautionary principle have ensured that not only has much 
of the 'green' agenda been addressed, but many of the risks and consequences 
of industrialism have also been integrated into the social mainstream. Rampton 
and Stauber argue that in the USA the precautionary principle itself is a 
mechanism whereby industry uses science and the scientific paradox to 
maintain the liberal capitalist economic and political status quo: 
Most people probably think that the precautionary principle is 
already part of the process of evaluating and approving risky or 
unfamiliar chemicals, products, and industrial practices. To a casual 
observer, there might notseem to be a lot of difference between an 
industry lobbyist who talks of 'assessing risks with sound science' 
versus an environmentalist who talks of' acting to mitigate potential 
risks before they appear'. In the real world, however, the differences 
are much greater than mere linguistics. Today's regulatory system 
essentially allows anything to be released into nature unless it is 
proven unsafe by scientific data, which is defined to mean 
measurable harm. In practice, this means that preventative action is 
not taken until damage has already been done.55 
This situation is different in Europe, particularly Germany, where preventative 
action on environmental issues is entrenched in law, but the point is still made 
that damage must already be evident in order for there to be a recognised risk of 
further damage. The perception and management of risks will be dealt with in 
more detail in Chapter 7, but it is necessary to define the changing role of 
science within the history of environmentalism. 
The use of science by industry and government in applying the 'green wash' 
55 S.Rampton and J.Stauber, Trust Us/ We/re Experts! (New York: Tarcher/Putnam, 2001)126 
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is twofold and designed, in both cases, to perpetuate the world dominance of 
liberal capitalist ideology. It must be stated here that the integrity of individual 
scientists is not at question, nor is 'science', per se. At issue is the industrial 
class-based system that uses elite professionals as a means of obscuring the 
nature of industry and technology by presenting only those findings that 
support its activities. Science, in this case, has become the religion of politically 
integrated environmentalism. The dual role of science in this case is, firstly, to 
answer only those questions asked of it by industry: "of not raising issues to 
which the [liberal capitalist] system has no solutions,"56 and secondly, by 
serving capitalist interests in retaining the hierarchical social organisation 
through the segregation of the lower social strata from the elite experts who 
represent the knowledge required to advance the technological society. By 
incorporating the practitioners of science into the liberal capitalist system, it is 
able to determine precisely what society will regard as expert knowledge, and 
therefore to be relied upon, and what is common knowledge, folklore or 
extremist (and therefore unreliable) views. Gorz cites the example of medicine 
in Western nations, which relies heavily on synthetic drugs and is therefore 
regarded as scientific, as opposed to homeopathy and other traditional plant-
based medicine which are considered 'unscientific' and are therefore 
condemned by the elite medical profession57• The narrow definition and 
application of science by industry has allowed it to manipulate governments 
(and nations) through selective and controlled information. 
The reference to science in terms of 'faith~ and 'religion' requires further 
explanation at this point. Prior to the Enlightenment, solutions to society's most 
pressing questions were sought through recourse to the Church, which was also 
the locus of knowledge and education. Unexplained natural phenomena were 
regarded as 'acts of God' and bounteous seasons as God's gifts. Leaders 
56 A.Gorz, "On the Class Character of Science and Scientists", in Rose and Rose (eds) (1976), op 
cit. 64 ( original italics) 
57 ibid. 66 
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deferred to their spiritual advisors before making political decisions and 
religious ideology was indivisible from that of the state. The Enlightenment 
began to tilt the balance towards secularity, a process continued through the 
Industrial Revolution and the growth of a knowledge-based economy. While 
the Christian Church remains, in Western liberal democracies, a very powerful 
lobby, religion itself has lost much of its direct influence over political decision 
making and the development of policy. State endorsed scientific research and 
practice in such areas as cloning, reproductive technology, stem cell research 
and genetic engineering, as well as the controversial issues of euthanasia, same-
sex partnerships and abortion, are deliberated on rational-legal grounds with 
religious considerations comprising only a part of the contributiqn to the public 
debate. The mystery of the church, with regard to its position in society, has 
given way to the mystery of science to the point where governments will defer 
to scientific advisors before making many decisions, particularly those that 
relate to the environment, and science is the authority to which society turns for 
its answers. This is not to say that science is infallible, any more than is the 
church, but the manipulation of science by parties with something to gain or 
lose means that the information disseminated to society may be as selective as 
that which was disseminated by the church in the pre-Enlightenment- and for 
much the same reason: the perpetuation of a dominant paradigm for means of 
control by a ruling elite. 
The real faith, then, is not just in science but in the liberal capitalist 
economy. In large part, the integrationist adoption of scientific authority by 
industry-reliant liberal capitalist governments is based on the reliance of the 
environment movement on science and the scope of the environment 
movement's science-based claims. Deference to science as a basis of authority 
removes the emotive and moral content of controversial issues. Thus, 
'ownership' of science gives the possessor of that knowledge a foundation of 
fact on which to base an argument, rather than relying on the moving target of 
morality, tied as it is, with religious implications. When empiricism, either 
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scientific or legal-rational, does not accord with the preferences of liberal 
capitalist government, political leaders are more likely to invoke religion or 
values as the ultimate source of their power. For example, the US Government 
and President Bush immediately and indignantly invoked God as the source of 
American rights when the Pledge of Allegiance was decreed unconstitutional by 
a Californian court on grounds of the state-sanctioning of a specific religion. 
Similarly, the environment movement, when lacking hard scientific evidence on 
which to base claims, will resort to appealing to the morality or emotional 
content of certain actions. 
Green democratisation took ecology into the political arena and 
integrationism moved it into the legislative sphere in order to support policy 
based on ideological grounds. Thus, Conservative British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, in the 1980s called for II scientific studies of the greenhouse 
effect" and "insisted that environmental policies be based on sound science1158 • 
The major flaw of this approach, according to Yearley, is that it relies on a focus 
upon one fact or set of findings at a time. Science, however, is seldom a matter 
of isolated facts: 
... science is held up for admiration as a body of factual knowledge. 
Most often, though, it is theoretical knowledge which is regarded as 
the principal achievement of science. The expectation that the 
earth's temperature will rise because of the greenhouse effect is a 
prediction based on scientific theory.59 
The interpretation of theory i~to a body of inarguable facts, and the faith of 
society in the impartiality of science in arriving at these facts, become part of the 
mechanism by which liberal capitalism maintains its global economic 
hegemony. This is compounded by the fact that most scientific research is 
carried out in or by the developed nations. 
The domination and economic control of science by the developed nations 
58 S.Yearley, The Green Case (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991) 113 59 ibid. 121 
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has provided liberal capitalist governments with justification for economic 
'rationalisation' in environmental policies, removing any consideration for 
principles of social and economic justice in the name of modernisation and 
technology. That the technological market is based in liberal capitalism is no 
accident. The unswerving faith in market-based environmental policy was 
illustrated by William Reilly, Administrator of the US Environmental Protection 
Agency during the Bush (Snr) administration, who stated that: 
The forces of the marketplace are powerful tools for changing 
individual and institutional behavior. If set up correctly, they can 
achieve or surpass environmental approaches.60 
Emerging as a political force in the 1970s and 80s, environmentalism formed 
a political link between the traditional political issues pertaining to social 
welfare and economic growth, and those of the environment. Social and 
economic justice, then, as part of an eco-political approach have been 
instrumental in the overlap between the left-wing and green political platforms. 
Corporatisation and environmental justice: mutually exclusive or mutually dependent? 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls defines justice in the context of the political 
economy thus: 
A doctrine of political economy must include an interpretation of the 
public good which is based on a conception of justice. It is to guide 
the reflections of the citizen when he considers questions of 
economic and social policy. He is to take up the perspective of the 
constitutional convention or the legislative stage and ascertain how 
the principles of justice apply. A political opinion concerns what 
advances the good of the body politic as a whole and invokes some 
criterion for the just division of social advantages.61 
60 Reilly, quoted in J.Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997) 103 
61 Rawls (1999) op cit. 229 
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The division of natural resources and environmental access underpins the 
doctrine of a political economy based on the principles of distributive justice. 
Preservationism was unable to address these issues through the restrictive 
nature of a conception of nature as social amenity. While environmental policy 
was enacted on an ad hoc basis as problems arose, there remained no allowance 
for the holistic view that would take into consideration the social and economic 
extensions of the environment. Green democratisation and integrationism, 
whilst mainstreaming environmental issues into the policy framework of the 
liberal democratic structure, are restricted in turn by the constraints of the 
global capitalist economy and its reliance on corporate competitiveness. 
Sustainable development, which I have not addressed in this chapter, is a major 
. component of the integrationist approach to environmental problems. 
However, the realisation of sustainability in developed nations, to now, has 
relied on the continuing exploitation of the developing nations62, despite the fact 
that the Brundtland definition of sustainability specifically allows for inclusion 
of all nations63 • Corporatisation of the environment has shifted the emphasis 
from sustainable resource use to sustainable economic growth and while the 
politico-economic view of natural resources has always been that of market 
commodities, the move from government regulation and control to increasing 
market competition has seen a corresponding decrease in equitable resource 
distribution. Where a resource is necessary for the maintenance of an 
ecosystem, such as water to river health, corporatisation effectively places the 
abstract concept of ecological integrity in competition with the very real concept 
of profit. 
This was the case at the outset of the campaign to save the Snowy. From the 
beginning environmental groups, and later the Greens, opposed corporatisation 
on the grounds that the SMHEA, as a government authority, was a publicly-
62 Prugh et al, The Local Politics of Global Sustainability (Washington DC: Island Press, 2000); and Athanasiou (1998) op cit 
63 WCED (Chair, Gro Harlem Brundtland), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 
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owned asset and that as a corporation competing in the market it would place 
profit-making ahead of environmental considerations. At the same time the 
National Party opposed corporatisation on the grounds that the corporation 
would not be under any obligation to honour the government's commitment to 
the irrigators64 • As mentioned previously, the first parliamentary mention of the 
issue, in 1991, concerned the process of the review and the likelihood of cost 
increases to electricity consumers. On October 22nd 1997, opening the debate for 
the Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Bill 1997, the ALP Member for Perth, Mr 
Stephen Smith, stressed that while the Federal Opposition supported the 
corporatisation process, which the ALP had started during its penultimate term 
of government, 11 the question of water distribution between electricity, 
environment, irrigation, aspects or needs had not been resolved by the time [the 
ALP] left office."65 Smith proposed crucial amen.dments to the Bill, which were 
subsequently adopted, to the effect that the Commonwealth not relinquish its 
controlling interest in the Snowy Hydro before being satisfied that the findings 
of the proposed Snowy Water Inquiry, to be funded jointly by the New South 
Wales and Victorian governments, were fully implemented. The amendments 
received strong bipartisan support in the House of Representatives, indicating a 
concern among members that the passage of the Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Bill 
1997 would limit the Commonwealth's input into the Snowy Water Inquiry 
with the likely result that either one or a number of stakeholder groups may be 
seriously disadvantaged. In the six years between the Hawke Labor 
government's announcement of corporatisation plans and the federal 
Parliamentary debate on the corporatisation bill, the emphasis had changed 
from one of sound economic rationale to concern for the equitable distribution 
to all stakeholders. 
The shift in political emphasis represents a number of significant 
developments in the perception of both environmentalism and the concept of 
64 T.Fullerton, Watershed (Sydney: ABC Books, 2001) 
65 S.Smith, from Hansard, Wednesday 22nd October 1997, House of Representatives, p.9639 
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· environmental justice, stemming largely from the strength of the Snowy River 
campaign. Crucial to the Dalgety campaign was that their convictions were 
supported by the findings of a number of scientific reports, recommending a 
minimum of 25% and an optimal 28% environmental flow66 • While the 
ecological state of the Murray-Darling Basin was also recognised as seriously 
degraded, political opinion started to fall towards the Snowy when it became 
evident that water savings could be made in the Murray and Murrumbidgee 
through transferable water rights and more efficient irrigation systems, where 
the only means of survival for the Snowy was the release of more water from 
the Jindabyne Dam and the Mowamba aqueduct. The New South Wales 
government announced that no irrigator would be disadvantaged and that the 
water 'returned' to the Snowy would be 'found' through a complex system of 
water trading and licences. The technicalities of interstate water trading and the 
conversion of gigawatt hours of electricity into gigalitre per annum release of 
water into the Upper Snowy and Upper Murrumbidgee underscore the scope of 
the negotiations. 
At a meeting with local residents on the bank of Snowy at Dalgety in late 
19991 NSW Special Minister of State, Ian McDonald MLC, expressed confidence 
that a "win-win outcome" could be attained67, meaning that all stakeholders 
could be accommodated in a final agreement on environmental flows. Twelve 
months later the NSW and Victorian governments announced a commitment to 
28% environmental flow to the Snowy, to be achieved through the 
decommissioning of the Mowamba aqueduct, structural changes to the 
Jindabyne dam and water efficiency savings in the west. At that stage, no 
financial commitment or timeframe for delivery was announced. The Heads of 
Agreement document, being the agreed outcome of the three governments from 
66 Dalgety and District Community Association, 2000, "How much water does the Snowy River 
need?", http:/ /www.ddca.asn.au/ ddcapage3.htm; also 
67 Personal notes of meeting, November 9th 1999 
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the Snowy Water Inquiry, was tabled in the NSW Upper House on December 6th 
2000. It guaranteed a 21 % environmental flow with a further 7% written into 
the agreement as a future target68 • Enshrined in the agreement is that: 
The environmental objectives for the Snowy River and the Snowy 
upper montane rivers are to improve the habitat for a diverse range of 
plant and animal species ... [and that] These objectives are 
complemented by an objective to maintain and improve 
environmental flows for the River Murray.69 
Significant in terms of the initial opposition to corporatisation is that, under 
the agreements made between the three shareholding governments, not a single 
drop of water could be released until corporatisation had been effected. By the 
time the Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Bill 1997 was debated in the Jederal 
parliament, the principles of environmental justice were already being 
implemented. Where was the green movement while all this was taking place? 
Certainly the DDCA does not regard itself as a 'green' group, indeed, many 
individual members are openly hostile to the suggestion. Environmental justice 
simply meant that the Snowy River would be restored to ecological health so 
that the local residents and those downstream would enjoy the economic and 
environmental benefits of a healthy river. Corporatisation of the Snowy has 
provided this where the Commonwealth could not. 
68 Hansard, 6th December 2000, NSW Legislative Council 
69 .b.d 1 1 . 
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Chapter 6 
The ecocracy and the development of environmental policy 
If voting could change the system, it would be illegal - Theodor Adorno 
The institutionalisation of the environment 
The decision to corporatise the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority 
was announced at a time when the national economy was slowing down. The 
government privatised the Commonwealth Bank and Qantas during the 1980s, 
Treasurer Keating's 'recession we had to have' was imminent and market 
principles were being applied to production and sale of electricity. The Minister 
responsible for the review of the SMHEA, Mr Alan Griffiths, in responding to a 
question in the House of Representatives after the announcement of the review 
as a precursor to corporatisation, stated that: 
... it has become increasingly evident that existing arrangements 
have major deficiencies; consequently, the aim of the review is to put 
in place new arrangements which will improve the efficiency of the 
scheme, simplify and modernise management and institutional 
structures and provide for a proper rate of return on the scheme's 
assets.1 
There was, at the time, no consideration of the environmental aspects or 
implications of corporatisation, despite the fact that environmentalism had been 
integral to the mainstream political process for at least a decade through the 
politico-institutional structure, and in particular to the federal Labor 
government since 1983. The issue of increasing the flow of the Snowy River was 
not mentioned and it was fully expected that the corporatisation process, in 
which the Authority would become an autonomous corporation jointly owned 
by the New South Wales (58%), Victorian (29%) and Commonwealth (13%) 
governments would maintain its operations in much.the same way as it had as a 
1 A.G.Griffiths, from Hansard 14th May 1991, p.3627 
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government authority. The profit-imperative, in this case, was the driving 
factor, while specific environmental issues that were not raised- and therefore 
not addressed2 - during the construction of the scheme were not considered of 
concern. 
The Snowy Scheme occupies a unique position not only in Australian social 
history, but also in terms of its institutional structure. During corporatisation 
discussions and negotiations, an underlying question was always present as to 
how a change of structure might alter the perception of the Snowy Scheme. 
Seddon points out that the Snowy Scheme "was so successful in promoting 
itself that it created its own myth, and in doing so, it has dominated the sources 
of information about its activities."3 As a government authority, the SMHEA 
was highly centralised and, partly due to the centralised structure and partly 
because of the 'myth' surrounding the Scheme, its operations remained 
unquestioned through half a century of changes in government and changes in 
social thinking. The enactment of the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Power Act 
1949 under the Defence Act, and its role in 'drought-proofing' the inland, also 
served to remove the scheme from other bureaucratic changes, for example, the 
establishment, in 1972, of a ministerial portfolio and department to deal with 
environmental issues and the increasing role environmental decision-making 
has played in the political and bureaucratic process. The fact that the Snowy 
Mountains Scheme remained unchallenged as an example of preservationist 
thinking in relation to the environment, that is, that the natural environment 
was held to be separate from development, until the closing decade of the 20th 
century is largely due to the 'myth' of the Snowy, its cultural legacy of 
multiculturalism in what was, at the time, an almost exclusively anglophile 
nation and its role in supporting the agricultural industry. 
2 While environmental flows were not an issue during the construction, soil erosion and soil 
conservation were particularly relevant in terms of dam construction. 
3 G.Seddon, Searching for the Snowy (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994) 25 
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In response to the rapid and wide-ranging social change during the 1960s 
and 70s on issues not traditionally addressed directly within the institutional 
structure of politics, later integrationist governments began to establish 
departments to deal with the issues of 'new politics'. Coinciding with the rise of 
the green movement and the formation of green political parties, the 1970s saw 
the establishment of national environment departments and ministries to 
legislate on environmental issues. At supranational level, the first United 
Nations international summit on the environment, the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE), was held in Stockholm in 1972. Australia's 
first environment department was established by the Whitlam government in 
1972, with Moss Cass assigned the portfolio of Minister for Environment and 
Conservation from 1972 to mid-1975. The Fraser government dropped the word 
'Conservation' from the Ministry title and the Environment Ministry, currently 
the Ministry for Environment and Heritage, has remained a cabinet position 
ever since. In Europe, the German Federal Government passed its first national 
environment program in 1971 while in Britain the same period represented 
major structural advancements in environmental protection 4. By the 1980s 
environmental issues, due largely to the electoral impact and lobbying strength 
of green parties and the environment movement, had become instrumental in 
election campaigns and ultimately, outcomes. 
The development and implementation of environmental policy is not a new 
political innovation. Environmental issues, although only relatively recently 
known as such, have been of concern to governments for at least a century. The 
problems and issues facing current governments are an evolutionary result of 
these previous issues. Political systems, regardless of their fundamental 
ideological foundation, rely on the state bureaucracy for policy development 
4 N.Carter and P.Lowe, "Britain: Coming to terms with sustainable development?" in Hanf and 
Jansen (edst Governance and Environment in Western Europe (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman 
Ltd, 1998) 
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and implementation. This chapter will examine the development of 
bureaucratic environmentalism leading to the establishment of the 'ecocracy'. 
There are three main angles from which this will be approached: firstly, the 
evolution of the environmental bureaucracy as a government department; 
secondly, the limitations and restrictions imposed on the bureaucracy by the 
institutional structures of the political system; and finally, in the context of 
sustainability, the grassroots movement for change and its influence on 
decision-making, issue awareness, policy and action. 
In Chapter 3 I examined the problem of the political representation of 
nature. In this chapter the problem becomes one of institutionalising and 
formalising nature for the dual purpose of political legitimacy and 
environmental integrity. The issue of sustainability and its social, political and 
environmental implications will be analysed in the context of integrated 
environmental policy and of the ultimate sustainability of sustainability itself 
given its economic and political applications. I will use the example of the 
national Landcare program in Australia and specifically with reference to the 
Upper Snowy region as a measure of sustainability programs to indicate 
differences in perceptions, foci and directions being taken on the issue of 
sustainability from governmental and community sectors. This will then form 
the basis on which to draw some general conclusion regarding the future 
viability of the post-political construct of sustainable development to be taken 
up in more detail in Chapter 8. 
The concept of sustainability, or ecologically sustainable c;ievelopment 
(ESD), has undergone some key definitional and perceptual changes since the 
Brund tland Report coined the term and defined it as the ability "to meet the 
needs of the present without sacrificing the ability of future generations to meet 
theirs"5 • The fifteen years since the WCED, including the 1992 Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro (UNCED) and the 2002 Rio+ 10 in Johannesburg (WSSD), have 
5 World Commission on Environment and Development (Chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland) Our common future, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987) 43 
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seen ESD adopted as a planning and policy instrument at all levels of 
government. It has entered the lexicon of environmentalism and politics alike, 
and has become a somewhat fluid benchmark for industry standards, 
government policy and community actions. It has given rise to new industry-
bureaucracy rhetoric, including terms such as 'triple bottom line', 'resource 
management' and 'natural capital'. In execution, however, ESD remains a 
widely disparate and largely unfathomed concept. Underpinning the rhetoric 
and the terminology is the fundamental question of how best to represent the 
interests of the environment in the political domain. 
There is a vast difference between resource conservation and land 
management, and the concept of assigning moral considerability to nature. 
Those two positions form the opposite ends of an environmental range - a green 
scale, as it were - that includes human welfare ecology, preservationism and 
animal liberationism6, marking points along the scale from which a green 
political practice can be formulated. Political parties take positions on the green 
spectrum according to their ideology: green parties tend to occupy the deeper 
green end, while capital-based parties move towards the light green. 
Environmental policy, at all points on the scale, is developed according to 
political requirements. At its lightest, green governance aims at conserving 
resources for long-term exploitation and regulating industry only insofar as it is 
necessary to comply with international protocols or minimum environmental 
standards. Social democrat governments are more inclined towards the human 
welfare ecology position on the range in order to satisfy the material needs of 
the greatest number of people as well as ensure the long-term viability of 
resource-dependent industries. 
Milbrath et al argue that, moving from the light to the deep end of the green 
scale, the emphasis on transforming society becomes greater: 
6 Milbrath et al, 1994, "Sustainable Living: Framework of an Ecosystemically Grounded Political Theory", Environmental Politics, Vol.3 No.3 pp 421-444; also R.Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach (London: UCL Press, 1992) 
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Among environmentalists, conservationists are least likely to push 
for societal transformation while ecocentrists, especially, call for a 
thoroughly transformed society.7 
In maintaining their position of resistance to social change, conservative, pro-
development and social democrat governments highlight the uncertainty 
associated with change as a reason for not taking a position more towards the 
deep green end of the scale. Towards the end of the 2002 New Zealand election 
campaign, in seeking voter support for a second term, Labour Prime Minister 
Helen Clark pointed to the Greens' policies of sustainability and stated that the 
Greens want a society based on subsistence, while "most Kiwis I know want a 
First World existence"8• The clear implication of this comment is of a regressive 
extremism associated with the Greens, and that deeper green policies would 
compromise material standards achieved through social democrat policies of 
resource management. The transformation of society to a more ecologically 
sustainable one based on policies aiming to decelerate economic growth 
contradicts liberal capitalist ideology and therefore, in the reality of modern 
electoral politics, it is deemed politically and economically unviable. The 
transition from the period of ad hoc environmental policy of the preservationist 
era, through the period of establishment and influence of social movements, to 
green democratisation and the integration of environmental policy into the 
mainstream political agenda, has, in fact, been a steady social transformation. It 
has occurred, however, against the growing dominance of capitalism as the 
driving force behind government policy directions: the very ideology the post-
materialist movements opposed in the 1960s and 70s. 
7 Milbrath et al (1994), op cit. 422 
8 L.Williams, "Clark may find it tough swimming against the tide", The Sydney Morning Herald, 
27-28 July 2002, 15 
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Preservationist environmental policy 
While Carson's Silent Spring is widely regarded as the catalyst for the 
modern environmental movement, Callicott regards Aldo Leopold's 
posthumously published A Sand County Almanac to be equally as influential in 
terms of "powerfully advocating, for the first time in Western •intellectual 
history, broad human ethical responsibility to the non-human natural world."9 
In extending the ethics that humankind naturally assigns to fellow human 
members of the community to include the land, defined by Leopold as 
including all elements of the biosphere10, humans are able to more completely 
appreciate the complexity and diversity of the natural environment: 
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from 
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. 
It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the 
. h n community as sue . 
Leopold is quite clear, however, that while the land ethic would allow 
humankind to live in harmony with the environment as a fellow-citizen with 
the non-human world: 
A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, management, 
and use of these 'resources', but it does affirm their right to 
continued existence in a natural state.12 
Appreciation of the intrinsic worth of nature, along with the pragmatism of 
post-World War II industrialisation were not seen as mutually exclusive, or 
even incompatible: they were, in fact two sides of the same environmental 
coin. Two decades later the extension of ethical consideration to nature would 
become deep ecology, but in the 1940s and 50s it was couched more in terms of 
an holistic approach to environmental management and preservation. 
9 J.B.Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 223 10 A.Leopold, (1989) A Sand County Almanac Special Commemorative Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
11 Leopold (1989) "The Land Ethic", ibid. 204 
12 ibid. 204 
189 
The translation of an ethical approach to resource and land management 
into practical, and, more importantly, acceptable, public policy must be based 
on simple premises. Goodin argues that ethical principles must be reducible to 
"rules of thumb, which can be stated simply yet widely applied." 13 Leopold's 
land ethic, at its most fundamental, delineated the basis of a sustainable 
approach to environmental policy, that is, ensuring minimal human impact on 
the environment in its natural state. It also, however, proposed a further 
dimension to ethical behaviour in affirming the 'right' of nature to its continued 
existence in that natural state. The ascribing of 'rights', an essentially human 
concept, to a non-human entity poses a problem in practical terms. While it is 
widely recognised that humans have rights and that these rights are universal, it 
is equally recognised that human rights, in practice, are not universally applied, 
nor are they equal14 • If, then, humankind is unable to practice equality in its 
approach to the rights of its own species, how is it to translate those rights to the 
non-human world and in what form? There is an implicit paradox in Leopold's 
concession of human use, management and alteration of nature at the same time 
as affirming its right to self-determination. Midgley argues that human concern 
for the environment is not furthered by the bestowal of honorary citizenship 
upon non-human entities: 
If we claim (for instance) that a wilderness such as the Antarctic has 
intrinsic value because it has independent moral status, meaning by 
this that we have decided to grant it the privilege of treating it like 
an extra fellow citizen, we shall sound rather inadequate. These 
larger wholes are independent of us in a quite different sense from 
that in which extra humans - or even animals - who were candidates 
13 R.Goodin, "Ethical Principles for Environmental Protection", in Elliot and Gare (eds) 
Environmental Philosophy (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983) 3 
14 P.Bailey, Bringing Human Rights to Life (Sydney: Federation Press, 1993); also T.Athanasiou, 
Divided Planet (Athens Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1998); also J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
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for citizenship might be so. Our relation to them is of a totally 
different kind from the one which links us to our fellow citizens.15 
Leopold, as an exponent of environmental ethics, believed that humankind 
had a responsibility towards nature and that responsibility should be exercised 
in the form of recognising intrinsic value in the environment. In practice, this 
could only be effected by leaving areas of wilderness in an untouched state so as 
to facilitate nature's self-determination. The gazettal of national parks and 
wilderness areas proscribing human activity served to reinforce the implicit 
dualism of Leopold's ethic; and it was this dualism that both defined, and was 
defined by, preservationist environmental policy. The translation of the ethical 
principles evident in affording nature its rights to self-determination, into a 
policy that afforded human society its rights to use natural resources to pursue 
economic and material ends, inevitably resulted in this dualistic approach, 
represented in the 1960s and 70s by the deep ecology/ environmentalism 
dichotomy. In explicitly defining the responsibility of humankind towards 
nature, that is, the appreciation of its right to existence independent of human 
intervention, Leopold presented an essentially anthropocentric ideat later 
challenged by the radical deep ecologists and ecofeminists16, but nonetheless 
influential in terms of the evolution of environmental policy development. 
Leopold's most significant contribution to the development of 
environmental policy and the wider green movement, was as a 'wilderness 
ecologist' and wildlife researcher, taking a position of prescribing action rather 
than describing situation 17• Like Muir before him, he also founded a major 
environmental organisation: 
15 M.Midgley, Science and Poetry (London: Routledge, 2001) 187 
16 Leopold's ethic was criticised by later deep ecologists for its implications of bestowal of rights 
on nature, whereas, according to the more radical deep ecology proponents such as Earth First!, 
humans exist at the behest of nature, not the other way around. Ecofeminists were critical of the 
approach because of its inherently patriarchal implications. 
17 M.Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) 205 
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... . 
... the Wilderness Society remains a potent legacy, forming with 
Muir's Sierra Club an effective advocacy for wildlife protection.18 
As discussed in the previous chapter, since the apocalypticist era, science has 
assumed a front-line advisory role in the development and implementation of 
environmental policy. Leopold's land ethic marks the watershed in this regard, 
represented by the "notion of ecology as a normative science."19 Along with 
Carson, whose recognition and exposure of the physical elements of 
degradation in the environment was a warning of the ecological effects of 
human intervention and development, Leopo_ld' s treatise was a social and 
cultural warning. That society, in particular in the USA, displayed: 
... an apparent overemphasis on economic criteria of judgment that 
seemed to lead to the destruction of not only things natural but 
things cultural - a harvest that included everything from freedom 
and privacy to art and philosophy.20 
While the land ethic was an ideal rather than a benchmark and even by 
Leopold's concession was unlikely to transpose to practical terms, it set a new 
standard for the use of science and scientific rationality in environmental 
politics. 
Environmental policy21 as defined by the parameters established by the 
preservationist proponents was developed and implemented through policy 
instruments contained within a range of departments responsible for such areas 
as agriculture, industry and health. It dealt essentially with problems as they 
arose and according to how they affected human society or economic 
development. While there was no specific methodology attached to the land 
ethic as a basis for policy, there was equally no holistic ecological attachment to 
18 ibid. 205 
19 ibid. 206 
20 ibid. 207 
21 The term 'environment' was not used in its current context until the 1960s. I use the term 
'environmental policy' in terms of pre-1960s policy to mean any policy instruments that would 
now come under the broad umbrella of 'environmental', that is, concerning the natural 
environment, natural resources and the use, conservation and management thereof. 
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discrete and separate regulatory instruments developed to address discrete and 
separate issues. Economic growth proceeded unhampered by the concerns of 
ecologists such as Leopold, whose ethical considerations were dealt with in 
much the same way as other issues: that is, by assigning them to the specific 
government department most able to produce a policy document to address the 
need to leave areas of nature in an untouched state. The paradox of 
preservationist environmental policy remained unresolved due to, firstly, the 
fact that there was no official acknowledgement, nor sufficient margin to allow 
for it, of 'the environment' in its holistic sense incorporating human society as 
well as the non-human world; and secondly, ecological prescriptions such as the 
land ethic were considered as romantic rather than rationaI22, and therefore not 
appropriate bases for rational (economic) political action. 
The convergence of the romantic and the rational that finally caused the 
dominance of preservationism to wane, was aided by the unexpected in the 
form of men of science. In the late 1950s and early 60s Soviet Russia and the 
USA began what became known as the 'space race', and for the first time the 
human species gained photographic and first-hand verbal reports of how the 
planet appeared from space. Accounts by astronauts, however, celebrated not 
the technological expertise and politico-economic might that put them in space, 
but the unexpected sight of the planet Earth from an immense distance. 
The Earth reminded us of a Christmas tree ornament hangi,ng in the 
blackness of space. As we got farther and farther away it diminished in size. 
Finally it shrank to the size of a marble, the most beautiful marble you can imagine. 
That beautiful, warm, living object looked so fragile, so delicate, 
that if you touched it with a finger it would crumble and fall apart. 
James Irwin, Astronaut, USA 
22 J.Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 156 
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Suddenly, from behind the rim of the moon, in a long, slow-motion moment 
of immense majesty, there emerges a sparkling blue and white jewel, 
a light delicate sky-blue sphere laced with slowly swirling veils of white, 
rising gradually like a small pearl in a thick sea of black mystery. 
It takes more than a minute to fully realize this is Earth ... home. 
Edgar Mitchell, Astronaut, USA 
For the first time in my life I saw the horizon as a curved line. 
It was accentuated by a thin seam of dark blue light - our atmosphere. 
Obviously this was not the ocean of air I had been told it was so many times in my life. 
I was terrified by its fragile appearance. 
Ulf Merbold, Astronaut, Federal Republic of Germany 
The Earth was small, light blue, and so touchingly alone, 
our home that must be defended like a holy relic. The Earth was absolutely round. 
I believe I never knew what the word round meant until I saw Earth from space. 
Aleksei Leonov, Astronaut, USSR23 
Accounts such as these heightened social awareness of the environment as a 
single living entity: a concept not circumscribed by the ad hoc environmental 
policy instruments of preservationism. The provision of wilderness areas, while 
recognising the intrinsic value of nature, did not address the more pressing 
problems of pollution and unsustainable resource use. The inherent dualism, 
therefore, had to be resolved in order for environmental integrity and ecological 
sustainability to be addressed together at the vital policy level. 
23 Astronaut quotes from Hamilton, //Earth from Space", 
http:/ /www.solarviews.com/ eng/ earthsp.htrn 
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Green democratisation and integrationist policy: the eco-bureaucracy 
There is considerable overlap between the land ethic of Leopold's text and 
the New Ethic that marked the establishment of the United Tasmania Group 
and the entry of environmentalism into politics. The convergence of the 
environment and the political domain, with the progression of the 
environmental movement, created a new direction in liberal politics. The 
approach which had allowed for environmental integrity through wilderness 
declarations and national parks, but also for industry to continue unchecked 
until environmental damage threatened economic development or human 
health, was an inadequate basis on which to address the issues being debated in 
public fora, within the green movement itself, and at the inter- and 
supranational levels. The conundrum of how to integrate the social demands of 
environmentalists and the environmental concerns of ecologists into the liberal 
democratic framework, became the underlying goal of the new political 
approach. If environmental ethics and ecological sustainability were the ends, 
the establishment of an environmental bureaucracy provided the means of 
implementation. 
Government approaches to issues are, by and large, defined by their 
bureaucracies. These front lines of governmental procedure are 'big' or 'small', 
according to the ideological foundation of the government. Policy is developed 
according to government priority and departments are resourced similarly. In 
environmental policy, the aim, generally speaking, has been to steer the middle 
course between ecocentrism and rampant development: a process linking 
Leopold's land ethic and its descendant in deep ecology, with the socially-
oriented concerns inherent in the environment movement. The organisational 
approach advocated by Uekoetter focuses on ''how to transform environmental 
awareness into viable alternatives and how to represent these concerns in the 
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cold and dirty world of politics."24 This approach enables continuity between 
the approaches of the past, and the "current endeavour of organising responses 
to the meta-challenge of sustainability, which is, above all, an institutional 
question."25 Where the goal of the social movements, then, was to transform 
society, the task of the bureaucracy is to measure and facilitate that change 
within the constraints of political ideology and economic growth. 
Green democratisation and integrationist policy has been forced to address 
. two fundamental questions that have linked environmental consciousness to 
political process. In the first instance, the emergence of the environment as a 
political actor placed government in the position of creating policy in the 
interests of an entity that can play no active role in liberal democr_atic politics. 
'Trees don't vote' has become a cynical adage on the subject of ecologically 
ethical decision-making. The question of who directly benefits from 
ecologically oriented policy and who will be guarantor in terms of political 
outcome underlies much Western environmental policy development and · 
prioritisation of issues. In the second instance, and directly related to the first, 
the question of the role of the state in taking action on environmental issues 
remains largely contentious in liberal democracies. Brown and Singer argue 
that the strength of democracy- its accountability to the community through 
the electoral process - is also its weakness in respect of environmental policy26 • 
Effective long-term environmental policy must look not only to the next 
parliamentary term but to the next generation and beyond. Within the liberal 
democratic structure, however, there is little or no provision for policy 
development that looks beyond the end of the current governmental term, 
except where this is politically convenient or in cases where significant political 
pressure is brought to bear. The institutionalisation of the environment, 
24 F.Uekoetter quoted in Dovers, "Still settling Australia: environment, history and policy", in 
Davers (ed) Environmental History and Policy: Still Settling Australia (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 15 
25 ibid. 15 
26 B.Brown and P.Singer, The Greens ( Melbourne: The Text Publishing Co., 1995) 92 
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through the instrument of the bureaucracy, must both address the long-term 
nature of environmental problems as well as the short-term electoral 
considerations of the government. Dryzek points out that the role of the state in 
contemporary politics, is: 
First, and arguably foremost, [to] secure economic stability and 
growth. If they fail in this task, then they are 'punished' by both 
falling tax revenues for any projects that state officials might want to 
pursue, and by unpopularity in the eyes of their populations .... 
The second maintaining function that states must perform is the 
keeping of order in societies. In large part this task involves 
legitimating the prevailing political-economic system in the eyes of 
the population ... 
The third maintaining function facing all states involves staying 
afloat in a hostile world, constituted by other states and by the 
international political economy.27 
These compounded roles, frequently, are not compatible with the long-term 
interests of the environment except insofar as environmental policy instruments 
can be seen as functional elements in (a) securing economic growth; (b) keeping 
order; and (c) ensuring national security. These prerequisites then, form the 
parameters within which the environmental bureaucracy - the ecocracy - must 
operate. 
The emergence of ecological modernisation as policy, particularly in 
Europe, in the 1980s and 90s was a direct response to the requirements of the 
liberal democratic political structure overlaid with scientific evidence of 
ecological degradation and the social and environmental justice demands of the 
green movement and green political parties. The paradox of liberalism in 
respect of environmental policy is that, in acting rationally, individuals are 
unlikely to take a voluntary initiative in preventing ecological damage "unless 
27 J.Dryzek, "Democracy and Environmental Policy Instruments" in Eckersley (ed) Markets, The 
State and The Environment: Towards Integration (South Melbourne: Macmillan Education 
Australia, 1995) 295 
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the gains for individuals supersede the costs." 28 While environmentalists, 
particularly in Australia where many state-based environmental initiatives have 
been strongly supported by the green movement29, prefer a greater state role in 
ensuring regulation, liberal capitalist market economics move towards less state 
intervention, 'light-handed regulation'30 and the promotion of natural 
capitalism31• The issue of the Snowy River and the corporatisation of the 
SMHEA presents a case of the paradox inherent in the green approach and 
forms the basis of the reason why, as posited in this thesis and detailed in the 
final chapter, localised environmental campaigns have replaced the 
'environment movement' as the social drivers of environmental policy. As a 
government authority, the SMHEA was impervious to the issue of 
environmental flows in the Snowy as its purpose, under legislation, was to 
impound and divert the waters of the Snowy and Eucumbene rivers. As a 
corporate body, however, the focus would be wider and more attuned to the 
needs of a greater number of stakeholders. It is Green political parties, not the 
green movement, that, while demanding state regulation on such issues as 
greenhouse emissions, air and water pollution, and resource extraction 
industries, also advocate community-based collective action on local issues 
towards a communitarian system of sustainability rather than centralised 
government policy. The challenge for liberal democratic governments has been 
to make environmentally sound action in the best economic interests of 
individual corporations, whilst establishing environmental standards for 
industry and local government to be centrally regulated. 
The past two decades have seen the rise of a new terminology to describe 
the processes of green democratisation and integrationism. Terms such as 
28 M.de Geus, "Ecological Restructuring of the State", in Doherty and de Geus (eds) Democracy 
and Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 1996) 190 29 E.Papadakis, 2001, "The Politics of Light-handed Regulation: New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in Australia", paper presented at the Joint Sessions, ECPR, Grenoble, April 2001 30 
'b'd 1 1 . 
31 Hawken et al, Natural Capitalism (London: Earthscan, 1999) 
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'triple bottom line', 'natural capitalism',' environmental impact assessment', 
'environmental audit', 'ecological footprint' and 'resource economics' have 
joined ecologically sustainable development as benchmarks against which 
government and industry can measure their progress. The ecological crisis 
predicted by the founders of the modern environmental movement has been 
transformed into state and corporate economic process while state agencies such 
as the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) exist largely to facilitate this 
process and form the official green interface between government and society. 
Models for measuring and changing certain behaviours, either in industry or 
community, are formulated according to the prescriptions of liberal capitalism: 
that is, the premise that in so acting, an individual will gain sufficient reward so 
as to make such action rational choice32 • The development and use of the jargon 
and terminology has served to give legitimacy to the ecocracy, as well as create 
a bureaucratic niche that it can occupy in perpetuity. 
Institutional change to accommodate the rising profile of environmentalism 
as a political issue has been integrated vertically through the political system as 
well as horizontally across all sectors of society. Changes have occurred both 
incrementally and, occasionally, as avalanches, according to the issue in 
contention and the projected political outcome. This, of course, raises the 
question of whether changes in government attitude towards environmentalism 
have occurred out of genuine concern for the environment, or out of electoral 
necessity- what Papadakis refers to as" cynical politics"33 • Since the early 1980s 
specific environmental issues have been blatantly used to lure voters at both 
state and federal levels, often through gaining the support of leading 
32 .b .d 1 1 . 
33 E.Papadakis, Environmental Politics and Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 13 
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environmental organisationS34 • Similarly, environmental policy that is perceived 
by voters to be not in their best interests can become a political liability. 
Institutional changes and the incremental transformation of the political 
establishment have occurred as responses to problems as they occur. 
Notwithstanding the precautionary principle (vorsorgeprinzip), adopted as policy 
by the German government during the 1980s35, solutions to the ecological crisis 
are developed within the institutional framework as economic needs dictate. 
Political and institutional change occurs as a response to, rather than in 
anticipation of, problems within the socio-environmental exemplar and which 
are facilitated through social agencies such as the popular media36 • 
Limitations and restrictions of integrationist policy 
The integrationist ecocracy serves the function of legitimating the state in 
matters of environmental decision-making. There are, however, serious 
limitations to this function. It has already been mentioned that the weakness of 
modern liberal democratic politics manifests in policy that seldom looks beyond 
the end of the current term of government, but the nature of problems to be 
dealt with at policy level are such that the results of actions and decisions made 
today will, quite conceivably, still impact on human society in two or three 
generations time37 • This places considerable strain on a political system not 
adapted for detailed planning beyond the immediate term of government: 
34 Environmental issues played a large role in the 1990 election campaign, but have been less 
determinative at Federal level since then, although the ALP gained the support of the ACF and 
The Wilderness Society in the 1996 Federal election. In the 1995 Queensland State election, 
conservation groups and the Greens campaigned against the Labor government in several key 
(marginal) south-east Queensland electorates in protest at the government's proposed highway 
development through bushland recognised as a major koala habitat. The government lost the 
election narrowly and the in~oming National Party government abandoned the ALP's proposed 
highway, while pressing ahead with development in the Daintree rainforest. 
35 Dryzek (1997) op cit. 139 
36 'b'd 1 1 . 
37 P.Christoff, "Ecological Citizens and Democracy", in Doherty and de Geus (eds) (1996), op cit. 
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Decisions must be informed by evolving scientific understandings of 
the intricate behaviour of fragile ecosystems, and of the 
environmental implications of human activity. These informational 
demands exacerbate tensions relating to the limited capacity of 
representative democracy adequately to reflect informed 
environmental choice.38 
Politically myopic planning is further compounded by the fact that in order for 
practical policy to be developed, it must first recognise a problem. The 
· transformation of the institutional structure from ecologically reactive to 
proactive is essentially a process requiring, in the first instance, problem 
recognition, and in the second instance, problem anticipation. Once again, 
notwithstanding the precautionary principle, which Rampton and Stauber point 
out is, in fact, a form of problem recognition rather than anticipation39, modern 
liberal democracies remain largely promethean40 in their faith that tomorrow's 
technology will solve today's problems and that long-term problem solving is 
not necessarily in the best interests of either the ecocracy itself or the 
government it serves. 
The temporal aspects of ecocratic limitation are equalled spatially by a lack 
of ability, within the structure, to adequately deal at state level with problems 
that reach beyond state borders. Multi-state blocs and supranational 
organisations have moved in part to address this, but such organisations are 
only as strong as the weakest member. There has been considerable difficulty in 
Europe in centralising European Union (EU) environmental policy due in part 
to lack of adequate implementation at state level41 and exhaustive attempts at 
UN level for uniform global regulation on greenhouse emissions have stalled 
with the USA, the world's biggest polluter and consumer of fossil fuels, refusing 
38 ibid. 158 
39 Rampton and Stauber, Trust Us, We're Experts! (New York: Jeremy P.Tarcher /Putnam, 2001) 
123-125 
40 Dryzek (1997) op cit. 
41 P.Bames and I.Barnes, Environmental Policy in the European Union (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, 1999) 98 
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. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Bi- and multilateral agreements on specific issues 
have been more successful than the supranational organisations, but are often in 
the form of economic or trade agreements. Davers and Handmer identify three 
levels of environmental issues to be dealt with according to their temporal and 
spatial specificities: 
Micro-problems: spatially and temporally discrete ... addressable 
within on political boundary using existing technologies and 
institutional structures. 
Mesa-problems: significant issues, but not posing systemic threats to 
the present pattern of production and consumption, or an 
overwhelming challenge to extant policy processes. 
Macro-problems: the big, global issues of sustainability -
multifaceted, fraught with uncertainty, with major implications for 
both natural and human systems, spatially and temporally diffuse 
and highly connected to other issues.42 
It is the last of these categories where the limitations of state-centric policy are 
the most apparent; and at this level also where the ecological crisis is most 
apparent and the need for strong, empirically-based policy development most 
urgent. Where the promethean view once prevailed: 
[t]his hope has been destroyed by the scale of human-induced 
environmental change and the spatial and temporal complexity of 
natural systems .... crucial policy decisions are demanded now, well 
before any semblance of certainty.43 
The concept of developing and implementing policy against a risk of which 
there is no certainty of occurrence has proven to be socially ( electorally) sound, 
environmentally prudent and politically complex. Implementation of 
preventative environmental measures as policy instruments have been, of 
political necessity, carried out with an immediate political benefit in the form of 
42 S.Dovers and J.Handmer, 1995, " Ignorance, the Precautionary Principle, and Sustainability", 
Ambia, Vol.24, No.2, 92 
43 ibid. 92 
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increased employment, corporate investment, national security or economic 
growth. Where no immediate benefit is apparent, no preventative measure will 
be taken. In reality, the long-term costs of not implementing preventative 
environmental policy do not figure in the balance. The point is made by 
Hamilton in the example of taking government action against lead pollution 
from petrol, where the decision by the Australian government in 1993 not to 
impose the burden of extra fuel costs on low-incom~ families by enacting 
legislation to ban leaded petrol, will impact on the same socio-economic group 
in the future in the form of "poorer health and reduced life opportunities."44 Of 
all the limitations placed on the functions of the ecocracy, those imposed by the 
politico-economic structure are perhaps the most restrictive in terms of 
inflexibility and predictive requirements. These requirements become more 
inflexible as the scope of the issues broaden, with the result that the large-scale 
global environmental issues, such as climate change, are the most problematic 
as state-centric legislation must, within the constraints of the liberal capitalist 
framework, afford the 1national interest' in the global economy. 
Economically, and in respect of the national interest, integrationist 
environmental policy development is also restricted by the specific interests of 
business and industry, leading to a power vacuum at the governmental level: 
... close coalitions between civil servants and industrialists in areas 
of state activity are especially apt to limit the independence of 
political decision-makers. An important element in the power of the 
industrial system is the specialization of industrial interest 
complexes, whereby particular growth interests can be brought to 
bear which do not coincide with the general interest in growth ... 
[particularly] those specialised industries which depend to a greater 
45 or lesser extent on govemm.ent orders. 
44 C.Harnilton, 1996, "Generational Justice: The Marriage of Sustainability and Social Equity'\ 
Australian Journal of Environmental Management, Vol.3, No.3 169 
45 M.Janicke, State Failure (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 14 
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The centralisation of the integrationist bureaucracy and its inherent liberal-
capitalist links with industry at the economic level controvert any notion of 
green social transformation by strengthening the existing structure. According 
to Bookchin, decentralisation is the key to achieving sustainability by scaling the 
democratic structure to "human dimensions"46 • 
Capitalism, the domain of competition par excellence, has its fair share 
of violence, plunder, piracy, and enslavement; but in the normal 
course of events its mode of self-preservation is a quiet process of 
economic cannibalization - the devouring of one capitalist by 
another and the ever-greater centralization of capital in fewer 
hands. 47 
Eckersley and de Geus, however, believe that on the socio-political level the 
provincialism inherent in small, decentralised communities would make 
implementation of social and environmental reform more difficult48 • While 
historically this has been the case as indicated by Eckersley, and Bookchin's neo-
medieval communities are utopian at best, it remains that centralisation places 
environmental policy planning in the hands of an agency whose only power is 
drawn from the economic conditions imposed by government and industry. 
A centralised eco-bureaucracy strives to create for government: 
1. a constancy of approach to environmental policy; 
11. economic control over environmental programs through the devolution 
of financial resources; 
111. decision-making over what environmental issues and problems to target 
and what policy instruments49 to use for the greatest political benefit; 
1v. security of the 'national interest' in respect of global environmental 
issues. 
46 M.Bookchin Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980) 144 
47 ibid. 145 
48 de Geus, (1996) op cit. 195 
49 For example: direct funding such as drought relief; indirect funding through related programs 
such as Landcare; research and development. 
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The ecocracy is thus constrained in developing and implementing policy for 
issues that: 
1. are not regarded as politically viable or urgent50; 
11. do not receive adequate government funding; 
111. may contravene or pose a risk to government economic or foreign 
investment policy; 
1v. may represent a major transformation of the socio-political structure 
away from the established institutional structure. 
While the bureaucracy remains a powerful institution, it does so only by 
remaining central. Janicke points out that each bureaucracy "is surrounded by 
favoured clients", and that in most cases these "are companies and trading 
organizations."51 This represents the bureaucracy-industry nexus, which, in the 
case of environmental policy, invests considerable institutional control in 
companies and individuals whose interest in the environment is its continued 
exploitation rather than its protection. 
The implications here for the construction of bureaucratic control of 
environmental policy is that the social perception of environmental problems, 
apparent in symptoms such as degradation of agricultural lands, polluted 
waterways, loss of biodiversity and changes in weather patterns, is not being 
met with policy aimed at addressing the sources of the problems, but with 
programs placing the onus for responsibility back on communities. The 
democratic implications of this are positive, however, it remains that without 
structured and adequately funded programs problems are more likely to recur. 
As a consequence, guilt-driven programs such as the highly publicised "Clean 
Up Australia" campaign rely on an army of volunteers to pick up tonnes of 
waste from the nation's public spaces without questioning, in any way, the 
source of the waste or where this might be better controlled. Ironically, the 
campaign is sponsored by McDonalds, which could encourage speculation 
50 I have used the word 'urgent', but in many cases this could be substituted with 'expedient'. 
51 Janicke (1990) op cit, 13 
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about the frequency with which the sponsor's logo appears on the aggregate 
end product52• Similarly, a recent innovation from the Australian Greenhouse 
Office, the Cool Communities Program53, offers community groups a grant to 
encourage householders to reduce their energy consumption by installing 
energy efficient light bulbs and showerheads. The reality, that is the 
symptomatic evidence of pollution and greenhouse emissions, in these cases, 
cannot be used to explain the existence of the campaigns, as it is only after the 
campaigns or programs are implemented that their environmental effect can be 
measured. 
Legal instruments are similarly constrained in their scope and capacity to 
ensure standardised policy measures for environmental protection and 
sustainability. Private property rights, the privatisation of utilities and the 
influence of global economic factors in the form of foreign investment may 
affect the implementation or maintenance of standardised national 
environmental law. Davers points out that while "nearly 2000 state and 
Commonwealth laws [are] being interrogated for 'anti-competitive' element"54, 
no such process is taking place, or planned, for laws in respect of 
'unsustainable' elements. To compound the difficulties for the law, in Australia 
the devolution of much environmental policy to the states creates circumstances 
where strong environmental laws in one state may be completely counteracted 
by weaker ones in an adjacent state. 
The assessment of environmental risks has become the common and 
accepted form of legal mechanism for establishing policy process and outcomes . . 
While environmental impact assessments (EIA) are viewed as technical and 
scientific processes carried out towards the goal of ensuring human 
52 R.Tennant-Wood, 2001, "Taking out the garbage: the sociology of waste", paper presented to 
Wastebusters and Organics 2001 Conferences, Ashburton NZ, May 2001 
53 Australian Greenhouse Office, (2002) 
http:/ /www.greenhouse.gov.au/ coolcomrnunities/ index.html 
54 S.Dovers, 1999, "Adaptive Policy, Institutions and Management: Challenges for Lawyers and 
Others'', Griffith Law Review, Vol.8, No.2 384 
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development impacts minimally on certain environments, Thomas argues that it 
is, in fact, an inherently political process55 • The EIA process frequently 
highlights the: 
... inadequacy of the information upon which government and 
society propose to act. In this situation EIA may be seen as a threat 
to those who avoid change ... [and] the politics surrounding EIA are 
not confined to the politics of parties and elections, but must include 
the politics of personal and organisational survival.56 
Rather than providing the opportunities for independent, flexible and 
accountable environmental decision-making, political instruments and 
processes in fact demarcate the parameters within which environmental policy 
must be developed and implemented. 
Sustainability: holy grail or political football? 
What, then, precisely, is sustainability and can it be achieved through 
bureaucratic procedure? While the Brundtland definition of ecologically 
sustainable development has provided legislators, environmentalists and 
industrialists with a conceptual rule-of-thumb, the past fifteen years have seen 
Brundtland' s very broad articulation of intergenerational equity and 
developmental restraint evolve into a process-oriented bureaucracy wherein the 
crucial challenge has become not whether policy outcome is sustainable, but 
whether the policy process itself is sustainable? Eco-bureaucracies are typically 
hierarchically organised and departmentally fragmented. Environment 
Australia (Department of Environment and Heritage), for example, has 11 
divisional groupings not including portfolio statutory authorities and executive 
agencies, and a triangular, top-down organisational structure where power 
55 l.Thomas, Environmental Impact Assessment in Australia: theory and practice (Annandale: 
Federation Press, 2001) 
56 ibid. 26 
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devolves directly from the Minister, through the Parliamentary and Public 
·service Secretaries to the divisional directors57 • Given this situation, where the 
Minister represents the government's interests and the senior bureaucrats may 
be primarily interested in advancing their careers, it is unlikely that policy 
development is motivated chiefly by ecocentric concerns or an innate sense of 
environmental justice. Rather, environmental policy fulfills the dual ecocratic 
objectives of addressing a specific environmental concern, and ensuring the 
sustainable future of the department itself in the form of monitoring and 
evaluation, research and ongoing policy development. The issue of sustainable 
bureaucracies reflects the views of Janicke58 and Papadakis59 that the centrality of 
these institutions creates a locus of power. In the case of the ecocracy, the 
maintenance of this position means that a concern for future generations and 
the intrinsic value of nature are not necessarily the primary motives behind 
politico-institutional administration of the environment. 
The literature concerning sustainability and ecologically sustainable 
development invariably contains references to a transformation of society or the 
socio-political order6°. Where social movements sought to transform society 
through a heightened awareness of the need to address social inequity, the 
ecological crisis and the dangers of concentrated nuclear weapomy, these basic 
premises when integrated into mainstream liberal democratic policy became 
affirmative action, anti-discrimination, nuclear arms treaties and ecological 
sustainability. While most of these represented broad, positive and irreversible 
changes in social thought, the integration and institutionalisation of ecological 
57 Environment Australia, 2002, "Organisational Structure", 
http:/ /www.ea.gov.au/ about/ structure.html 
58 Janicke (1990) op cit. 
59 Papadakis (1996) op cit. 
6
° For example: WCED, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Davers, 
(1990) "Sustainability in Context: An Australian Perspective", Environmental Management, 
Vol.14, No.3, pp.297-305; Davers, Institutions for Sustainability, Issue 7, (ACF, Environment 
Institute of Australian and Land and Water Australia, 2001); Meadows et al, Beyond the Limits 
(London: Earthscan, 1992); Prugh et al, The Local Politics of Global Sustainability (Washington DC: 
Island Press, 2000); Bookchin Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980); 
Sagoff The Economy of the Earth (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
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sustainability has, over the past two decades, been accompanied by a 
simultaneous - and paradoxical - growth in industrialisation and consequential 
environmental alteration. The inherent tension between the two sectors has 
created a credibility gap between the theory of sustainability and its practical 
implications in the face of global capitalism and industrialisation. While society 
and community attitudes and behaviours have changed through awareness and 
response to environmental interrelationships, the politico-economic order has 
transformed to a far less degree: it has, rather, taken a systemic approach to 
integration and adapted sustainable principles to itself and its own functions. 
Ecological sustainability is concerned primarily with two areas: the 
reduction, through human use, of the earth's natural resources (including 
biodiversity) at a rate faster than they can be replaced; and the subsequent and 
consequent creation and accumulation of human byproducts such as wastes and 
undesirable societal situations61 • On the first point, the Brundtland Report was 
quite clear that the global economy had a role to play in ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of natural resources: 
Two conditions must be satisfied before international economic 
exchanges can become beneficial for all involved. The sustainability 
of ecosystems on which the global economy depends must be 
guaranteed. And the economic partners must be satisfied that the 
basis of exchange is equitable; relationships that are unequal and 
based on dominance of one kind or another are not a sound and 
durable basis for interdependence.62 
The credibility gap between this prescription and the reality of the global 
economy, however, has created a playing field which, far from being level, is 
heavily weighted with a growing commodity demand: sustainability in the 
form of environmentally-friendly consumer goods for the capitalist market. 
61 S.Dovers, (1990) //Sustainability in Context: An Australian Perspectiven, Environmental 
Management Vol.14, No.3 pp.297-305 
62 WCED (1987) op cit. 67 
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This, in turn, exacerbates the problem of the second concern of sustainability, 
that of waste byproducts and the societal 'waste' that occurs as a result of 
inequitable economic relationships. 
The institutionalisation of the environment in the form of the ecocracy 
approaches the socio-economic imbalance inherent in this situation through 
policy programs that (a) address resource management at all levels of 
development; (b) repair existing environmental damage; but ( c) do not impede 
liberal-capitalist economic growth. It is recognised that, from ecocentric or 
ecological standpoints and in the context of the Brundtland Report, this is not an 
ideal approach. However, it is entirely logical that this should be the result of 
the democratisation and integration of the environment. The concept of 
sustainability has moved beyond the parameters set by the Brundtland 
Commission in 1987 and endorsed by the Earth Summit in 1992. Integrationism 
has ensured that corporate environmentalism - or 'natural capitalism' - is a 
central force in driving the issue of sustainability forward63 • It is at this level 
that economic transformation has occurred, but only insofar as the 
environmental revolution provided a new and untapped market. 
Today many companies have accepted their responsibility to do no 
harm to the environment. Products and production processes are 
becoming cleaner; and where such change is under way, the 
environment is on the mend. In the industrialized nations, more and 
more companies are 'going green' as they realize that they can 
reduce pollution and increase profits simultaneously. We have come _ 
a long way.64 
Liberal capitalist environmentalism, despite the rhetoric, has not turned 
corporate warriors into born-again greenies. The fundamental weakness in the 
liberal capitalist approach is the profit imperative: unless the business and 
63 S.Bernste:in, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001) 
64 S.L.Hart, "Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World", :in Harvard Business Review on 
Business and the Environment (Harvard Business School Press, 2000) 106 
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industry sector can achieve a profit margin in environmentally sustainable 
practices, they have, under the system of global capitalism, the option to 
abandon those practices altogether by relocating their operations to developing 
nations where legislative ( or ethical) restrictions may not apply. This is the crux 
of the corporate-bureaucratic nexus. Environmental policy developed within 
the institutional structure of the ecocracy must incorporate the interests of 
economic stakeholders motivated by the fundamental requirements of neo-
classical economics. Economically sustainable policy, therefore, becomes the 
priority, based on sound economic returns. In 2000 market research showed 
that in the previous twelve months between 75 and 82 percent of Australian 
consumers purchased products solely on the basis of environmental or social 
issues65 • Reinhardt makes quite clear the priorities of business when addressing 
environmental considerations: 
... managers should look at environmental problems as business 
issues, They should make environmental investments for the same 
reasons they make other investments: because they expect them to 
deliver positive returns or to reduce risks. Managers need to go 
beyond the question 'Does it pay to be green?' and ask instead 
'Under what circumstances do particular kinds of environmental 
investments deliver benefits to shareholders?'66 
While the challenge to business is clear, the message in terms of environmental 
sustainability is less confident. 
The integrationist ecocracy, as the fir~t bureaucracy in history established 
for the purpose of establishing specific policy and planning instruments for the 
environment, can generally remain professionally blinkered regarding specific 
environmental issues that may not be in the economic interests of its 
65 KPMG Consulting: Social Responsible Investment Research (August 2000), in Krockenberger et al, 
Natural Advantage:_A Blueprint for a Sustainable Australia (Australian Conservation Foundation, 
2000) 4 
66 F.L.Reinhardt, "Bringing the Environment Down to Earth", Harvard Business Review, (2000) op 
cit. 37 
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stakeholders. Insofar as sustainability remains an eco-political goal, its 
development and implementation have largely been diffused across a range of 
institutions to facilitate maximum socio-political uptake. Programs for 
sustainability in energy, waste, resource extraction, agriculture and risk 
management are therefore concentrated where expertise in those areas is most 
available. Resources for policy development can be devolved according to the 
judgment of professional bureaucrats, while the experts in the fields retain, in 
turn, their independence and a great deal of flexibility in their approach. 
The placement of sustainability within a political framework presents 
another set of obstacles. The challenge presented by the fact that ecological and 
social processes "rarely match historically defined political boundaries"67 is not 
confined within green democratisation and integrationist borders. Reconciling 
the human and natural scales was one of the primary motives of John Muir and 
his ecological antithesis, Gifford Pinchot68• The polarisation represented by the 
opposing positions of these two proponents, both of whom professed the best 
interests of nature, is reflected in the modern eco-bureaucracy as a function of 
representative democracy. Given the short-term planning inherent in electoral 
politics, it is in the best interests of government that any transformation in the 
socio-political order that is to occur does so gradually, predictably and with the 
sound backing of government institutions. Sustainability, as an environmental 
imperative and universally accepted as such, has had to be integrated into the 
political structure as a natural extension of governmental functions . 
It is probably beyond question that, given the level of social awareness of 
environmental problems, a liberal democratic government that actively opposed 
the concept of ecological sustainability would be committing electoral suicide. 
The adaptation of the liberal democratic structure to the concept of ecological 
sustainability has been influenced by a number of key factors : 
67 Davers (2001) op cit. 14 
68 Oelschlaeger, (1991) op cit. 282 
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i. electoral viability, gauged though community and social responses to 
specific issues; 
11. economic benefits, gauged through economic and financial institutions 
both global and domestic; 
111. the existence of green political parties (green democratisation); 
1v. environmental pressure groups and NGOs 
There is, however, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, a certain level of 
cynicism that suggests political and governmental annexation of sustainability, 
almost as a freestanding institution itself, is simply a matter of electoral 
convenience. It is at this point that the term 'sustainability' loses its 
environmental context and becomes simply political jargon to cover the widest 
possible range of meanings. 
Grassroots meets Leviathan: the case of Landcare in Australia 
While the integration of environmental concerns into liberal capitalist 
politics has resulted in new market formulae for business and industry to 
maximise 'green' profits, the practical effect of this has been the transference of 
responsibility for action from industry to local communities through guilt-
driven campaigns aimed at ensuring that consumers, in taking action on 
environmental issues, are also supporting the corporate machine. 
Environmentalism is a niche market and consumers are encouraged to support 
it. Expensive advertising campaigns assert that certain companies or products 
are addressing environmental issues, and consumers are being environmentally 
irresponsible if they do not, in turn, support those companies and their 
products. While local action has always been central to the environmental 
movement, coercion through guilt does not constitute this. It presumes, from 
the outset, the Hobbesian premise that everyone acting in their own self-interest 
will result in a state of anarchy, or in the more recent terms of Hardin: 
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"freedom [in the commons] will bring ruin to all."69 This situation has resulted 
in a liberal-capitalist Leviathan, by definition almost an oxymoron but in reality 
manifesting in the form of business and industry, assuming the role of protector 
of, in this case, the environment, from the purely self-motivated actions of 
individuals. The corporate Leviathan, however, despite its power nexus with 
the ecocracy and unfettered access to global economic resources, cannot force 
the issue of sustainable practice from its own perspective on individuals or local 
communities: 
... sustainability covers too wide a scope for supra- or transnational 
action to be effective at the grassroots level: carbon credit trading 
means little to communities disenfranchised or displaced as a result 
of economic policy of corporate governance. 70 
Sustainability, if left solely to liberal capitalism for its implementation, 
would undoubtedly fail. Integrationism, however, has ensured that the 
capitalist economy and its symbiosis with the centralised bureaucracy are only 
part of the sustainability equation. The green movement has had a long-
term, irreversible transformative effect on society, evident in the widespread 
adoption of practices such as recycling, water conservation measures, the use of 
solar and other 'green' energy alternatives, backyard and small-scale 
composting and other organic agricultural and horticultural methods. The fact 
that approximately 60,000 consumers, including 2,500 businesses, in Australia 
are currently opting to use 'green power' from renewable sources at a higher 
cost to individual consumers than the standard coal-fired power71 would seem 
to contradict the Hobbesian-Hardin theory that all individuals will act in their 
own self-interest rather than in the interests of the community as a whole. It is 
possible that in acting in the interests of sustainability they are, in fact, acting in 
their own genetic interests in ensuring that their descendants will inherit 
69 G.Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons", Science, Vol.162, No.3858; December 1968, 1247 
70 R.Tennant-Wood, 2002, "Local Green Governance: the value of community and a sense of 
place", Ecopolitics Journal Vol.1, No.3, 56 
71 Sustainable Energy Development Authority, Greenpower, http:/ /www.greenpower.com.au/ 
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sufficient resources for their needs. It is also possible that there is a certain level 
of altruism present in acting in the interests of the community at individual cost. 
More likely, however, and notwithstanding the presence of either or both of the 
above, environmentally aware actions at individual and local community level 
are the results of internalisation and institutionalisation of these practices over a 
period of some three decades. This represents a transformation of society and 
social attitudes at the grassroots level. 
The preservationist reliance on centralised government policy and 
regulation on isolated areas of environmental concern gave way, through the 
rise of the environmental movement, to the awareness of ecological 
interrelatedness. The 1972 coining of the slogan "Think globally, act locally" 
and its subsequent cooption as the expression of green ideology·provided the 
essential direction for human action on the environment. The development of 
the green democratisation and integrationist approach and establishment of the 
eco-bureaucracy allowed the slogan, and its theme, to be absorbed as a means of 
ensuring grassroots participation through the agency or encouragement of the 
centralised structure, for example, the promotion of 'green power' as a desirable 
alternative to non-renewable energy sources. The issue of agricultural land 
degradation in Australia has been of concern to farmers, rural communities and 
legislators since the 1930s72 • Practices such as ring-barking, broadacre land-
clearing, overgrazing and damming coupled with infestations of rabbits and 
weeds, resulted in problems such as soil erosion, topsoil removal and 
degradation of natural waterways. Within the parameters of preservationist 
policy, there were few means by which government could approach the 
problems holistically and little agreement over whether policy was a matter of 
state or federal responsibility73 • Ultimately, it became the responsibility of 
n S.Lockie, "Community Environmental Management? Landcare in Australia", in Lockie and 
Bourke (eds) Rurality Bites (Annandale: Pluto Press, 2001) 244 
73 .b.d 1 1 . 
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landholders to practice land and soil conservation measures in order to ensure 
continued agricultural productivity. 
Institutions, as agents for human development, are central to the broad 
social framework wherein collective and individual achievement is facilitated, 
but the method through which is this achieved tends to be retrospective rather 
than progressive. Davers points out that: 
Humans only achieve things collectively through institutions, mostly 
public institutions. . .. through which individual and private 
interests [are] enabled. Institutions reflect past rather than present 
understanding and imperative, naturally enough, and we still 
understand little about institutional change and design and the 
nature of policy leaming.74 
The eco-bureaucracy established in response to the integration of the 
environmental movement bears testimony to that view, nowhere more evident 
than in the process documents prepared for the 'Decade of Landcare', launched 
in 1989 by then Prime Minister Hawke aimed at engaging and combining the 
strengths of grassroots skills, human resources and resourcefulness and local 
knowledge, with the expertise and economic and political control of the 
ecocracy. The official policy documents, "produced essentially by the 
bureaucracy for the bureaucracy ... are defining documents and certainly 
establish a set of values and beliefs, but, despite appearances ... are not practical 
d t 1175 process acumen s. 
Despite this, or perhaps partly because of it, the Landcare P~ogram, which 
has endured beyond the originally intended decade, has proven to be a highly 
successful model of grassroots participatory environmental policy. Its vertical 
integration into policy and community process from an entry point at two 
separate levels - bureaucratic and community - has facilitated adaptive change 
74 Davers, (2000) op cit. 15 
75 M.Bailey, "Landcare: Myth or Reality?", in Lockie and Vanclay (eds) Critical La.ndcare (Wagga 
Wagga: Centre for Rural Social Research, 1997) 131 
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at the organisational stratum, collective achievement in communities, and has 
worked in the individual interests of individual stakeholders. This multiple-
level institutionalisation, retrospective insofar as action is almost exclusively 
restorative and concentrated where problems already exist (as indicated in 
Figure 6.2, which shows the 10 most addressed issues by Landcare groups in 
NSW), is reliant on available models for reparation, and also in its hierarchical 
organisational framework, is also a model for progressive change in its localised 
approach and engagement of the 'sense of place'76 that exists among 
communities. While Lockie has argued that Landcare is a means of maintaining 
the legitimacy of the state by abrogating its responsibility for environmental 
issues77, its main strength, in terms of delivering results on environmental 
issues, is the fact that at grassroots level, the bureaucracy has minimum 
influence. The institutional weakness in the Landcare model is the issue of 
accountability for environmental policy implementation. Morrisey states that: 
One of the central tenants (sic) of the Government's Landcare policy 
has been the devolving of responsibility from governments to local 
communities for environmental management. Devolving 
responsibility to communities is particularly relevant because 
devolution and local responsibility are central themes of community 
development and seen as necessary for sustainability.78 
76 Tennant-Wood (2002) op cit. and A.Carr, Grass Roots and Green Tape (Annandale: Federation 
Press, 2002) 
77 Lockie, 1993, "Landcare: Self-help, local knowledge and the state" (draft), paper presented to 
Ecopolitics VIII Conference, 1993, Griffith University, 
78 P .Morrisey, Interest Groups and the Landcare Forum: How do they influence sustainability in rural Australia? 1999 PhD Thesis, Southern Cross University, Lismore, 17 
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Figure 6.2: NSW Landcare groups, top 10 issues by percentage of groups 
[Source: DLWC Landcare Directory, 2001] 
While community development remains a necessary part of social 
sustainability, the issue of devolution of responsibility is also problematic in 
terms of where, in the institutional structure, lies accountability. Bureaucratic 
handwashing on a Pilatean scale is an inherent danger where policy is 
integrated vertically downwards. Where technical expertise is supplied by the 
ecocracy, however, through provision of a hierarchy of professional 
appointments, accountability is not so easily abrogated. State Landcare 
Councils and working groups, Landcare facilitator positions at state and 
regional levels, and Landcare program coordinators at community level form a 
chain of responsibility from the ecocracy down, with the on-ground personnel 
ensuring community interests and perceptions are adequately addressed 
through the appropriate bureaucratic channels. The community groups that 
form the Landcare network are responsible for identifying issues and providing 
labour: indeed, many Landcare groups form with the specific intent of 
addressing one issue, and once completed, the group may then disband or 
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target another single issue79 • Community Landcare groups assume 
responsibility for these tasks, and, as community groups, are accountable only 
to themselves. There is a strong sense among these groups that the bureaucracy 
is accountable to them, not the other way around: "groups can afford to say 
'we're the community, we're in charge here"'.80 
The sense of 'ownership' of the local environment has been highly evident 
in the Snowy campaign and in terms of Landcare, this was not restricted to the 
Dalgety community, but extended through Landcare groups in the Upper 
Snowy Region. Rosie Chapman, an environmental science graduate with over a 
decade's experience in community environmental management through 
Landcare, was appointed Upper Snowy Regional Landcare coordinator in July 
2000 and has worked closely with local groups in the region on projects directly 
and indirectly connected to the umelated campaign to save the Snowy. The 
East Jindabyne Landcare group embarked on a major project to rehabilitate the 
eroded and degraded foreshore of Rainbow Beach close to the Jindabyne dam 
wall, while the Bungarby and Berridale-Rocky Plains groups began a systematic 
program to remove crack willows from the streambanks and streambeds of the 
Wullwye and other small creeks that flow into the Snowy below the dam. The 
Dalgety-Numbla Vale group, consisting of many members of the Dalgety and 
District Community Association, worked on the riverbed of the Snowy, 
rehabilitating the channel itself and removing noxious weeds and willows. The 
concept of place attachment is an important factor in community environment 
programs and is unlikely to occur on a national scale unless a specific place has 
considerable symbolic national value81 • Interesting in terms of the Snowy River 
campaign is that, while the river does occupy a significant place in the cultural 
79 Comment from R.Chapman, Upper Snowy Landcare Coordinator, interviewed, June 2002, 
transcript in possession of author 
80 .b.d 1 1 . 
81 M.Vorkinn and H.Reise J'/Environmental concern in a local context: The 
significance of place attachmenf', Environment and Behavior1 Vol.33, No.2, March 
2001 
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legacy of the country, this only became a factor when national environmental 
NGOs or individual politicians released media statements designed to elevate 
the issue to national status. The NGOs were not a driving force behind 
the campaign, and, according to the local campaigners and the groups who 
worked on rehabilitating the streambed, appeared only for the photo 
opportunities. While national 'ownership1 of the Snowy may have brought the 
media to town, it was the choked and degraded streambed that was of concern 
to the community. 
Carr identifies four distinct criteria leading to a sense of community in 
groups: "membership, influence, emotional connection and reinforcement of 
needs. 1 ' 82 I would add to those a fifth and less definable category: that of 
establishing and fitting into a group 'ethos1 • Landcare groups ar·e either 'green' 
or 'brown', reflected in the attitudes of their members. Seldom do Landcare 
groups consist of individuals from both environmentalist and conservative 
categories83 • Carr touches on this when she indicates that in choosing not to join 
a community group people wished to avoid such labels as "radical greenie 
fringe" 84 • The term Landcare, in the 13 years since its inception at a national 
level, has come to repr~sent a far broader concept than its original intention. In 
much the same way as 'sustainability' has become a generic term for all things 
environmental, so Landcare has become a generic term for the social or 
'grassroots1 manifestation of sustainability. Belonging to a Landcare group can 
be regarded as a hands-on equivalent of eschewing the plastic shopping bag at 
the supermarket and taking the polystyrene-packaged chops home in a calico 
bag: it is an individual choice reflecting individual values, but is not necessarily 
in the best interests of ecological sustainability. The institutional basis of 
Landcare has resulted, in many cases, in issues being addressed according to 
methods that have worked in the past, or are believed to be the most effective in 
82 Carr (2002) op cit. 164 
83 R.Chapman, 2002; and anecdotal evidence from Landcare members interviewed 
84 ibid. 165 
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achieving a short-term result. This has been evident in such practices as 
chemical herbicide use on weeds near waterways85, or filling erosion gullies 
with old machinery86 - both unsustainable and ecologically unsound practices, 
but both reflecting the problem identified by Davers as being one of institutions 
reflecting past understandings. 
The ecocratic evolution has paralleled the development of green political 
thought. Where environmental issues were regarded as problems belonging to 
agriculture, primary industry production or public health, they were dealt with 
according to the parameters of those specific bureaucracies within the broad 
socio-political confines of preservationism. The era of change represented by 
the apocalyptic view of ecological collapse, with the emphasis on social 
transformation and an ecologically holistic approach to the environment, gave 
rise to a new politico-institutional means of approaching the environment. 
Green democratisation and integrationism did not appreciably transform the 
political or economic order, but absorbed social attitudinal change into its 
institutional framework. Broad scale social change on environmentalism has 
been gradual, but reflected in ecocratic measures to ensure holistic management 
and stewardship of the natural environment that will: 
1. ensure continued liberal capitalist market growth; 
ii. allow for grassroots community participation; 
111. incorporate the concept of ecologically sustainable development into 
mainstream policy implementation; 
1v. ensure the log-term sustainability of the eco-bureaucracy; 
v. minimise risks to the environment; and 
v1. create vertical integration of environmental policy through all sectors of 
society. 
While integrationism has created a situation that allows for both restoration 
85 Comment, R.Chapman, Upper Snowy Landcare Coordinator, 2002 
86 Anecdotal evidence from Upper Snowy Landcare group members, 2002 
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of existing problems, through community and 'grassroots' organisations, as well 
as long-term planning and preventative measures through application of the 
precautionary principle, there still remain several areas of practice that are 
unsustainable or environmentally cynical. Many of these practices are directly 
attributable to global economic factors and the economic hegemony of the 
corporate sector and the power nexus between industry and the eco-
bureaucracy. Much of this comes under the broad heading of risk management: 
a growing industry in an increasingly environmentally aware society. 
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Chapter 7 
Crises and risk management: perceptions, action and reaction 
Environmentalists have long been fond of saying 
that the sun is the only safe nuclear reactor, situated as it is some 
ninety-three million miles away - Stephanie Mills 
A political construct of accidents, events and disasters 
In the three months from July to October in 1999, several major earthquakes 
in Turkey, Greece, Taiwan and Mexico shook the Earth literally and 
metaphorically. In excess of 40,000 human lives were lost as a direct result and 
many more tens of thousands of people were injured and left homeless. The 
economic cost was counted in billions of dollars, the social cost inestimable. 
Earthquakes, however, regardless of their severity and apart from the human 
toll, are natural occurrences and it is only when considered in relation to their 
effect on human society that they are described as 'disasters'. There is no 
human technology that can be applied to reduce the risk of earthquakes and 
where these events oc~ur in remote and uninhabited locations they are not 
described as 'disasters' but 'seismic events' or 'seismic activity'. The term 
disaster applies only where humans are at risk. Those not directly involved 
learn of these disasters through the media and assistance in the form of charity-
based relief funds and government financial and medical aid is arranged, but at 
no point is human soci~ty regarded as at fault. It is a natural risk and as such, 
something we accept and adapt to within our own limitations. 
On September 30th 1999 an 'accident' occurred at a nuclear power plant 
160kms north of Tokyo on Japan's largest island of Honshu. Three people were 
reported as having suffered severe exposure to radiation, forty-nine people 
suffered lesser exposure and many others were considered at risk. The 
populations of nearby villages were evacuated in the face of chain reaction 
leaks. In terms of lives and damage, this 'accident' was immeasurably less 
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significant than the earthquakes that had occurred over the couple of months 
prior. The Australian media, however, carried the accident as a lead story for 
two days. On October 2nd, the Sydney Morning Herald printed a smaller article 
alongside the continuing report of the nuclear accident. The article, "It couldn't 
happen here - could it?"1 highlighted the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor in 
Sydney, drawing comparisons between its operations and that of the Tokaimura 
plant and quoting the director of environmental and radiation health at the 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency as saying a similar 
accident could not occur in Australia 2. There has been no similar report quoting 
seismic experts on the likelihood of our suffering a catastrophic earthquake 
because, of course, that is beyond human control. Nuclear power plants, on the 
other hand, are a human invention and accidents, therefore, are icaused' by 
humans. Even though statistics and the occurrence of events indicate 
otherwise3, the risk from nuclear accidents is perceived to be far greater than 
that from earthquakes or other natural disasters4 because there is something that 
can be done about minimising or controlling man-made risks. Governments 
can legislate to protect us from ourselves within the construct of liberal 
democracy; indeed, it could be argued that they have an obligation to do so. 
Political parties and organisations can take a leading role in influencing our 
perception of risk, our demands on government with regards to protective 
legislation and the ways in which governments respond to such demands. 
This chapter will examine the concept of risk and its influence on 
environmental policy development in order to support the thesis that the 
paradigmatic evolution of eco-politics has rendered the green movement 
1 Joseph Kerr, "It couldn't happen here - could it?", The Sydney Morning Herald, October 2 1999, 
p.23 
2 
'b'd 1 1 . 
3 In the second week of August, 2002, more than 1000 people were killed in floods on the Indian 
subcontinent and a further 100 in the Czech Republic, Germany and Russia, with thousands 
more evacuated and displaced. No deaths were recorded from nuclear accidents. 
4 P.Slovic, 1987, "Perception of Risk", Science, Vol.236, pp.280-285 
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virtually obsolete in terms of driving policy or leading public perceptions of 
environmental issues and risks. Risk management can be divided into two key 
categories, divisible into four sub- categories (Table 7.1). This chapter will 
concentrate on the sub-categories of 'long-term' and' direct' risks as these are 
the areas of risk analysis and perception directly related to environmental 
politics and the development of ecological thought. To this end, one example 
from both of these sub-categories will be used to examine how it represents a 
risk, and how the political management, or mismanagement in some cases, of 
that risk impacts on the natural environment. The external and internal risks 
contained within the first category will be examined insofar as to establish the 
definitive criteria of differentiation between the two key categories and place 
the concept of risk management in a political context. The issue ·of drought risk 
in Australia, and its management and control, will be approached as an example 
of an external risk that has shifted, in accordance with directions in eco-political 
thought, to now represent a direct risk. Ultimately, the ways in which 
governments respond to certain risk situations determine how, in the post-
political construct of ecology and environmentalism suggested in the next 
chapter, human development will integrate with the environment. 
It is recognised that the creation and maintenance of a secure society is an 
obligation of government. While the term I security' has come to be understood 
in either an economic context, relating specifically to government financial 
provision for citizens unable to provide sufficiently for themselves, or in terms 
of national security ensured through defence policies and strategic negotiations, 
treaties and alliances, the concept of social security will here be used more 
broadly to encompass issues of environmental security. This refers to the 
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External risks -ie. minimising, avoiding or compensating for 
damage to human society from risks beyond human control, 
Risks to human such as earthquakes and asteroid strikes. 
life and Internal risks - ie. protecting us from ourselves, eg. crime, traffic 
livelihood accidents and health risks resulting from certain behaviour or 
situations. 
Risks to the 
environment 
Long-term risks - ie. the damage or potential damage that human 
society can have on the environment but which is not 
immediately apparent, such as climate change and species loss, 
and which requires scientific (both physical and social) analysis 
in order to determine the holistic and long-term effects. 
Direct risks - ie. damage to the human environment or that area 
of nature that directly impacts on human society, such as waste 
disposal and land degradation and which is apparent in the 
short or immediate term. 
Table 7 .1: Risk categories 
maintenance of both natural and human environments, an awareness of their 
interrelatedness, and 1nanagement of the risks associated with the specific 
social, political and environmental paradigmatic frameworks. The 
identification and management of risks is an essential basis for social security 
and the political approach taken depends largely on the ideological factors 
underpinning individual governments. Anthony Giddens, in the 1999 Reith 
Lecture series, described the welfare state, the development of which "can be 
traced back to the Elizabethan poor laws in England", as a: 
. . . risk management system ... designed to protect against hazards 
that were once treated as at the disposition of the gods - sickness, 
disablement, job loss and old age."5 
In contemporary society the environment-its use and management- is also 
5 Anthony Giddens, "Risk", Runaway World: The 1999 BBC Reith Lecture Series, 
http: / / news.bbc.co.uk/ hi / english/ static / even ts/ reith._99 /week2 /week2.htm 
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inextricably linked to the concept of the secure society. Risk management from 
a political perspective, is more about addressing, managing and containing the 
negative effects of human development on nature, once considered the 
inevitable and irreversible consequence of civilisation, rather than attempting to 
control nature's effects on society. 
Economically and litigiously, risk management is big business. While I 
have no intention of attempting to unravel the complexities of the insurance 
industry in this thesis, it must be acknowledged that the growth of this 
industry, and its legal implications, are a function of the significance placed on 
risk by policy makers and the power nexus between politics and the business 
and industry sector. Further, the sustainability of growth in this sector is 
questionable, and current trends and evidence would suggest that government 
intervention may be necessary to control the profit imperative inherent in the 
identification and marketing of risk as a consumer product. Whereas Hobbes 
described life in a 17th century state of nature as potentially "solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish and short"6, the marketability of the state of nature in the 21st 
century is such that if life cannot be longer, then its brevity will be amply 
compensated. The temporal and spatial aspects of risk will be dealt with later in 
this chapter in relation to the management of direct risks, but the point noted 
here is that 1risk' is a relatively modern socio-political concept and refers mainly 
to post-industrial revolution society. 
Risk management and environmental policy are inevitably tied together in a 
difficult relationship. It is this relationship that was at the basis of the Snowy · 
Mountains Scheme when it was first conceived in the late 1930s, and this 
becomes the point of reference for the management of an external risk, in this 
case drought, as a risk with direct or immediate effects, with the resulting long-
term risk of degradation in the lower Snowy. Leiss and Chociolko point out 
that risks involving our health and the condition of the natural environment are 
6 Hobbes, Leviathan 
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among the most contentious of all contemporary issues7• They are also the 
issues that most immediately affect the population with solutions more likely to 
involve scientists and engineers rather than political strategists or economists. 
In providing for social security in that broad context, however, it is necessary 
that environmental policy addresses the contentious issues in such a way as to 
both defuse controversy and ensure political stability. Where preservationist 
environmental risks involved specific actions to address problems on an 
individual basis according to the specificities of the issue and affected area, the 
integrationist approach has been to minimise risk by recognising its existence 
and likely effects and then take preventative measures through either the 
precautionary principle at the institutional level, or in creating opportunity at 
industry and corporate level. This approach is environmentally justifiable in its 
holistic view of ecological factors, however, the establishment of risk 
management as an industry has created a potential new set of risks to be 
addressed by similar means, with the consequent risk of reactive environmental 
risk-minimisation devices rather than long-term preventative measures. 
External risks: acts of God and other catastrophes 
While we can insure against damage from external risks we cannot prevent 
them from occurring. Storms, earthquakes, floods and drought fall into the 
broad category of what used to be called 'acts of God', now a seldom-used term 
in a more secular age. The potential danger to_ human life and property from 
these risks is constant and accepted, and although a certain fear may prevail, 
communities in areas that frequently experience certain types of natural risks 
internalise the steps to be taken in the event of a risk occurrence and accept 
consequences accordingly. After Cyclone Tracy flattened Darwin in 197 4 the 
local government introduced building covenants to insure against the 
7 W.Leiss and C.Chociolko, Risk and Responsibility (Quebec City: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1994) 3 
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recurrence of similar devastation, and in particular loss of life, but it cannot 
insure against the recurrence of a cyclone of similar force. While governments 
can legislate to minimise actual damage from external events, it is impossible to 
legislate against the cause and impossible to know the effects until after they 
· have occurred. Institutionalised political action, therefore, as pointed out in the 
previous chapter, is based on precedents and past understandings of issues8• 
Giddens points out that prior to the 16th century, there was no concept of 
risk: 
The idea of risk appears to have taken hold in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, and was first coined by Western explorers as they set off 
on their voyages across the world. The word 'risk' seems to have 
come into English through Spanish or Portuguese, where it was used 
to refer to sailing into uncharted waters.9 
Risk, then, according to the Giddens definition is an entirely sociological 
construct and does not exist anywhere in nature independent of human 
understanding. Employing the risk factor in government lobbying in respect of 
environmental policy amounts to the difference between perceived future risk 
as defined by experts and actual risk as defined by society. This distinction is 
categorised by Shrader-Frechette as cultural-relativism, which reduces risk 
evaluation to a purely sociological judgment; and na1ve positivism, which uses 
only objective scientific methodology in risk evaluation ignoring all value 
judgments10 • Schrader-Frechette argues a middle path, claiming that: 
... it is_ false to say that hazard assessments can be wholly value free 
(as many na'ive positivists claim), and it is equally false to assert (as 
many cultural relativists do) that any evaluation of risk can be 
justified.11 
8 S.Dovers, Still Settling Australia: Environmental History and Policy (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 
9 Giddens, 1999, "Risk" op cit. 
10 K.S.Schrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991) 30 
11 ibid. 30 
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The concept of managing external risks falls into two categories: 
1. where the risk is perceived mainly in terms of human life, such as in the 
case of severe storm activity, earthquakes and other violent 
meteorological or geophysical events; 
11. where the risk is perceived in terms of human livelihood, such as the risk 
to farmers in the event of severe drought or flood. 
It is only relatively recently that these events have been regarded as risks, and, 
strictly speaking, given Giddens' s explanation of the origins of the term in 
respect of sailing into uncharted waters, the word 'risk' does not necessarily 
apply in its narrow sense. The terminology and the political response are 
inextricably linked, as it is the perception of the term that precedes and 
determines the response. The risks to life associated with the first category are 
accepted, in much the way they were prior to the Enlightenment. People choose 
to live in regions that are prone to violent storms, volcanic eruptions or 
earthquakes, and while measures may be taken to reduce risk to human life, 
such measures generally take a form that may allow for people to take 
protective action in the event of a catastrophe: for example, severe storm 
warnings, public education campaigns and building covenants. The concept of 
risk management, in the case of external risks, is something of a misnomer, 
implying as it does, some form of control over the source of the risk. In the case 
of external risks no human control can be exerted, and therefore only the 
outcome of the risk can be managed according to social perceptions of danger. 
In cultural-relativist terms danger is perceived according to any number of 
associated beliefs. Natural catastrophes are still regarded by many religious 
believers across cultures as 'acts of God'. To attempt preventative action against 
a natural occurrence, or the will of a particular deity could be regarded as futile 
at best and interfering with the natural order at worst. Social values, therefore, 
have been instrumental in determining reactions to the likely or possible 
outcomes of natural disasters on human life generally. Threats to human 
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livelihoods, on the other hand, are regarded differently. The provision of 
'drought relief' by the Australian government to primary producers whose 
livelihoods are threatened by what, essentially, is a natural cyclicalu climatic 
occurrence is generally regarded as a legitimate and necessary welfare function 
of government13 • For political reasons, for many years drought was treated as a 
natural disaster. Botterill and Chapman point out that: 
Constitutional responsibility for responding to disasters lies with the 
State governments and initially the Commonwealth was not 
involved in disaster relief.14 
This began to change in 1939 when the Commonwealth provided financial 
assistance to Tasmania after bushfires, and "from then on the Commonwealth 
became involved on an ad hoc basis, gradually increasing its financial 
contribution."15 In 1990 the Drought Policy Review Taskforce: 
... rejected the concept of drought as a specific, defined event based 
purely on its climatic features and argued that it was inappropriate 
to treat it as a disaster.16 
The fact that no human lives are directly at risk due to the occurrence of a 
drought has shifted the political approach from that of natural risk to a risk that 
should be managed by those whose livelihoods depend upon rainfall. Leading 
freshwater ecologist, Professor Peter Cullen, has stated that government 
financial relief and suggested technical measures such as turning rivers inland 
are not solutions to drought and farmers should better manage the risks 
associated with their industry: 
12 The Australian Bureau of Meteorology cites research indicating that severe drought conditions 
affect some part of Australia every 18 years. 
http:/ / www.bom.gov.au / climate / drought/ livedrought.shtml 
13 L.Botterill, Muddling through or just a muddle : Australian government responses to farm poverty 
1989-1998, Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2001 and L.Botterill and 
B.Chapman, "Developing Equitable and Affordable Government Responses to Drought in 
Australia", paper presented to Australian Political Studies Association Conference, ANU, 
October 2002 
14 Botterill and Chapman, (2002) op cit. 
1s .b.d 1 1 . 
16 .b.d 1 1 . 
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You can't drought-proof Australia. We need to learn to live with the 
landscape, not trying to fight against it all the time ... We have 
sufficient knowledge now to set a new direction. This involves some 
radical changes in land use towards those that can buffer the variable 
climate that is intrinsic to Australia.17 
Environmental historian, Dr Libby Robin, found in the 1980s that farmers who 
had access to southern oscillation index data that predicts El Nino weather 
patterns did not believe themselves to be 'victims' of drought as they were able 
to prepare18, while Dr Neville Nicholls, Senior Research Scientist with the 
Bureau of Meteorology, believes that with current access to southern oscillation 
index and other related data, all farmers should be well-prepared for drought19 • 
Australian farmers, of course, have always attempted to manage drought. 
The diversion of watercourses for irrigation and impoundment of natural runoff 
in dams has been a feature of Australian agriculture since the 19th century and 
ownership of water has always been highly contentious. Wigmore relates 
incidences of "armed men guarding private dams ... in the latter half of the 
[19th] century"20 and the subsequent state legislation to ensure that storage and 
diversion of water was regulated. The ambitious scheme to divert the 'wasted' 
waters of the Snowy for irrigation west of the mountains was conceived as part 
of a Commonwealth plan to control and manage the risk of drought and its 
effects on the livelihoods of the rural sector. The attempted management of 
drought from the early days of the colonies became an entrenched part of the 
Australian culture, to the point where the political approach taken to manage it 
shifted from that of external risk, that is, minimising, avoiding or compensating 
for damage to human society from risks beyond human control, to a direct risk, 
17 P.Cullen, quoted on ABC online news, lfh October 2002 
http:/ /abc.net.au/news/justin/ nat / newsnat-1 loct2002-56.htm 
18 L.Robin, pers.comm. 
19 N.Nicholls, 2002, "Climatic outlooks: from revolutionary science to orthodoxy", paper 
presented at Climate and Culture in Australia: National Academies Forum, Canberra, September 
2002 
20 L.Wigrnore, Struggle for the Snowy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1968) 68 
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that is, one that damages the human environment or that area of nature that 
directly impacts on human society and can be controlled. This latter point 
became the focus of the campaign to save the Snowy River from ecological 
degradation caused by post-War government policy to remove the risk of 
drought. In attempting to control an external risk by shifting it to a direct risk, 
government policy in fact created a direct causal link to a resultant long-term 
risk, that is, the ultimate effect on the Snowy River of' drought-proofing' the 
inland. 
Internal risks: the enemy within 
Society creates and maintains risks simply as a function of society: the 
endemic dangers of civilisation. These risks involve the potentiality of 
harm to individuals or communities from other people and include such factors 
as road and traffic accidents, crime at all levels, health risks posed by certain 
behaviours such as smoking, drug-taking and participating in 'high risk' 
activities, and acts of aggression such as war or terrorism. It is risk at this 
fundamentally social level that human laws are able to 'manage' through 
enacting and enforcing certain regulations and applying justice to those whose 
behaviour poses significant 'risk' to others. Although superficially, this form of 
risk does not appear commensurable with environmental policy and law, White 
argues that there are certain parallels stemming from the basic social constructs 
of 'risk', both in "the ways in which risk terminology is deployed as a means to 
secure particular social ends", and in providing indications for future regulatory 
directions21 • There is also considerable overlap between risks posed to society 
through environmentally unsafe behaviour, such as pollution to waterways and 
waste disposal, but which have only been generally recognised as direct 
environmental risks since the rise of the environment movement. 
21 R.White, "Criminality, Risk and Environmental Harm", Griffith Law Review Vol.8 No 2, 1999 
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While all internal risks could be categorised as direct risks, the distinction is 
drawn in the context of their social construction. Direct risks, for the purpose of 
this thesis, are defined as those risks that pose some threat specifically to the 
environment. That they also pose a threat to human life in terms of the human-
nature interrelationship is acknowledged, but it is consequential. Internal risks 
are constructed purely in cultural-relativist terms, that is, according to social 
value judgments. Further, these are risks that can be ordered and controlled by 
political and legal means towards socially acceptable outcomes. These 
outcomes themselves are dependent upon the dominant political approach and 
White points out that the maintenance of social security also reflects and 
reinforces the prevailing discourses and ideologies: 
For instance, 'security' is essentially being privatised. Responsibility 
for managing 'risk' has been individualised, in the sense that each 
person is deemed responsible for their own safety and security 
needs. People are thus exhorted to purchase security in much the 
same way as any other commodity (eg. home alarm systems). This is 
reinforced by the demands of insurance companies to ensure that 
adequate security systems are in place, as a precondition to the 
claiming of benefits.22 
The language of risk also serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the dominant 
political paradig~ over other political discourses or ideologies. Slavic states 
that: 
The dominant perception for most Americans (and one that contrasts 
sharply with the views of professional risk assessors) is that they face 
more risk today than in the past and that future risks will be even 
greater than today' s.23 
On the same subject, Wildavsky comments that despite the fact that the current 
civilisation is the best resourced, most technologically advanced, best-protected 
22 ibid. 239 
23 P.Slovic, 1987, op cit. 280 
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and longest-lived of human civilisations, it "is well on its way to becoming the 
most frightened. "24 Where risk is implied, a frightened population will look to a 
strong central authority for protection. Strategic political use of the word 'crisis' 
to describe various and diverse situations, including economic trends, war, and 
environmental issues, implies danger. Where government pronounces itself as 
being in control of that situation and addressing it through the safe and 
legitimate means of political channels its position is strengthened. Socially, the 
effect of risk as a political device is the maintenance of the status quo. As Wells 
points out, "the politics of crisis is the politics of fear." 25 The use of the fear 
factor in risk management will be examined later in this chapter, but the point 
made is that internal, socially constructed and cultural-relativist risks can be 
created and manipulated towards a specific political goal within· the political 
institutions and processes. 
Ideologically, and from the perspective of environmental policy 
development, manipulation and promotion of internal risks can provide 
support for policies of economic and strategic security at the expense of the 
environment. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
on September 11 2001, President George W. Bush declared war on terrorism and 
subsequently sought and gained Congressional approval for massive spending 
measures on military defence. Chomsky points out that this is hardly a novel 
political tactic: 
We should recall that the Reagan administration came to office 20 
years ago proclaiming that 'international terrorism' (sponsored 
worldwide by the Soviet Union) is the greatest threat faced by the 
US, which is the main target of terrorism, and its allies and friends. 
We must therefor dedicate ourselves to a war to eradicate this 
'cancer', this 'plague' that is destroying civilization.26 
24 A.Wildavsky, quoted in ibid. 280 
25 D.Wells, In Defence of the Common Wealth (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1990) 38 
26 N.Chomsky, 9-11 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001) 68 
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Where the main threat to a society is perceived to be from human sources1 
increased spending on measures to control and reduce the risk will be socially 
justified along the ideological lines of the dominant political paradigm. 
Governments that are spending massively on military hardware will seldom 
place environmental policy high on the political agenda as in the case of the 
Reagan and Bush (Sm and Jm) administrations. The use of national security as 
justification for this also reinforces the notion of the crisis and in so doing1 
effectively neutralises the environment movement and environmental 
organisations1 which/ if they maintain pressure over environmental issues1 risk 
being accused of caring more for the environment than people. 
Long-term risks: ecology, society and the Big Picture 
Preservationist environmental policy recognised ecological concerns and 
placed them within the boundaries of conventional attitudes and behaviours 
towards nature. That is1 ecology was categorised as a science and consulted 
where scientific facts on nature and its interrelationship with humans were 
required. Ecologists were not consulted on environmental value judgments1 
social issues1 development and planning or ethical questions27 • This has been 
the case in most parts of the world1 where progress from the time of the 
Industrial Revolution, and particularly since World War It advanced at the 
expense of the environment. The period of the social revolutions that led to the 
rise of the environment movement called for a new approach to technological 
progress that considered the effects of development beyond the immediate 
benefits to society1 politics or the economy. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the era of space exploration, which 
coincided with the era of social movements and environmental apocalypticism1 
provided a catalyst to viewing the earth from a perspective different from 
27 L.Robin, 1994. "Nature Conservation as a National Concern: The Role of the Australian 
Academy of Science", Historical Records of Australian Science, Vol.10, No.1, 1-24; also pers. comm. 
236 
previous understandings and practices. Terms such as 'spaceship earth' 
implied the concept of unity and direction, and personification of the earth 
through the name 'Gaia', after the publication of Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis28, 
added a personal dimension to the need to nurture and respect a living 
organism. The 'global' environment as a single ecosystem, became, for the first 
time the focus of attention that sought to repair and conserve rather than 
subdivide and exploit. Risks, too, became global. By the end of the 20th century 
the growing awareness of damage to the ozone layer, climate change and its 
predicted changes to sea levels and threats to coastlines, the BSE (bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy) threat to agriculture and human and animal 
health, hazardous waste 'trading' and species loss had led to pressure on 
governments to be proactive in conservation and preventative environmental 
measures. 
Beck defines modern risks, as opposed to the external risks that have always 
faced humankind, as those which are "politically charged", or: 
... based on decisions ... that focus on techno-economic advantages 
and opportunities and accept hazards as simply the dark side of 
29 progress. 
Long-term risks, as defined for the purposes of this thesis, are exclusively based 
on techno-economic decisions and the uncertainties that have arisen as a result 
of these decisions are based on ·prior scientific understanding of certain 
outcomes. These are "risk situations for which we have very little historical 
experience for confronting."30 The knowledge currently at our disposal on the 
projected effects of climate change is based on (a) climatic precedents and cycles 
such as the ice ages; (b) the correlation of human industrialisation and rapid 
deterioration of the atmosphere leading to climatic anomalies [based on (a)]; (c) 
the physical composition of the atmosphere and the natural greenhouse effect; 
28 J.Lovelock, Gaia: A N ew Look at Life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
29 U.Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) 50 
30 Giddens, (1999) "Risk", op cit. 
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and ( d) the cumulative spatial and temporal effects of certain industrial 
byproducts on the atmosphere [based on the results of experimentation using 
current technologies]. Despite the certainty of what is known, however, there 
remains considerable uncertainty regarding appropriate measures to be taken to 
address a situation that has no predetermined timeframe or outcome. 
Scientific uncertainty, economic interests and costs, political tensions 
and the fundamental question of equity between developed and 
developing countries all came to bear on an issue which one 
diplomat has called perhaps 'the most complex public policy issue 
ever to face governments' .31 
The international political balancing act required to address all these frequently 
conflicting interests is itself a risk in terms of domestic policy development. 
Initial effects as a potential and predicted outcome of climate change, or 
global warming, include rising sea levels as the polar icecaps and glaciers melt, 
increased likelihood of drought and more frequent extreme weather conditions. 
As a consequence of these effects, the global community will be affected by 
inundation of coastlines, many of which are densely populated; coastal erosion; 
inland salinity; loss of agricultural land and further loss of biodiversity32• 
However, as Elliott points out, there is considerable difficulty in predicting 
impacts based simply on the relative composition of the atmosphere and 
research, as a result, "confirms trends rather than proof, emphasising probable 
rather than certain outcomes."33 Political responses by individual governments 
to the uncertainties inherent in climate change predictions have been anchored 
firmly in their ideological bases. For governments, solutions must be politically 
viable at the electoral level and promote positive economic results. The 
precautionary principle, now widely accepted in environmental policy 
development, operates on the practice of anticipation. Preventative 
31 L.Elliott The Global Politics of the Environment (Houndsrnills: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998) 60 
32 .b.d 1 1 . 
33 ibid. 62 
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environmental measures can be enacted in advance of anticipated damage from 
current practices based on scientific predictions. On a socio-political basis, 
governments also anticipate the reaction of the electorate if no action is taken in 
respect of environmental issues: governments want to see socio-political 
climate instability even less than physical climate change. The precautionary 
principle, therefore, is a politically conservative measure towards the immediate 
benefit of governments and the eventual benefit of the environment. 
The concept of the precautionary principle is not new. It was used in public 
policy as early as the 1850s in London when the handle of a street water pump 
was removed to prevent use of the pump in an attempt to control a cholera 
epidemic. Although the correlation between polluted water and cholera was 
not scientifically conclusive, the action was recommended as a "necessary 
public health action, where the likely costs of inaction would have been far 
greater than the possible costs of action."34 While clearly an example of public 
policy acting in advance and anticipation of conclusive scientific fact, this was 
also a matter concerning public health and was not perceived as relating to 
environmental health. Similarly, the precautionary principle applied to fisheries 
in the 19th centuries35 aimed at avoiding depletion or exhaustion of the resource 
in terms of the fishing industry and the supply of a commodity to marine 
resource-dependent countries, rather than species extinction or the balance of 
the marine ecology. These examples of precautionary and anticipatory policy 
were exclusively state-centric and based on the requirements of separate areas 
of government responsibility. The precautionary principle in its most recent 
political applications is both national and global in scope and based on an 
ecologically interrelated understanding of policy areas. 
In accordance with the ecological perception of long-term risk management, 
there has been a move towards political overlap of policy areas such as 
34 P.Harremoes., Introduction., in Harremoes et al., The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century 
(London:Earthscan.,2002)5 
35 M.MacGarvin., -'-'Fisheries: taking stock-'-' in Harremoes et al., (2002) op cit. 
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agriculture, health, trade and industry, with risks inherent in each and all to be 
managed in conjunction with environmental issues. This approach has been 
evident in the BSE crisis in the UK and Europe from the late 1980s, which has 
had practical implications for all of these policy areas. Scientific knowledge of 
the human variant of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease (CJD), is alarmingly scant: 
Although an estimated 750,000 BSE-infected cattle were eaten by 
humans between about 1980 and 1996, no one knows how many 
people actually became infected, nor how long it takes for an 
infected person to become sick. Past projections of the possible 
death toll have not relieved the uncertainty.36 
The risk potential for agriculture and trade at, initially, British and EU level and 
then ultimately, globally, were at source eco-political, where the prefix retains 
and emphasises its original etymology. Grove-White argues that the BSE crisis 
reflects: 
... crucial features of these new patterns of risk crisis ... In the 
immediate furore, and in a universal anxiety to establish a bedrock 
of certainty in which to locate trust, there has been an intensified 
focus on 'the expert' - in this case, the scientists ·studying cause-effect 
relationships between BSE in cattle and CJD in humans. Predictably, 
given the alarming stakes for public health, the political exchanges 
and media witch-hunts have followed ritual patterns: allegations of 
political neglect and bad faith, reflecting a large measure of 
hindsight in relation to what 'the scientists' have been telling 
37 
us. 
Although the connection between BSE and CJD was established in the mid-
1990s, the British government was reluctant to act immediately. To enforce 
regulatory measures while there remained a large measure of scientific 
36 M.Balter, "Uncertainties Plague Projections of nvCJD Toll", Science, Vol.294, October 2001, 770 
37 R.Grove-White, "Risk Society, Politics and BSE", in Franklin (ed), The Politics of Rick Society 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 51 
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uncertainty was to risk an economic crisis as a result of inevitable loss of 
confidence in the British beef industry at the domestic level and potential trade 
bans at the international level. Conversely, not to act was to risk a health crisis 
the nature of which was unpredictable. Ultimately, the risks associated with 
inaction outweighed those of action, although the European Commission had 
unsuccessfully requested the British government as early as 1989 to cease 
exporting stockfeeds made from animal waste material38 to member states. The 
risks to the environment, agriculture, trade and human and animal health 
stemming essentially from modern agricultural practice is at the core of long-
term risk management. It is politically-charged and the ultimate effects are 
unpredictable, highly reliant on scientific analysis and not confinable within 
spatial and temporal frameworks. Long-term risks as a broad concept are 
problematic to institutional politics as they largely defy categorisation in specific 
policy areas, unlike many of the direct or internal risks. Banwell and Guest 
point out that CJD represented: 
... a different risk experience from the more commonly discussed 
public health risks. The so-called lifestyle diseases where experts 
place more emphasis on the risks associated with smoking, drinking 
and eating 'unhealthy food' than the general population ... In such 
cases, lay experience gives people a basis for forming their own 
judgments about risks ... With BSE and nvCJD, individuals had no 
personal experience upon which they could form their own risk 
, , 39 
estimations. 
The lack of precedents on which to base risk assessment leads to a reliance 
on centralised institutions for decision-making that will be in the best interests 
of the community and the environment. Long-term risks that pose uncertain 
38 This practice, which involves supplementing the natural diet of cattle with a mixture of 
ground offal and bone material from abattoirs, itself is widely criticised as unsound, unsafe and 
unnatural. 
39 C.Banwell and C.Guest, f/Carnivores, Cannibals, Consumption and Unnatural Boundaries: The 
BSE-CJD Epidemic in the Australian Press", in McCalman et al (eds), Mad Cows and Modernity 
(Canberra: Humanities Research Centre ANU, 1998) 23 
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risks to the environment, both natural and human, are therefore essentially 
political risks. On broad environmental issues of global significance such as 
climate change, the BSE agri-environmental crisis, the HIV/ AIDS pandemic, 
transportation of toxic waste by sea and widespread loss of biodiversity and 
species extinction, action at local level is unlikely- to have much impact globally 
without institutional direction and support based on sound analytical advice. 
Janicke believes that, in this respect, Western nation states are failing, given that 
institutional solutions currently in use either address the symptoms of the 
problem or displace the problem: 
... from one medium or place to another-from water into the air or 
the ground, from densely populated areas to mountainous regions, 
or from industrial countries to the Third World (as at Bhopal).40 
The spatial and temporal scales of long-term problems, combined with lack of · 
lay experience and knowledge ensures a perpetuation of the dominant 
paradigm through institutionalisation and state reliance on political precedents 
and past understandings. 
Direct risks: playing with nuclear fire 
Most environmental risks of immediate concern in modern society, such as 
pollution, waste, land degradation or nuclear accidents, fall into the category of 
direct risks. It is these risks that are the most visible in terms of their immediacy 
and most commonly targeted by green political activists and political parties 
wishing to gain maximum environmental mileage from highly visible and 
localised issues. Direct risks are the products of unsustainable human activity 
and development. The symptoms of these environmental problems may pose 
risks to human health, agricultural productivity, ecological integrity, aesthetic 
40 M.Janicke, State Failure (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 47 
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considerations/ local economies or social justice. Direct risks differ from long-
term risks in: 
1. their spatial and temporal scope: they are more localised and immediate 
and do not necessarily require international or cross-border solutions; 
11. certainty of outcome: in most cases the outcomes direct risks are based on 
prior knowledge; 
111. approach: in many cases1 direct risks can be addressed at source and 
1v. there is less reliance on a centralised institutional approach. 
Using Schrader-Frechette's definitions of risk assessment techniques as a 
basis1 grassroots activists and communities have tended towards cultural 
relativism1 using value judgments as justification for determining 
environmental risk. The NIMBY syndrome provides an extreme but very 
common negative example of this. The representative extension of NIMBY are 
the NIMTO (Not In My Term of Office) and NIME (Not In My Electorate)41 
syndromes1 both of which, although lightheartedly, if not cynically1 termed 
indicate the social and political immediacy of issues such as the siting of waste 
disposal facilities1 transportation routes for hazardous waste1 land-zoning for 
industry and potentially harmful industrial activities. Governments1 on the 
other hand, have tended towards the na1ve positivist end of the spectrum, 
trusting objective scientific methodology or using it as justification for inaction 
on ethical or social concerns on the same environmental issues. Instruments 
such as environmental impact assessments (EIA) are frequently used as the 
basis for decision-making on environmental issues1 and while it is now common 
practice for the EIA procedure to involve some measure of public participation421 
Molesworth notes that there are certain 'disadvantages' in this practice1 
including: 
41 Devereux, Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, Waste 
Disposal (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 1994) 171 
42 Thomas, Environmental Impact Assessment in Australia (Annandale: Federation Press, 2001) 249 
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• only those with scientific or technical training are able to 
contribute to positive and constructive decision-making; 
• members of the public tend to be subjective; 
• the existing political process works to take into account public 
opinion; public participation is almost interference; 
• public participation is not truly representative of public opinion; 
• public participation adds to the costs of projects or governing; 
• the public cannot appreciate the importance of many affairs of 
State (which only government or its agencies can fully 
appreciate) 43 
These points, made by a leading lawyer, indicate an industry-centric view of the 
hazards of including public participation and community consultation in 
environmental c:Iecision-making and risk management and in so doing, 
completely circumscribe the whole point of community participation. As a 
result, the most effective community involvement in risk management and 
environmental issues operates outside the institutionalised process including 
both governmental and NGO institutions. This approach is underscored by the 
Snowy campaign, which succeeded largely because of the deliberate separation 
maintained between it and the institutionalised environmental organisations 
which represent very specific ideologies and political positions often directly 
conflicting with those of government or industry. 
The risk perception associated with nuclear power is used here as an 
example of direct risk, where issues of nuclear safety have been prominent 
particularly in Europe and the US for several decades. The nuclear debate 
covers a number of risk scenarios: the possibility of an 'accident' at a nuclear 
power station; the transportation and ultimate location of nuclear waste 
material; and concerns about nuclear weaponry. These are essentially direct 
43 S.Molesworth, "The Case for and Against Community Participation" Paper presented at Rivers 
and Community Resource: A Community Responsibility, Melbourne Metropolitan Board of Works, 
Melbourne, 1985 
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risks in that the outcome of each of these scenarios is based on prior knowledge 
of expected effects on the natural and human environments. Despite the low 
probability of actual risk occurrences compared with numerous other direct 
risks, the social perception of danger is rated very high. Of 30 risks associated 
with activity or technology presented in a US survey to members of four 
separate categories of people in 1987, two of the categories (The League of 
Women Voters and University Students) rated nuclear power as the most 
dangerous. A third category (Active [Recreational] Club Members) rated it at 
number 8, while in contrast, Experts rated it as number 2044 • Starr places nuclear 
weapons (war), nuclear reactor accidents and nuclear weapons fallout as the 
three most highly rated risks perceived by the public in a study of 81 separate 
risks45 • 
The results of a nuclear accident or nuclear war in terms of irreparable 
damage to the environment and potential risk to human life and long-term 
health are well-documented and have never been in dispute. The accidents at 
Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Tokaimura (1999) are now 
entrenched in both the public consciousness and the official record, as are the 
images of Hiroshima and the nuclear tests at Maralinga and Moruroa Atoll. 
Movies such as The China Syndrome (1979) and Silkwood (1983) gave popular 
exposure to the government and industry secrecy that often surrounds the 
nuclear industry and served to highlight the inherent dangers of nuclear 
facilities. Otway believes that the approaches taken by governments in 
balancing public risk-perception against the benefits· of nuclear energy, not the 
probability of accidents, is the real controversy: 
... in general the [anti nuclear power] group ... assign high 
importance to the risk items while the pro group view benefit-related 
attributes as most important.46 
44 Slavic (1987) op cit. 
4s .b.d 1 1 . 
46 Otway quoted in Schrader-Frechette, 1991, op cit, 91 
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Further, and more significantly: 
... although both pro and con groups "strongly believe that nuclear 
power is in the hands of big government or business ... the pro 
group evaluates this attribute positively, the con group evaluates it 
negatively ... There were no significant differences between the 
[pronuclear and antinuclear] groups on the eb [evaluation-belief] 
scores of any items related to risk."47 
These findings would appear to align with the popular view portrayed through 
the movies as well as reflect the concerns of the public regarding the ownership 
and control of nuclear facilities. Following from this, the conclusion could 
logically be drawn that the general opinion of the 'experts' in the Slavic research 
would be based on the probability of an actual accident rather than their 
perception of risk outcomes per se. The high-risk perception of the other groups 
would be based on a combination of elements including cultural relativist 
judgments on nuclear war, and beliefs about the safety of government and 
business in providing for social security. 
An integrationist approach to environmental politics, represented in many 
procedural and ideological objectives by the WCED Brundtland Report, Our 
Common Future, approaches the issue of nuclear energy via Schrader-Frechette's 
'middle path' of scientific proceduralism48, using scientific as well as ethical and 
social factors in risk management. The reality of the situation, however, is often 
value judgments based on economic factors. The main causes of the accidents at 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl were recorded in the WCED document as 
"human operator error"49, underlining the safety of the facilities themselves 
under the 1975 international Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) code. The 
Brundtland Commission however, does not dismiss the risks associated with 
nuclear technology itself, stating that: 
47 ibid. 91-92 
48 .b.d 1 1 . 
49 WCED, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 185 
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... available analyses indicate that although the risk of a radioactive 
release is small, it is by no means negligible for reactor operations at 
th · 50 e present time. 
Deliberately stated in cautious tones, the report acknowledges the possibility of 
accidents and the perception of risks. This approach stands in contrast to the 
statements of reassurance from government and industry spokespeople .on the 
subject of risks arising from nuclear accidents. Falk's detailed analysis of the 
Three Mile Island accident clearly indicates the official obfuscation surrounding 
the cause and effects of that accident51, and Papadakis' s research on attitudes 
towards nuclear power in Europe shows that the public have concerns about the 
lack of information they receive about nuclear power stations52• Lack of 
information, or misinformation, increases the perception of the existence of risks 
with heightened public suspicions of corporate and government cover-ups. 
When governments have acted to reassure the public about the safety of nuclear 
energy or to downplay the existence of risks, it has often stood in contrast to the 
messages being received from other agencies. Because of the known outcomes 
of nuclear accidents as direct risks, the attitudes of government and industry 
have served not so much to assuage public concerns but to feed them. Where 
fear exists, government, in order to maintain its position, must act to address the 
questions of society in such a way that retains confidence in the centrality of the 
political institutions and provides apparent solutions to the issues of concern. 
This frequently results in policy that addresses only the immediate effects, that 
is, the symptoms, and fails to address the cause of the problem or the real 
concerns. 
50 ibid. 185 
51 J.Falk, Global Fission (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
52 E.Papadakis; The Green Movement in West Germany (London: Croom Helm, 1984) 
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The fear factor in environmental policy 
There is a clear but very fine distinction between the perception of a risk 
and fear of its occurrence, the former arising from known factors and the latter, 
largely, from unknown. According to Douglas and Wildavsky, within certain 
social groupings members will react to certain risks by either downplaying or 
emphasising them as a means of controlling and maintaining the status quo of 
that group53 • This behaviour reflects at a localised level the behaviour of the 
dominant political institutions towards actual and perceived risks to society or 
the environment and ultimately, to itself. Where the central authority has no 
solution to a perceived risk or problem it is more likely to downplay that as an 
issue of concern. Where there is an institutionalised approach to a problem, 
however, the risk is likely to be highlighted or emphasised as a means of 
strengthening the public1 s faith in the institution and thereby maintaining the 
political status quo. 
In the case of long-term risks, for example, climate change, where scientific 
evidence may be ambiguous and central institutions are uncertain as to the 
formulation of a policy response that will not threaten the liberal capitalist 
economic hegemony, environmental risks can be dismissed as vague and 
inconclusive. This has been the case in the USA and Australia, where 
governments have consistently placed the economic risks associated with 
conforming to uniform reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions more 
prominently that the environmental risks associated with not conforming to 
reduction targets. In implying that we have more to fear economically by 
complying to targets than environmentally if we don1t, the government ensures a 
hegemonic maintenance of liberal capitalist ideology as it applies to the security 
of the national interest, and hence, the security of society. In Europe, by 
53 M.Douglas and A.Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) 
112 
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comparison, where the precautionary principle has been integrated into 
environmental policy for two decades, the government can emphasise the risks 
of non-compliance to greenhouse gas reduction targets in environmental terms, 
as this is an area of paradigmatic strength. While integrationism applies in both 
these cases, the approach vari~s within that particular framework according to 
the perception of the risks and consequences of certain actions. 
Risks confronting society are not a result of the dominant political model: 
they are symptomatic of a prevailing social ethos based on available 
information, perceptions and scientific advancement. This, then, is scientific 
proceduralism. For example, society is far better informed in 2002 about the 
health risks involved in such activities as smoking, sun exposure and having x-
rays than we were in 1962. Similarly, there is considerable information available 
about the use and effects of agricultural chemicals, aerosols, waste incineration 
and PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls). Additionally, there are new risks that 
have arisen as a result of diseases such as HIV/ AIDS and CJD, for which there 
are certain specific risk-avoidance behaviours, and risks associated with new 
technologies such as genetic modification and certain medical procedures. 
These constitute risks for which society has documented evidence and certain 
institutionalised procedures for risk management and minimisation. There are 
still risks, however, for which value judgments remain the sole arbiter of 
behaviour. In the months following the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington DC in 2001, airline travel and employment in the airline industry 
dropped dramatically and worldwide54, despite there being no evidence to 
suggest that airline travel itself was more dangerous after September 11 than 
before, and despite increased security measures in airports. Furedi states that 
all "risk concepts are based on the distinction between reality and possibility."55 
Within a dominant political paradigm fear of possibility, regardless of how 
54 US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Impact of September 11 on Airlines, 9th January 2002 
http://www.bts.gov/PressReleases/2002/bts001_02.html 
55 F.Furedi, Culture of Fear (London: Cassell, 1997) 18 
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small, and reality of risk, regardless of how large, can be manipulated according 
to the requirements of the central authority and through balancing scientific or 
historical evidence against value judgments. 
Strategic use of the word 'crisis', as mentioned earlier, is a device used to 
emphasise certain risks towards the objective of maintaining the status quo. 
The BSE crisis was not described thus until it had been recognised as such by 
European governments and institutionalised risk management measures were 
in place to ensure social security. While scientists have been warning on the 
severely degraded state of Australia's Murray-Darling Basin for some decades, 
it has only been described as a 'crisis' situation since the Australian government 
instigated political and bureaucratic measures, such as the Murray-Darling 
Basin Commission to identify, describe and recommend restorative and 
protective action. Through using the word crisis to describe certain risks that 
are under management by the central institution, there is an implicit message, 
translating at wider community level as fear, that without the central institution 
the situation is in imminent danger of escalating into an uncontrollable or 
potentially disastrous situation. Paradoxically, to use the word crisis to describe 
a situation for which there is no institutional solution in place but which may, in 
fact, be a crisis, is to risk precisely that which the authority seeks to avoid, that 
is, social unrest. Further, as Wells points out, there remains an inherent danger 
for government in persisting with this approach due to the difficulties in 
sustaining fear as a control mechanism where there are no apparent immediate 
dangers, and in the unpredictability of human behaviour given real crisis 
• · 56 situations. 
The results of risk manipulation are, as Beck described it, a form of 
"organised irresponsibility."57 
In other words, the institutions involved and affected do not merely 
56 Wells, op cit. 
57 U.Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (Cambridge: Polity, 1995) 64 
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dispose of highly effective instruments and strategies for 
'normalizing' industrial self-jeopardization. This normalization has 
been achieved precisely by demanding and doing the same as has 
always been demanded a..nd been done: inquiring into 'causes' and 
prosecuting 'guilty parties' in accordance with hitherto valid 
conceptions. The greater the shock with which public consciousness 
apprehends industrial self-jeopardization, the more important it 
becomes not to allow what is produced under systemic constraints to 
appear as such ... 58 
This is the basis of the fear factor. Where the central political institutions are in 
danger of losing authority in the face of unresolved questions, policy is either 
developed to address a 'crisis' 1 whereby certain parties are held to be 'at fault' 
and instruments put in place to redress the situation, or the situation is not 
deemed to be severe enough and fears are allayed or displaced to another 
political risk area. 
If, as Kasperson asserts, "the defining of risk is essentially a political act"59, it 
should logically follow that the solutions should also be political. 
Environmental risk management strategies to address either long-term or direct 
risks, such as pollution control, greenhouse gas reduction, water quality and 
supply, waste management and land conservation are therefore administered 
by governments either directly or through agencies. It is the pressure brought 
to bear on governments to enact such administration that is the crucial factor in 
determining who, or what, will carry out environmental policy and who, 
ultimately, is accountable. Until relatively recently, the environment movement 
has played a crucial role in this area, however, the integration of the 
environment into mainstream politics has paralleled the integration of the green 
movement itself into the corporate structure of industry and liberal democratic 
58 ibid. 64-65 
59 Roger Kasperson, "The Social Amplification of Risk: Progress in Developing an Integrative 
Framework", Social Theories of Risk, Krimsky & Golding, eds. (Westport: Praeger, 1992) 155 
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government. The role of the environmental NGOs is now virtually restricted to 
media activism and fund-raising. The perception and management of 
environmental risks has allowed for the development of institutional responses 
to environmental issues which accord to political means and resources and 
reflect grassroots social concerns that are neither ideologically nor politically 
based. 
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Chapter 8 
Post-political ecology and a return to Arcadia 
Finality is not the language of politics - Benjamin Disraeli 
Whither the green revolution? 
In the 1993 movie Jurassic Park a scientist uses biotechnology to recreate 
dinosaurs and plant species from a number of prehistoric epochs to populate 
the eponymous theme park. The result, inevitably, is a rather gruesome chaos 
as the dinosaurs escape, bearing out the underlying theme that the use of 
technology should be based on sound empirical and ethical principles: 
I'll tell you the problem with the scientific power that you're using 
here - it didn't require any discipline to attain it. You read what 
others had done and you took the next step. You didn't earn the 
knowledge for yourselves, so you don't take any responsibility for it. 
You stood on the shoulders of geniuses to accomplish something as 
fast as you could and before you even knew what you had you 
patented it and packaged it and slapped it on a plastic lunchbox, and 
now you're selling it, you want to sell it! 1 
The movie, adapted from Michael Crichton's 1990 novel, is only one of a 
number of works of prophetic fiction to have provoked both fears and concerns 
about the use and future of technology in the context of social and ethical issues. 
Huxley's Brave New World (1932) and Orwell's 1984 (1949) were both 
groundbreaking works of fiction when they were written, and subsequently 
became benchmark standards against which social progress was measured. 
Jurassic Park is possibly destined to the same socio-historical niche with claims 
1 Quote from Jurassic Park, United International Pictures, 1993 
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by scientists in recent years that it may be possible to clone the (presumed) 
extinct thylacine (Tasmanian tiger/. 
This chapter and the conclusion that follows are not an attempt at a post-
integrationist prediction of the end of ecology or politics but rather draw some 
general conclusions about environmentalism and the future of green politics 
using the Snowy River campaign as an example. The purpose is to suggest, as a 
possible future direction based on the preceding thematic discussion of eco-
political development, a construct of nature and its interrelationship with 
humankind that goes beyond a political interpretation based on the concept of 
institutional or formalised politics, and for which there are significant 
indicators. This chapter will analyse the eco-political construct in terms of its 
social and environmental strengths, and the trends that are emerging as a result 
of these, concluding that the integration of the environment and 
environmentalism into mainstream politics is not adequately addressing 
ecological problems from the local and localised perspective. The move from 
integrationism towards an environmental heterodoxy is not a revolutionary act 
but a logical development from political action based on an institutional 
structure, to extra-political action based on broader beliefs and which may form 
the basis of future directions for environmentalism. 
Revolutions, as a general concept, require certain elements for their 
instigation and implementation: 
1. widespread social discontent (which may manifest as anger, fear or loss 
of confidence) in the existing situation; 
11. an achievable, or at least believable, alternative vision; 
111. belief among society that the alternative is better than the status quo; 
1v. informed leadership. 
2 Australian Museum Online (2002) Australia's Thylacine: To clone or not to clone? 
http: / /www.arnonline.net.au / thylacine/ 
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In this, all revolutions, whether political, scientific, social, or economic are 
inherently political acts. They all seek widespread change by popular demand. 
The ecological crisis exposed by Carson in 1962, and preceding the development 
of the 'green revolution', was based on scientific evidence and called for the 
science of ecology to be employed more as a basis for political and economic 
decision making on environmental issues: 
Much of the necessary knowledge is now available but we do not use 
it. We train ecologists in our universities and even employ them in 
government agencies but we seldom take their advice. We allow the 
chemical death rain to fall as though there were no alternative, 
whereas in fact there are many, and our ingenuity could soon 
discover many more if given the opportunity.3 
She goes on to present what, e_ffectively, became an ecological call-to-arms: 
Have we fallen into a mesmerized state that makes us accept as 
inevitable that which is inferior or detrimental, as though having lost 
the will or the vision to demand that which is good? 
... On every hand there is evidence that those engaged in [chemical] 
spraying operations exercise a ruthless power .... 
. . . If the Bill of Rights contains no guarantee that a citizen shall be 
secure against lethal poisons distributed either by private 
individuals or public officials, it is surely only because our 
forefathers could conceive of no such problem.4 
Carson's call was for a new ecological awareness that would result in industrial 
and agricultural development based on sound ecological and ethical principles 
- in effect, an eco-social revolution. Her final paragraph was a damning 
indictment of society's treatment of nature under the style of ad hoc policy 
development and short-term decision-making that had characterised the 
previous construct of environmental thought: 
3 R.Carson, Silent Spring (London: Penguin. 1962) 28 
4 ibid. 28-29 
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The 'control of nature' is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the 
Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed 
that nature exists for the convenience of man. The concepts and 
practices of applied entomology for the most part date from that 
Stone Age of science. It is our alarming misfortune that so primitive 
a science has armed itself with the most modem and terrible 
weapons, and that in turning them against the insects it has also 
turned them against the earth.5 
There was, however, an ambiguity in Carson's approach that made science 
itself very uneasy and brought the political left wing clearly into the picture. 
The technology and development that had resulted in the environmental 
degradation and ecological crisis were essentially the results of science. The Old 
Left of the preservationist era had accepted the role of science and technology as 
the vehicles of social progress: "For them, scientifically wrought forces of 
production would, under socialism, be set free from the shackles of capitalism."6 
The focus was not on science as an agent of ecological destruction, but on the 
capitalist system that controlled science. The emerging New Left in the early 
1960s, however: 
... was skeptical of science because of its visible effects ... the Vietnam 
~ 
War was predominantly a technological war, a lesson not lost on 
antiwar activists ... and, of course, the ever present threat of nuclear 
conflagration loomed over the lives of the generations born after 
1940 for whom the A-bomb was a defining feature of social and 
psychological worlds.7 
The green movement that grew out of the awareness of a pending ecological 
crisis understood that, firstly, the role of science in society had been one of 
progress, and that this progress had elements that were used destructively and 
had wrought damage on the environment; and secondly, that in order for 
5 ibid. 257 
_ 
6 S.Aronowitz, 1996, "The Politics of the Science Wars", Social Text, Vol.14, Nos. 1 & 2, 183 
7 ibid. (original italics) 
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environmentalism to succeed politically, scientific evidence would be necessary 
to support the claims of an environmental apocalypse. It was not science itself 
that needed to be changed, but the institutions perceived to be in control of 
science. 
The 'reclamation' of science by environmentalism, successful in terms of 
providing informed leadership for the environment movement and the 
establishment of green democratisation, was not universally accepted. There 
remained those, represented broadly but not entirely by the deep ecologist 
school of thought, who continued to regard science as the cause of imminent 
ecological collapse and who, as a result, turned more to philosophy as a basis 
for revolution. Despite this, however, environmentalism as a broad social 
movement, came to be defined and led by the writings, not only of Carson, who 
died in 1964, but also scientists such as James Lovelock, Paul Ehrlich, Garrett 
Hardin and those who comprised the Club of Rome. 
The past two to three decades of integrationist environmental policy have 
been defined by the ability of centralised institutions to address, through the 
channels of political process, the environmental challenges of the late 20th 
century. From its first steps in Stockholm in 1972, the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) has demonstrated a strong integrationist 
approach by connecting environmental science with government and society. 
The strength and acceptability of the UNEP lay in the fact that at its base was 
scientific advice: 
The credibility of their advice lay in the fact that their understanding 
was scientific - that is, open to revision by new information. At the 
same time, UNEP could harness scientists' interests by sponsoring 
research. The result was to organize a politically effective 
community of credible actors.8 
8 K.Lee Compass and Gyroscope (Washington DC: Island Press, 1993) 131 
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. The Stockholm World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
in 1987, Rio de Janeiro UNCED (Earth Summit) in 1992 and the Johannesburg 
WSSD (Rio+ 10 or Earth Summit II) in 2002 have all used ecological principles as 
the starting point for political deliberations on environmental issues. The 
ecological foundation, however, has begun to yield to economic factors. The 
concept of 'natural capitalism'9 has entrenched the ideals of liberal capitalism 
into environmental policy and green political parties have turned to a wider 
agenda of social and economic issues, partly as a logical extension of the 
human-environment interrelationship, and partly as a means of making 
themselves more electorally viable on the liberal democratic playing field. The 
last decade of the 20th century saw environmental issues become highly visible 
corporate campaigns from transnational companies to environme.ntal 
organisations. 
While the integration of the environmental agenda into mainstream liberal-
capitalist policy has succeeded in commodifying and corporatising 
environmentalism, in the light of current environmental issues, how effective 
has it been ecologically? Despite a growing social awareness of environmental 
issues and general political recognition of their importance in terms of both 
political viability and ecological necessity, and considering the scope of 
investment in sustainable development10, international progress has been 
relatively minimal in the areas of long-term risks while state-centred progress 
on direct risks has often been restricted by economic factors or issues of 
domestic politics. In opening the Earth Summit in Johannesburg, South African 
President, Thabo Mbeki, admitted that global progress on environmental issues 
in the decade since Rio has been disappointing: 
"Sadly, we have not made much progress in realizing the grand 
9 Hawken, Lovins & Lovins, Natural Capitalism (London: Earthscan, 1999) 
'
0 M.Jacobs, "Financial Incentives: The British Experience'1 in Eckersley (ed) Markets, the State and 
the Environment (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995); P.Bames and I.Barnes Environmental Policy 
in the European Union (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999) 
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vision contained in Agenda 21 and other international agreements," 
Mbeki said. "It is no secret that the global community has, as yet, not 
demonstrated the will to implement the decisions it has freely 
d d ttll a opte . 
While there is much research still to be done on the impact, gains and effects of 
Agenda 21, Mbeki' s assessment certainly does not correlate with either the 
progress made or the willingness to implement environmental measures at the 
local community level. The canyon between integrationist political 
environmentalism and grassroots action appears to pe widening in terms of 
goals, achievements and method. 
The role of scientific research in the progress of environmentalism and its 
consequent mainstreaming in terms of identification and scale of environmental 
problems has been fundamental. However important to this process, science 
itself has not been responsible for social attitudes towards the environment12, 
which are decreasingly represented by government rhetoric and bureaucratic 
policy. Further, as Bliihdorn points out, the "processes of the functional 
differentiation of society" are constantly further separating the "institutions 
responsible for the perception and framing of environmental problems" from 
the" sketching and implementation of appropriate solutions."13 Following this 
line of argument, the type of social revolutionary period of the 1960s, from 
which grew the environmental movement, may well be occurring again at 
grassroots and community level based along many of the same principles and 
containing the same elements as its forebear. That is, that there is a perceived 
crisis situation that the state is failing to address, widespread discontent, an 
alternative direction and informed leadership. 
11 T.Mbeki, quoted in "Johannesburg Summit 2002", United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development 
http:/ /www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/whats_new / feature_story25.htm 
12 F.Fischer, Citizens, Experts and the Environment (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2000) 
13 I.Bhihdorn, 1997, "A Theory of Post-Ecologist Politics" Environmental Politics, Vol.6 No.3, 129 
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Towards post-political ecology and the new green world order 
In 1997 Bliihdorn argued in favour of a theory of non-ethical, individualised 
post-ecological politics constructed around a pluralist "democratised" concept 
of nature oriented exclusively to the present rather than past or future 
concerns
14
• The perceived shift would be from "preservation" to "construction", 
as the human species would engage positively in creating or recreating rather 
than dwelling on negative concerns "about potential or factual losses."15 Since 
Bliihdorn' s paper was published there have been indications, based largely on 
shifts in political priorities at government level, of a change in the political 
construct of ecology, leading in turn to more community-based environmental 
initiatives. It is these recent developments that form the basis of what I perceive 
to be, rather than post-ecological politics, an alternative move towards a post-
political ecology, which, like the Bluhdorn theory: 
• will be oriented towards the present; 
• is based on a pluralistic concept of nature; and 
• represents a shift away from a weakened paradigm. 
Unlike Bliihdorn's theory, however, a post-political ecology could be seen as 
moving away from the current location of green politics within the established 
institutional framework to an extra-political location. 
It is further argued that a post-political ecology cannot be constructed 
without a moral or ethical structure. The influence of environmental issues on 
the liberal capitalist political system effectively separated the fundamental green 
movement ethics of the intrinsic value of nature, intergenerational justice, 
considerability of life systems and the inherent interrelatedness of 
environmental issues from environmental decision-making. In their place was 
established eco-corporatism and eco-rationalism to create a new growth 
industry that has manifested in green consumerism. Industry-based 
14 ibid. 141 
1s .b.d 1 1 . 
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environmental solutions such as bio-degradable, phosphorus-free detergents for 
dishwashers, supermarket bags made from cornstarch, and the boom in eco-
tourism have systematically removed original green movement ethics, replacing 
them with feel-good panaceas that temporarily mask the symptoms but do not 
address the cause of ecological problems. Twenty years of politically objective 
and amoral integrationist environmental policy and eco-industrialisation have 
given us recycling, unleaded petrol and EIAs, but these have not addressed the 
problems of waste generation, global warming or land degradation16• To this 
end, a post-political ecology could be based on a green ethic along the lines of 
Goodin's 'Green Theory of Value', described and paraphrased by Radcliffe as: 
... people want a sense of purpose and pattern; this can only be 
achieved within a wider setting; natural products provide that 
. 17 
setting. 
Goodin accordingly places the human-nature relationship in an ethical 
framework: 
.. . we value the products of natural processes precisely because they 
are the products of something larger than ourselves .. . for my 
purposes, it would do equally well to say that the processes in 
question are things 'outside' of ourselves. The point is merely that 
such natural processes, and our relation to them, serve to fix our 
place in the external world.18 
With Bliihdorn I argue that a new paradigm of environmental action, 
constructionism, can emerge to replace the current environmental approach of 
integrationist environmentalism. Constructionism, as an approach to 
environmentalism, is likely to assume the grassroots values upon which current 
environmental action is based: values spatially and temporally defined as 'here 
and now'. Constructionism is not the global view encapsulated by the green 
16 W.Tabb The Amoral Elephant (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001) 
17 J.Radcliffe, Green Politics: Dictatorship or Democracy? (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000) 69 
18 Goodin, quoted in Radcliffe, ibid. 69-70 
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aphorism "Think globally, act locally": its fundamental approach more a matter 
of, "Think locally, act locally". Constructionists would be neither experts nor 
theorists and the practice of constructionism neither entirely anthropocentric 
nor entirely ecocentric. It would rely heavily on social capital and place 
attachment as moral bases rather than the green ethics of moral considerability 
to nature and intergenerational justice but recognise the intrinsic value of nature 
represented by the perception of wilderness. 
A post-political ecology can be described according to the criteria set out in 
Table 8.1. This model does not replicate the radical social change that occurred 
during the 1960s but it nonetheless does represent a significant challenge to the 
political order and comes at a time when the dominant liberal capitalist political 
order is already under threat from other external factors. It is worth noting that 
there are also certain similarities and parallels between the global political and 
social situation during the period of the social revolutions and rise of the mass 
social movements and the current social and political climate: 
• Cold War realpolitik has been replaced by a Jihad realpolitik, involving the US 
and its allies on the one side, and the so-called 'rogue' Muslim states of the 
Middle East, Iraq and Iran, on the other; 
• the movement for civil rights, and to a lesser extent, the women's movement, 
have been replaced by the broader movement for human rights and 
women's rights, evident in campaigns for environmental justice, social 
equality and refugees and against poverty and third world debt; 
• as with the early environmental campaigns in the late 1960s and early 70s, 
environmental action at the turn of the century is being led largely by older 
1 19 peop e . 
19 L.Robin, Defending the Little Desert (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1998); also 
demographic statistics of current environmentally-oriented organisations [Appendix 1] 
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Criterion Characteristics 
• Social perception of state Loss of confidence in government's ability to address 
failure; environmental issues; evident in electoral trends, public 
fora and declining influence of environmental NGOs; 
• Knowledge-based community Identification and characterisation of local problems; 
action; participation at local level, (eg. Landcare); 
• an ethical foundation of Values-based ecological decision making which takes 
cultural-relativist and socially into consideration such factors as local history, 
and environmentally relevant indigenous sensitivities and concerns, ecological integrity 
principles specific to areas, and intergenerational justice; 
communities or issues; 
• a focus on the present rather Pragmatic view of environmental problems that does not 
than past causal events or make judgments about causes, but acts on their results to 
future risk possibilities; solve problems for long-term environmental health; 
• a move away from the state- Recognition that the bureaucracy-industry nexus that has 
science paradigm to local and failed to adequately address environmental concerns also 
indigenous knowledge and includes the 'biodiversity industry'
20
• Local communities 
place attachment as drivers for seek expert advice from independent sources and can 
appropriate action; tailor that advice according to local specificities; 
• a move away from large-scale 
Focus on programs that utilise current environmental 
programs aimed at changing awareness and behaviours, and address community 
social behaviours and attitudes; concerns rather than global; 
• 'fat-free' environmentalism 
A pluralistic view of environmentalism that removes fear 
and guilt, replacing them with action based on social and 
environmental values. 
Table 8.1: Schema of post-political ecology 
20
,Term used by Libby Robin, pers.comm., to describe corporate science 
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The criterion-based schema of a post-political ecology is drawn from the 
current grassroots environmental movement: a new green world order. It is 
characterised generally by what Indian writer and activist, Arundhati Roy, 
describes as 'the dismantling of the Big'21 • The long-term risks requiring 
international cooperative action have become separated, theoretically and 
practically, as well as psychologically, from the direct risks at grassroots level. 
Ekins details a number of very specific environmental movements around the 
world, such as the 'Green Belt Movement' in Kenya led by Professor Wangari 
Maathai22, which, like the Snowy Campaign, utilise community skills, local 
knowledge and place-specific values to achieve social change. The change 
brought about thus is not the result of bureaucratic programs, often presented 
as education programs, which use guilt and the fear of crises to effect 
behavioural and attitudinal change on a socially homogenous scale, but the 
mobilisation of existing knowledge and attitudes which recognise 
environmental and social plurality. Political environmentalism, in this respect, 
may have reached a fin de siecle in which localised environmental action ceases 
to be part of the systemic eco-political machinery and moves to the periphery. 
As was the case with the Little Desert campaign in the late 1960s and is the case 
with the Snowy in the early 2000s, there is power in the periphery from an 
extra-political approach. 
Green politics in a post-political construct 
The decline in environmental effectiveness of integrationism has been 
accompanied by a relative surge in the electoral fortunes of green political 
parties at the close of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. While there are 
21 A.Roy "The Greater Common Good", essay in The Algebra of Infinite Justice (A.Roy) (Bombay: 
India Book Distributor Ltd., 1999) 9 
22 P.Ekins, A New World Order: grassroots movements for Global Change (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1992) 151 
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a number of contributory factors to the apparent greening of the liberal 
democratic electorate, it must be viewed in perspective in respect of liberal 
capitalism, environmentalism and the current socio-political climate. Within an 
integrationist contextual framework, situations which, taken in isolation could 
be regarded as aberrant, are institutional responses to situations or challenges. 
Bliihdorn points to the paradox of the German Greens' position in a governing 
coalition against the 1984 statement of founding Greens member and activist, 
Petra Kelly, that the Greens were "working towards establishing a radically 
different society in which a party like the Greens would no 'longer be 
required."23 The fact that almost two decades later the Greens are governing 
coalition partners in Germany and their antipodean counterparts are 
experiencing unprecedented levels of electoral success would indicate either 
that the radical social transformation envisaged at the outset of green 
democratisation has not occurred, or, as Bliihdorn states: 
For those Green Parties which have had a taste of political power, 
being re-elected has become the main objective taking priority over 
any ideological consideration. 24 · 
While the Greens argue that it is only through increasing and maintaining their 
electoral presence that they can continue to influence the political process25, this 
does not comply with Kelly's aim of voluntary political redundancy. The very 
concept of a green 'politics1 , however, is defined by the parameters of liberal 
capitalism. The fact that a green agenda has been incorporated into mainstream 
politics, however cynically or expediently that may be, indicates the shift of the 
greens from the periphery towards the centre, despite, or perhaps because of, 
statements made from the periphery prior to the process of integration. 
23 I.Bluhdorn, 2001, f/Further to Fall? Adverse Conditions for the Survival of the Greens", paper 
presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Grenoble, April 2001 
24 ibid 
25 Interviews and discussions with elected Green MPs, former Green candidates and Green Party 
members elucidated very consistent responses on this point. 
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It is the post-integrationist movement of the Greens, however, that is at 
issue in this chapter and is most evident in the changing political role of the 
Greens in terms of electoral viability. Bliihdorn states that since the entry of Die 
Griinen into coalition government with the SPD in 1998, their electoral support 
at both federal and lander levels has been steadily eroding26 • This, according to 
Bliihdorn, is partly a function of the political necessity of compromise - which is 
more difficult to avoid from a central position than from the periphery - and 
partly due to external political factors that are neither specifically Green nor 
specifically German 27. While the theory that political compromise is more 
difficult to avoid from a position of political centrality than from the periphery 
may be correct, Bliihdorn's assertion that the Greens' electoral support is 
waning has been proved wrong in the event. The German Federal election, held 
on September 22 2002, saw the SDP-Die Griihen coalition narrowly returned to 
government with an increase in the Greens' vote to 8.4%. This correlates with 
the situation in Australia where the Australian Greens' representation increased 
at federal level with the addition of a second senator as a result of the 
November 2001 election and the election of the Greens' first member of the 
House of Representatives as a result of the by-election in the formerly safe 
Labor seat of Cunningham; and the Tasmanian and New Zealand Green parties 
both having recorded an increase in their votes with consequently greater 
parliamentary representation in the respective elections both held in July 2002. 
There are several qualifying points to note regarding this situation, however, in 
respect of a construction of post-political environmentalism: 
• Neither the Tasmanian nor New Zealand Greens are in government, a 
situation significant in the light of the 1989-91 Tasmanian Labor-Green 
Accord which saw Green support considerably reduced; 
26 Bluhdorn, 2001 op cit. 
27 .b.d 1 1 . 
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• a decrease in support for the Australian Democrats has correlated with the 
increase in national support for the Greens indicating consistent rather than 
increased support for minor or alternative parties28; 
• specific regional or national issues require policy development which reflects 
those concerns and this, in turn, affects polling, for example, the NZ Greens 
based their 2002 campaign heavily on maintaining a moratorium on 
genetically engineered imports and crops, an issue not relevant in Germany 
or Australia; 
• the approach taken by 'major' parties to traditionally 'green' issues affects 
Greens' polling and support levels. 
Bli.ihdorn questions the need for a Green party in a post-ecologist political 
paradigm29, suggesting that in order to survive politically, the Greens will need 
to reinvent themselves as a party30 • A post-political construct of the Greens may 
accompany significant changes in the perception and addressing of 
environmental issues. Certainly, since the emergence of a green politics in the 
late 1970s and early 80s, the role and method of Green parties has changed. An 
increase in their overall vote has taken them over the 4 % threshold for electoral 
funding in Australian federal and state elections, allowing them to run more 
expensive, professional and high profile election campaigns. It is arguable 
whether the Greens running an expensive advertising campaign, in fact, 
achieves any environmental benefit while their representation remains 
28 The Morgan poll of August 30, 2002 showed Greens support up 1 % to 8% and the Democrats 
down 1 % to 3%. One Nation support has dropped by 0.5% while support for Independents and 
Others is up 0.5% http:/ /www.roymorgan.com/polls/2002/3547 / 
29 Bluhdorn (1997) and (2001) op cit. 
30 ibid. (2001) 
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relatively low31 • In this, the reinvention of the Greens in the two decades of 
green politics has been from political pressure group to fully-fledged political 
party and in so doing, 'bled' support from the traditional parties but 
compromised the antiestablishment basis of their original principles. 
The role of the Greens as an electoral vehicle for the 'protest' vote is 
unreliable and unsustainable in terms of creating a long-term political support 
base. The somewhat ambivalent position of the Labor Party on the issue of 
refugees at the 2001 Federal election is largely credited, certainly among the 
Greens themselves and the popular view [indicated in the cartoon, Appendix 2] 
with the 2.34% increase in the Greens' vote from 2.62% in 1998 to 4.96% in 2001, 
while the ALP (primary) vote fell by almost precisely the same percentage 
margin32• While there is a role for minor parties and protest parties in the 
democratic system, the question must be posed as to whether this is a role the 
Greens wish to fill indefinitely and if so, what kinds of protests do they wish to 
record? Environmental issues were not a policy feature during the 2001 Federal 
election campaign, focused, as it was, on issues of national security. The 
Greens, therefore, gained ground by taking a very strong opposing line to the 
Government's and Opposition's approach to refugees and the US war on 
terrorism. Issues of peace and nonviolence, of course, are part of the Green 
platform and as such it is entirely right that the Greens' policy on such matters 
should be made known to the electorate during an election campaign. 
However, as a protest party, they can only be assured of support on specific 
'protest' issues for as long as those issues remain •in the public consciousness 
through continued media attention, which is largely poll-driven and 
31 N.Economou, "Green performance in Australian federal elections: Much ado about nothing?", 
paper presented at the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, Canberra, October 
2002. Also, despite the addition of one senator in the current parliamentary term the Greens do 
not hold the balance of power in the Senate. There are currently 2 Greens in the NSW Upper 
House, 5 in the WA Upper House (with balance of power) and 4 in the Tasmanian Lower 
House. 
32 Figures from Australian Electoral Commission http:/ /www.aec.gov .au/ 
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determined by the policy agendas of the major parties. That is, protest parties 
gain negative support in the form of voter reaction against major parties rather 
than positive support for their own political agenda. 
In many respects, the radical social changes foreshadowed by Petra Kelly in 
1984 have taken place. The world in 2002 is far more conscious of the 
environmental effects of industry and development than in 1984, certain 
ecological behaviours have become internalised at individual and community 
level and global long-term environmental issues are the subject of international 
fora. The 'greening of industry' has identified: 
... 'eco-efficiency' as a new driving force for industrial progress ... 
[and introduced] 'natural capitalism' in which economic activity can 
be adapted to ecological laws and principles.33 
Industrial and urban development in liberal-democratic capitalist nations 
requires consideration to its environmental effects and processes exist to ensure 
consultation across the range of community, industry and government 
stakeholders. Environmental education is part of school curricula across the 
developed world, with many governments offering funding and other 
incentives for schools to become 'sustainable' in such areas as waste reduction · 
and energy consumption34 • The long-term benefit of such programs, from the 
perspective of green political thought, is the change that occurs in collective 
social attitudes and behaviour through educating the young in practical 
environmental issues35 • The end of the Cold War saw the scaling down of 
nuclear arsenals, and several countries are introducing measures to phase out 
nuclear power. 'Green jobs' are being created through the increase of 
33 A.Jamison, 2001, "Environmentalism in an Entrepreneurial Age: Reflections on the Greening 
of Industry Network", Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning Vol3, No.l, pp.1-13 
34 S.Beavis & R.Tennant-Wood, 2001, "Waste minimisation in schools: mapping successful 
pathways", Conference proceedings of Waste Educate 2001: Maintaining the Momentum 
Conference, Brisbane, November 2001, pp.33-37 
3s .b.d 1 1 . 
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sustainable technologies and 'green' power is an option for many energy 
consumers. 
The term 'green' itself and its political and social connotations have become 
mainstreamed to the point where 'green' is considered a positive attribute for 
businesses and activities and a majority of people consider themselves 'green' in 
at least some facets of their lives. A Roy Morgan Poll conducted in June, 2000 
posed the question, "Do you consider yourself 'a bit of a greenie' at heart?": 
55% of respondents answered in the affirmative, 26% said no, while 19% were 
uncommitted. When asked if they always try to recycle everything, 79% said 
yes, including 68% of those who disagree that they would consider themselves a 
'bit of a greenie' .36 In terms of the national approach to the environment, 76.6% 
of respondents to an on-line poll on August 28 2002 believed that Australia 
should do more for the environment37• These developments have all taken place 
since, and most likely as a result of, the entry of Green parties into the political 
process. 
Despite this social and political change towards a green consciousness, the 
Greens do not 'consider that there is no longer a requirement for them to exist as 
a political party and certainly, there is no indication that the environmental 
issues of two decades ago have been fully resolved. Green parties worldwide 
continue to contest elections and their presence in the political process indicates 
an acceptance of both the party and their policies as a valid and viable 
alternative to major parties. Greens in elected positions seek reelection through 
exactly the same processes as their political opponents and with the same aims. 
Gaining sufficient votes to reach the threshold for electoral funding has become 
an important goal in Green campaigns in order to ensure party growth and 
legitimise future campaigns. Far from Petra Kelly's vision of the 'anti-party 
36 Roy Morgan Polls, The Bulletin, June 13 2000, 
http:/ /www.roymorgan.eom.au/polls/2000/3309 
37 News.com "Have your say!" opinion poll 
http:/ /www.news.eom.au/poll/ display /1,7111,A/\3 /\ l A0,00.html; 
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party' that could disband once social change had been effected, the Greens have 
become a mainstream political party with very similar aims and methodology to 
their opponents. 
Green democratisation and integrationism through measures such as 
ecological modernisation and environmental institutionalisation have effected 
widespread social change in respect of the environment, but have also removed 
Green parties from their original core concern, the environment, towards 
concerns for political survival. In so doing, the 'green' agenda has, of political 
necessity, broadened to encompass areas of economic and social concern, which, 
while commensurate with environmentalism as a fundamental left wing 
political concern, is nonetheless not immediately communicable in terms of 
grassroots environmentalism. The role of Green parties at the beginning of the 
21st century, based on the Australian 2001 Federal election and the 2002 New 
Zealand and Tasmanian elections and the Cunningham by-election, is to fill the 
gap left by the rightwards shift of social democrat parties. The early green 
rhetoric of being 'neither left nor right' has been superseded by the political 
opportunity, indeed the necessity, to fill that left-wing gap. 
Rather than the more 'traditional' issues associated with environmental 
groups, issues such as the rise of 'new right' and populist parties, domestic 
politics and elections, international action on global warming, population, 
refugees and multiculturalism and opposition to biotechnology in agricultural 
development have emerged as major issues of concern to members and 
supporters of The Greens in the early 21st century [see Figure 8.1]. The high 
priority given to issues of domestic politics and elections, which includes the 
performance of particular politicians and parties, Australian government 
reaction to certain issues, election campaign issues, Greens candidates and party 
policy, the performance of parties or governments on green issues, media 
reporting of specific issues and government-media relationships indicates that 
the old green guard has yielded to the more technical matters of electoral 
politics within the liberal democratic system. Interestingly, while the survey 
271 
period included September 11 2001 and its aftermath, neither the attacks on the 
World Trade Centre nor the American military reaction figured prominently as 
discussion points on either of the lists surveyed. There may be any number of 
reasons for this, but worth noting in the context of early green movement 
ideology, is that while anti-war rallies were being held around the country, the · 
Greens, at least in this discussion forum, remained largely silent. Also 
interesting in the broader context was that discussion concerning the WSSD in 
Johannesburg was more centred on the 'Green' political presence and the 
Australian government's refusal to include Greens Senator Bob Brown in their 
delegation than the issues and outcomes of the Summit itself. 
Figure 8.2: Issues raised in Greens electronic discussion lists 2000-200238 
In much the same way as post-materialism has been recast as neo-
materialism, the Greens as a political party have reflected this change in their 
own party operations and policy. The role of the Greens in a post-political 
38 Data collated from a survey of the issues raised as discussion points and election issues from a 
total of 2240 emails from April 2000 to August 2002 on the Greens-activist and Greens-global 
email lists administered by the Australian Greens. Email postings were recorded from a total of 
158 different subscribers. Issues described as 'other' include domestic violence, Indigenous 
issues, urban development, war and terrorism, feminist issues and general information about 
activities, publications etc. http://us.altnews.com.au/ greens/ 
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construct of ecology may be possible, as Bliihdorn states regarding the German 
Greens39, only if the Greens can redefine themselves in a more mainstream 
political mould, with the inevitable result that much of their original 'green' 
ideology will be compromised. Both the conundrum and the strength of green 
politics is perhaps best expressed by the election poster used during the German 
election by Die Griinen leader and German Foreign Minister, J oschka Fischer, 
showing a somewhat perplexed-looking Fischer, chin resting in hands, with the 
·slogan, Auflen Minister, innen griln (Outside Minister, inside green) - a slogan 
reminiscent of the 'watermelon green' ( outside green, inside red) criticisms 
levelled at the Greens by conservative political opponents. The Australasian 
situation is somewhat less crucial for the Greens with less at stake in terms of 
political power and considerable redefinition having been accomplished 
through a gradual and fluid process of political evolution. Few would argue 
that the Greens in 2002 are a far different party from the 1972 United Tasmania 
Group in terms of aims, ideology or organisation. While the core philosophy 
has remained, the political methodology has become more oriented to the liberal 
democratic system within which they operate in much the same fashion as 
mainstream political parties. 
Beyond the political construct of nature: return to Arcadia 
The preservationist approach to environmentalism was characterised by an 
arcadian concept of the environment: a romanticised view of nature epitomised 
by the English parson and naturalist, Gilbert White, and described by Worster 
as the advocation of : 
... a simple, humble life for man with the aim of restoring him to a 
peaceful coexistence with other organisms.40 
39 Bliihdorn, (2001) op cit. 
40 D.Worster, Nature's Economy Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 2 
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Following White was Thoreau, Whitman, Emerson, Muir and then Leopold, all 
of whom looked to nature and humankind's relationship with it in terms of 
preserving wilderness for the spiritual and cultural heritage of future 
generations: 
... wilderness [was] an adversary to the pioneer. But to the laborer 
in repose, able for the moment to cast a philosophical eye on his 
world, that same raw stuff is something to be loved and cherished, 
because it gives definition and meaning to his life. This is a plea for 
the preservation of some tag-ends of wilderness ... for the edification 
of those who may one day wish to see, feel, or study the origins of 
their cultural inheritance.41 
The construction of nature as a 'cultural inheritance' is problematic in the 
burden of human values it places upon the natural environment. 
The Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme was conceived out of human 
values and itself is regarded as a 'cultural inheritance'. The ambitious 
engineering project that would harness the fast-flowing waters of the Snowy 
and Eucumbene Rivers to generate hydro electricity and, more importantly, 
provide a reliable water source for the dry farming lands to the west bringing 
"stability and security to these fertile areas, allowing them to prosper and 
develop"42, was only part of the story. The scheme recruited thousands of 
workers, mainly from post-War Europe, and placed them in a volatile melting 
pot of nationalities, hard and dangerous work, extreme conditions and a social 
climate of racial intolerance and conservative values. Stories of racially-
motivated violence and lawlessness in the isolated construction camps and an 
41 A.Leopold, "Wilderness", in A Sand County Almanac Special Commemorative Edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 188 
42 
"Water - A J oumey Westward", Snowy Hydro website, 2002 
http:/ /www.snowyhydro.eom.au/ corporate/water.cfm 
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alarmingly high worksite death toll43 are balanced against the positive social 
aspects of the project, reflected in the songs, poetry and stories that have lent 
legendary status to the project and its workers. While the violence and 
lawlessness are often painted in the romantic hues of the frontier spirit, and the 
litany of deaths and injuries are glossed over as testament to the toughness of 
the workers, socially, the Snowy Scheme was a brave experiment that worked. 
The Snowy Hydro remains the largest single employer in the shires of Snowy 
River and Cooma-Monaro44 • Many former workers on the scheme remained in 
the district long after their employment ended, giving the region a multicultural 
heritage of which it is justifiably proud and which Cooma commemorates with 
a permanent display of the flags of all the nations represented by workers as the 
centrepoint of the town. To suggest that the scheme was ill-conceived, 
ecologically unsustainable or badly planned is tantamount to spitting on the 
Man from Snowy River: and therein lies the problem. 
The fictitious (although there are many claims to his validity) Man from 
Snowy River, a legendary horseman without peer, dwelt among the snowgums 
and granite pinnacles of the alpine 'high country', beside the untamed waters of 
the Snowy River. A.B. Paterson's best-known character is immortalised in the 
Snowy River region through art, monuments, place names and high country 
equestrian events which test the skills of the best local horseriders. An annual 
'Man From Snowy River' A ward is presented to a local resident who best 
exemplifies the 'spirit' of the Man, and a 'Stripling' award for a junior Man 45• 
Former winners of the Man Award include brothers Mick and Dave Pendergast, 
both now octogenarians, direct descendants of original settlers in the district, 
43 Officially, the death toll is 124 over the 25 years of the project, but these statistics were not 
compiled until 1981 and do not include several multiple fatalities, nor fatalities that occurred on 
the roads around the project, often involving heavy vehicles, icy conditions, sheer drops and 
several lives. The police station in Khancoban alone processed 130 coronial inquests and that 
was only one of many stations throughout the region. 
44 Local employment information from shire councils 
45 Both awards can be, and have been, presented to women/ girls who exemplify the generic 
'Man'. 
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born and bred as mountain cattlemen who left the Snowy·River only once in 
their lives when they enlisted to serve in World War II. The Pendergast 
brothers (there were seven of them, four still living) and their father, uncles and 
grandfather before them, held high country summer grazing leases in what is 
now the Kosciuszko National Park. Their hand-blazed tracks can still be 
followed through the sub-treeline scrub in the Thredbo Valley, up through the 
Cascades, the Diggings and Dead Horse Gap, and around the south and west 
_faces of Mt Kosciuszko. Old hand-hewn fenceposts, stone chimneys and rusty 
barbed wire in isolated pockets of the national park serve as reminders that the 
perceived wilderness of the high country is a historical abstraction. 
The Dalgety district has its own local legends, some of whom, like the 
Pendergast brothers, grazed the high country before the gazettal of the national 
park, but most are post-War soldier settlers or the descendants of selectors who 
settled the Snowy River valley south from Jindabyne, through Dalgety and 
down towards the Victorian border. In mounting a campaign to restore the 
river, the local residents removed all associations of' cultural inheritance' from 
the river. Jo Garland has deliberately avoided using the word 'icon' to describe 
the river: 111 don't like using that word - too many associations that aren't 
relevant."46 Instead, she shows photos of the river at Dalgety before the 
Jindabyne dam and the same place in 2001, and points to examples of 
streambank erosion, stagnation, infestations of noxious weeds and channel 
siltation, all of which have resulted from the reduced flow of the river. With an 
impressive knowledge of river ecology gained from a decade of talking to 
scientists, ecologists and natural resource planners and reading environmental 
impact statements and technical reports, Jo explains precisely why 28% is the 
minimum flow required to restore the river to health and the optimum level for 
maintenance of the environmental flow. Compared to the language used by the 
politicians and the organisations lobbying for both the irrigators and 
46 Interview with Jo Garland, Dalgety, fh April 2002, transcript in possession of author 
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environmental organisations, which has been either liberal with references to 
history and legends or heavy with economic or technical jargon, the language 
used by the Dalgety and District Community Association has been simple, 
factual and direct. 
The pollies and the experts from the Snowy [Hydro Authority] 
would come down here and talk [at a high level] about economics 
and water savings - but that's their problem and it was just putting 
us off the track. We just kept reminding ourselves, what is 
important? The river is important. That's all. It's the river. We 
can't solve their problems on the Murray, we can only deal with our 
own problem- and that's the Snowy.47 
The approach taken by the Dalgety community in their campaign to save 
the Snowy is in many ways the epitome of arcadian environmentalism, but why 
was it successful in an era of integrated environmental policy instruments and a 
high level of social consciousness of environmental issues? The Dalgety 
community and the Snowy River Shire Council have no doubt that had it not 
been for the sheer doggedness of the campaign, the corporatisation process of 
the Snowy Hydro would have been completed by the mid-1990s and the Snowy 
River would have died, regardless of its cultural heritage and iconic status. 
Certainly the river's national significance helped in raising the wider public 
awareness of the issue and in taking the campaign beyond the local area, but it 
was not the campaign appearances by actors Tom Burlinson and Jack 
Thompson, or the "Snowy River Must Flow Again" bumper stickers on cars in 
Sydney and Melbourne that ultimately won the agreement to 28% 
environmental flow. The deciding factor was the absolute refusal of the local 
community to accept defeat in 1998 and agree to the 15% compromise that the 
policy makers believed was the solution to both the environmental and 
economic issues. 
47 .b .d 1 1 . 
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The irrigators and the South Australian government view the decision to 
restore the 28% environmental flow to the Snowy as the (Labor) governments of 
Vic_toria and New South Wales bowing to local pressure for the sake of votes on 
the eastern seaboard while ignoring that the real environmental problem lies in 
the Murray. Former (Liberal) South Australian Premier, John Olsen, believes 
there is an unbalanced preoccupation with the Snowy: 
The historic flow down the Snowy is 60 percent, the historic flow 
down the Murray is 20 percent. Let's get our priorities right. And 
the Man from Snowy River and the Old Regret horse and the 
Museum is not on the Snowy it's on the River Murray, Corryong, yet 
this folklore that's developed on the eastern seaboard ignores the 
Murray. 48 
While a simmering feud persists between the Snowy River and Towong Shire 
Councils over which jurisdiction has rightful 'ownership' of the legend on a 
geographical and commercial basis, this simply indicates the level of 
obfuscation that occurs when icons and legends are used as a basis for 
environmental planning. 
Murray Valley irrigators have also been angered by what they see as saving 
one river at the expense of another despite assurances that: 
... they will not be disadvantaged and all the water will come from 
efficiency savings as irrigation infrastructure is upgraded through 
pipelining, major engineering works and improved maintenance of 
the water distribution system.49 
They also have substantial cultural heritage on their side in the form of the 
Federal government's 1940s commitment to drought-proof the fertile land to the 
west of the Australian Alps by diverting the Snowy's flow, and the legacy of 
two centuries of Australian agricultural production. Politically represented by 
the National Party, the irrigators opposed the corporatisation· of the Snowy 
48 Olsen quoted in Fullerton, Watershed (Sydney: ABC Books, 2001) 189 
49 I.Paterson, "Water gates open into Snowy River", The Land, Thursday, August 29, 2002 p.6 
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Hydro and have invested considerable resources and energy through their 
lobby groups in fighting against the campaign to restore the environmental flow 
to the Snowy River. National Party President Helen Dickie believes that for as 
long as the Commonwealth retained ownership of the Scheme they were 
obliged to honour Chifley's commitment to the farmers, while a corporatised 
Snowy Hydro would not be under the same obligation50 • On the morning the 
Mowamba aqueduct was turned off in the first stage of restoring the Snowy, a 
large contingent of Murray Valley irrigators rolled into Jindabyne 11with 20 
tonnes of irrigated lucerne hay to voice their frustration at the water taken from 
full Snowy Hydro Scheme catchment dams rather than from the promised 
savings in the water storage system."51 The implicit question is whether 
Australia's rural and agricultural heritage, reliant on water for its viability, 
should have precedence over Australia1s cultural and social heritage and if so, 
by what criteria is this determined? Both sides, I would suggest, could mount 
strong cases for the primacy of their legacies but ultimately, there can be no 
definitive answer. 
The national environmental organisations have not been major players in 
the Snowy campaign. While they have occasionally provided a credible and 
nationally recognisable voice to the issue, it has been local action, culminating in 
the election of Victorian Independent MP, Craig Ingram in the formerly safe 
National Party seat of East Gippsland, on a single-issue platform of saving the 
Snowy that finally achieved the goal of an agreement to restore the 
environmental flow. Fullerton comments that the Snowy is not the only river in 
Australia to have suffered severe degradation from development, but it is the 
only one that has been saved. 
One of the loudest messages from [ the Snowy' s] victory is the power 
of public opinion. Other rivers which have been 'brutalised' in this 
50 Fullerton, op cit. 189 
51 L.Bull, "A 'snow job' says Murray, The Land, Thursday August 29, 2002, p.6 
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country go unnoticed. The romance of the Snowy has been its 
saviour, as Victorian Premier Steve Bracks demonstrated. 'To leave 
behind a legacy of the Snowy River running again for future 
generations is something I am very proud of. '52 
Environmentalist, rock star, former Senate candidate for the Nuclear 
Disarmament Party and President of the Australian Conservation Foundation, 
Peter Garrett, also drew on cultural heritage to press the point of saving the 
Snowy: 
It is important the Snowy is not held hostage to government failings 
on allocations, because it would be a tragedy if the beginnings of this 
unique decision on one of Australia's iconic rivers was derailed.53 
What Fullerton, Bracks and Garrett, however, failed to recognise is the single 
basic grassroots element: the strength of the campaign was not in the romance, 
the legend or the legacy to future generations. The strength of the campaign 
was in its temporal and spatial immediacy. The river's condition today and here 
were the motivating factors behind the Dalgety community's campaign. 
Political process, while an essential component of the equation in reaching an 
end result, has not driven the locals and as recognisable political pressure 
groups, neither have the environmental organisations. 
Essentially the presence of the ACF and the National Conservation Council 
on the campaign implied a 'green movement' political ideology that was not 
helpful to the local community groups when arguing their case to governments, 
farmers' lobby groups and ind~stry from the local perspective. The Snowy 
River Shire is politically and socially conservative and 'greenies' are generally 
regarded as socially marginal at best and obstructive to progress at worst. Over 
the decade of the campaign the proponents dealt with governments and 
individual politicians from both sides of the party-political divide and remained 
consistent in their extra-political approach, appealing not to specific political 
52 Fullerton, op cit.189 
53 Garrett quoted in ibid. 188 
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ideology or 'playing off' one side against the other, but arguing a case for the 
ecology of the river and its importance to the communities and stakeholders. 
A post-political ecology, then, could represent a return to an arcadian 
culture of ecological restoration54 characterised by local communities taking 
responsibility for, in both a metaphorical and literal sense, their own backyards. 
In contrast to the environmental movement's philosophy of 'think globally, act 
locally', which encouraged local campaigns that would ultimately have a 
positive effect on 'big picture' environmental issues, arcadian environmentalism 
thinks locally and acts locally. That this, may, ultimately have a positive 'big 
picture' effect is not a driving factor. The movement ideology of working for 
the greater good is not a priority; rather emphasised are the simpler values 
relating to what Worster describes as "a self-contained community with a 
deeply rooted sense of identity"55, and Light defines as "an effort to restore an 
important part of the human relationship with nonhuman nature."56 This 
movement towards a post-political environmentalism is evident in a number of 
ways drawing on the criteria outlined in Table 8.1: 
• the 'Decade of Landcare' announced in Australia by Prime Minister Hawke 
in 1989 signalled the beginning of a governmental shift away from directly 
addressing localised environmental issues, placing their solutions, officially, 
in the hands of communities led by experts; 
• measurable loss of social confidence in the government's ability to solve 
environmental problems as indicated in polls and through the popular 
media; 
• the 'corporatisation' of the large environmental organisations whereby they 
are no longer seen to represent the interests of grassroots environmentalists 
but are seen as quasi-political organisations; 
54 A.Light, /;Ecological Restoration and the Culture of Nature: A Pragmatic Perspective", in 
Gobster and Hull (eds), Restoring Nature (Washington DC: Island Press, 2000) 
_ 
55 Worster, op cit. 20 
56 Light, op cit. 49 
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• the removal of political ideology from environmental campaigns and the rise 
of community values. 
While the campaign to save the Snowy must rank as one of the landmark 
battles in Australian environmental history, the fundamental difference that 
separates it from the other landmark campaigns such as Lake Pedder, Fraser 
Island and the Franklin underlines the change in direction of environmentalism. 
Lake Pedder, Fraser Island and the Franklin were all campaigns in opposition to 
development. The Tasmanian government policy of hydro-industriahsation 
and the Queensland government's support for sandmining galvanised national 
environmental campaigns that polarised the community and set 
'environmentalists' against government and industry. The unsuccessful Lake 
Pedder campaign resulted in the birth of a political movement, and the Fraser 
Island and Franklin campaigns, backed by the national environmental 
organisations succeeded after the Federal government used its external powers 
under World Heritage agreements57 to overturn state government decisions. 
The Snowy campaign, while of national significance and recognition, was never 
opposed to anything. On the contrary, the Dalgety community used the 
proposed corporatisation of the Snowy Hydro as leverage to achieve their goal. 
Nor were the proponents of the campaign opposed to the Murray catchment 
irrigators. Although they believed that, given the degraded state of the Snowy 
downstream of Jindabyne Dam, flood irrigation for rice fields in the Murray-
Darling Basin was profligate, at no point did they suggest that the irrigators' 
right to water should be revoked and they supported the proposed measure of 
water savings. The Snowy campaign, unlike its predecessors, did not seek to 
stop anything, only to change something. 
s7 R b. . o m, op cit. 
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Does politics matter? 
At the outset I posed two questions: what has happened to the environment 
movement?, and does politics matter? The suggestion of a post-political ecology 
does not imply a post-political construct of society. It does, however, pose a 
challenge to the political order of environmentalism. Green democratisation 
and integrationism, as well as absorbing environmental policy into the 
mainstream political agenda, also absorbed the green movement represented by 
the major environmental organisations. Greenpeace, the ACF, the Sierra Club 
and The Wilderness Society are highly structured corporate and political 
actors58 • Even the more radical Earth First!, based on deep ecological principles 
of' eco-resistance' and holding to a more anarchic political view, is a 
streamlined quasi-political organisation. Spokespeople for these organisations 
are, in many cases, as well-recognised as politicians and the groups themselves 
represent a certain social 'electorate'. The methodology of environmental 
organisations, however, is still that of opposition to government or industry and 
large-scale issues. The Wilderness Society is currently engaged in campaigns 
opposing commercial development of Christmas Island and landclearing in 
Queensland59, while Greenpeace Australia is engaged in several campaigns 
against, variously, the proposed new nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in 
Sydney, genetically modified crops, the Federal government's lifting of a port 
ban on Japanese bluefin tuna trading and the non-ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol60 • Do these organisations comprise the environment movement? 
In ear 1 y September 2002 a tanker carrying toxic chemicals ran aground close 
to the shoreline off the east coast of South Africa. Within five days it was 
burning and in danger of breaking up, its spill having become an 11 kilometre-
long oil slick along the coastline endangering the World Heritage listed Saint 
58 A.Jamison, The Making of Green Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 165 
59 The Wilderness Society website, http:/ /www.wilderness.org.au/ 14th September 2002 
60 Greenpeace Australia Pacific website, http:/ /www.greenpeace.org.au/ 14th September 14, 
2002 
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Lucia Wetland Park. News reports at the time stated that 'environmentalists' 
were working to block the mouth of the River Umfolozi with sand in an attempt 
to contain the oil spill and prevent it from affecting the wetland. The 
environmentalists were using bulldozers and other heavy equipment to shift 
sand into the river mouth under the direction of a 'disaster management 
officia1'61 • None of the major environmental organisations issued a statement 
concerning the incident or its potential ecological effects. An exhaustive search 
of the websites and press releases of the major international environment 
organisations failed to find reference to the incident or its potential disastrous 
effects on the wetland ecology. Media releases from Greenpeace International, 
Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Fund and Earth First! Worldwide all dealt 
exclusively with specific campaigns being run by those organisations, including 
abseiling down the statue of Christ the Redeemer in Rio to protest the failure of 
WSSD, and filing a lawsuit against the US government on behalf of victims of 
global warming. Is the environment movement in the River Umfolozi trying to 
stop a toxic tide or in court trying to prove a point? 
It has been the underlying theme of this thesis that the environment 
movement, as conceived in the 1960s and 70s and acted upon through the 1980s, 
has come to a crossroads in its development. The movement succeeded in 
placing the environment in a political context but in so doing became politicised 
itself. This shift created a vacuum at the level of local environmental issues that 
the major organisations are unwilling to adopt as campaigns and which are not 
included in government environmental policy due to their specific and localised 
nature. The vacuum has been filled by community groups and grassroots 
organisations based not on the overarching principles of the Green movement, 
but on the arcadian environmental values of reconnecting community with 
61 News reports from BBC news online http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/2255873.stm and 
ABC news online http:/ /abc.net.au/news/justin/nat/newsnat-15sep2002-33.htrn 
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nature and local environmental stewardship. From this, and illustrated by the 
Snowy example, environmentalism may be turning towards a constructionism: 
an ecological approach that operates outside institutional political process 
through a constructive view of the relationships between society, nature and the 
government-industry nexus and seeks to construct a positive role for 
community in the use, stewardship and management of natural resources. This 
becomes, then, a reconstruction of the type of social action evident during the 
era of social movements: 
... many social movements of the past, much like the environmental 
movements of our time, have provided a seedbed, or alternative 
public space, for the articulation of utopian "knowledge interests" 
that have then been translated into more socially acceptable forms of 
knowledge-making ... Social movements, that is, have periodically 
served as important contexts for the reconstitution of knowledge.62 
The role of politics, including Green politics, in a post-political construct of 
nature is not irrelevant in terms of the relationship between the environmental 
organisations and government-industry. However, where the environment 
movement and the major organisations view government and the government-
industry nexus as part of the problem, constructionism sees government and 
industry as part of a solution. Government is able to provide the financial 
resources and the authority necessary to enable local communities to address 
environmental problems. 
In terms of the global environmental crisis, this does not necessarily make 
for an optimistic outlook. While local communities are restoring rivers, 
revegetating coastal dunes, rehabilitating agricultural soils and creating urban 
wetlands, governments, driven by economic growth and industry, continue to 
equivocate over climate change, support resource extractive industries, generate 
waste and use the environment as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations. 
62 Jamison, op cit, 46 
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Where the environmental 'big picture' is being addressed, it is through policy 
that ensures a measurable economic or electoral benefit and while this approach 
is opposed by the major environmental organisations, a resultant impasse 
continues to thwart positive environmental action. Small-scale, localised 
environmental management and stewardship, however, of the type illustrated 
by the case study, even where dependent upon political patronage, is growing63 • 
It is likely to be successful in this respect because: 
• taken on an issue-by-issue basis small-scale environmentalism is too small to 
present a major threat to the politico-economic dominance of the 
government-industry nexus; 
• it allows governments to divest themselves of responsibility for 
environmental issues where local communities are taking responsibility; 
• it facilitates negotiations which provide the so-called 'win-win' situations 
governments require for their continued legitimacy; 
• the identification of local environmental problems and taking grassroots 
action in addressing them empowers local communities and reconnects 
communities with the environment; 
• political patronage, usually in the form of financial resources or access to 
information or expert advice, allows governments to support environmental 
policy and community wishes. 
To local and small-scale environmentalists, represented by a constructionist 
and extra-political approach, 'politics' is thus often regarded largely as an 
obstacle to be manoeuvred around or used constructively in order to achieve a 
desired outcome. The direction of environmentalism, on current evidence and 
illustrated by the Snowy campaign, appears to be changing from a view of the 
63 A.Carr Grassroots and Green Tape (The Federation Press, Annandale, 2001); E.Weber Bringing 
Society Back In (MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 2002); P.Gobster & B.Hull (eds) Restoring Nature 
(Island Press, Washington, 2000); D.McKenzie-Mohr & W.Smith, Fostering Sustainable Behavior 
(New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island BC, 1999), F.Fischer Citizens, Experts and the 
Environment (Duke University Press, Durham. 2000) 
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environment as integrated policy instrument, to ecology as community interest. 
This is characterised by small-scale sustainability and ecological restoration 
juxtaposed against a global climate of continued ecological exploitation in the 
form of corporate governance and environmental and social injustices. It may 
be that amoral management of the environment has created a park full of 
dinosaurs that are on the verge of escape. 
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Conclusion 
Issues and agendas: what has happened to environmentalism? 
... I warrant he'll be with us when he's wanted at the end 
For both his horse and he are mountain bred. 
On October 11th 2002 the Australian forest industry launched the Australian 
Forestry Standard (AFS). Negotiated and written by Standards _Australia and 
endorsed by federal and state forestry ministers, the timber industry and the 
unions, the industry standard is aimed at ensuring sustainable forest 
management practices across all areas of the industry through AFS certification 
of products, applying to both locally grown and imported timber. Green 
groups were quick to condemn the standard, claiming that it wo:uld not be 
internationally credible. Speaking on behalf of World Wide Fund for Nature 
Australia, spokesperson Michael Rae stated that: 
It doesn't pass the test in Brazil and the developing world, so how 
this government system expects that the market's going to stomach it 
happening in a developed country like Australia is laughable.1 
Two days before the launch of the AFS, the Executive Director of the National 
Association of Forest Industries, Kate Carnell, told me that as part of the 
Standards Australia process, representatives of environmental organisations 
were required to be part of negotiations to ensure full and transparent 
consultation across all sectors of government, industry and community. "The 
NGOs walked away a month ago", she said. "They simply refused to negotiate. 
They say the structure of their organisations doesn't allow for them to negotiate, 
but if that's the case, what's the point of having the organisations? How can 
you possibly arrive at the best possible environmental outcome if the NGOs 
won't negotiate?"2 While Carnell's interest is in promoting the industry she 
1 M.Rae, quoted in "Forestry standard a rubber stamp: green groups", Canberra Times, Saturday, 
October 12 2002, 13 
2 Interview with Kate Camell, October 9th 2002, transcript in possession of author 
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represents as sustainable and environmentally sound, her frustration at losing 
the input of the NGOs from the standards negotiation process was evident and, 
from the point of view of gaining the support of the 'green' sector of the 
community, justifiable. 
The environment movement, represented by these NGOs, in refusing to 
negotiate with the forestry industry, government and trade unions on the 
design and delivery of a national industry standard, has effectively denied itself 
any positive input into the future sustainable management and environmental 
impact of an industry with a reputation for unsustainable practices. Certainly, 
from the point of view of the environment movement, the industry standard 
may only be window-dressing an industry long opposed by the greens for its 
ecologically destructive practices, but by remaining outside negotiations, the 
role of the NGOs is relegated to one of negative and reactive media statements. 
The industry perception, summed up by Carnell, is that the environment 
movement no longer has an environmental agenda. According to Carnell, the 
industry is keen to work towards the best possible environmental outcome, not 
only for the longevity of the industry itself but also, and crucially, because being 
'green' makes good business sense. 
The environment movement has also been noticeably absent from 
discussions regarding plans to 'drought-proof' Australia. In an ambitious plan 
with an alarmingly familiar ring, various media and corporate leaders 
announced financial support for a plan to turn Australia's northern rivers 
inland, thus providing water for the arid interior in times of drought. The plan 
has been dismissed by the 'Wentworth Group' of leading scientists as 
unrealistic, but cautiously welcomed by the Prime Minister and federal Minister 
for Agriculture as a possible alternative that would not be ruled out, but with a 
qualification by the Prime Minister that "you have to deal in reality and not deal 
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in things that are unachievable."3 While state and federal government ministers 
met with the instigators of the corporate-based Farmhand Drought Relief fund, 
media figures and scientists to discuss options for more efficient management of 
water resources, the green NGOs have remained apparently silent. Ultimately, 
the course of action the government decides to take will determine the position 
of the environmental organisations. Given the precedent set by the Snowy 
campaign, that direction may well simply be to support the grassroots local 
environmental campaigns. 
Kate Carnell half-seriously suggests that the best way to arrive at sound 
environmental outcomes through negotiation may be to set up an 
environmental organisation for the sole purpose of negotiating between the 
NGOs and industry4. Carnell, as an industry leader, is well aware of the need to 
include environmental concerns as part of future industry development, but 
perceives that a vacuum exists between the government-industry level and the 
grassroots level while the environmental NGOs have moved out of the picture. 
Green movement activists may still stage blockades in forests and chain 
themselves to logging equipment, but such acts are ultimately futile against the 
weight of endorsed industry standards that claim long-term economic and 
ecological sustainability. A long-time environmental activist reluctantly agreed: 
"The grassroots [green] movement is still operating in the same way we were in 
the 70s. Everything else has moved on, but we haven't. What worked in 
Terania simply isn't going to work in the [South East forests] now, but what else 
. th ?" s 1s ere. . 
The Snowy campaign does not represent 'proof' that environmentalism is 
heading in a new direction, nor has it been presented here as a unique and 
ground-breaking method of environmental management. What it does 
3 John Howard quoted in Martin, "Support for water plan", The Australian Financial Review, 
October 13th 2002, 2 
4 Interview with Kate Camell, October 9th 2002 
5 Interview with Kristy Benecke and Anton, August 13th 2002, transcript in possession of author 
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illustrate is a weakening of the broad environmental movement and 
institutionalised green politics within the established political system and the 
growing strength and popularity of extra-political, independent, local 
community environmental action. While the environmental movement has 
made much ground over the past three decades, its current political position is 
limiting its ability to address issues of local concern without recourse to political 
ideology or process. In this period of change, localised campaigns such as the 
Snowy are looking to the examples set by the early campaign.s such as Little 
Desert and Kelly's Bush, and are gaining importance as vehicles for 
environmental action, building, crucially, upon the strengths and gains of the 
movement that succeeded the early campaigns. 
The Dalgety and District Community Association, meanwhile, are not 
resting on their laurels. The increase in flow down the Snowy from the 
Mowamba aqueduct has made a difference, but "the job is not yet done and we 
will be following progress very closely. We are optimistic that the governments 
will deliver on time."6 On Australia Day 2002 the Snowy River Shire Council 
recognised the contribution made by the DDCA to the local community by 
presenting them with the annual award for the Community Organisation of the 
Year. In accepting the award President of the DDCA, Jo Garland, was typically 
modest and low-key, giving credit to past president Paul Leete and past and 
present members of the committee, including two long-time Dalgety residents 
who had died in recent years, and insisting that the job would not be over until 
there was 28% environmental flow in the river. While the outlook for 
environmentalism is unclear, the future ecological health of the Snowy River 
has been sealed through extra-political action and political authority. 
6 Jo Garland, from Dalgety and District Community Association website, 
http://www.ddca.asn.au 
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Total 
membership 
at June 2002 
Male 
Female 
Average age 
(group) 
Major 
occupation 
(categories) 
Appendix 1 
Environment group demographics 
Dalgety & The ACT Greens Upper Snowy 
District Landcare 
Community 
Association 
87 - 226 300* 
32 102 50%* 
55 124 50%* 
45-55 40-45 45-55 
Farming; Professional; Farming 
business public sector; 
student 
* Figures for Upper Snowy are not exact as membership can vary according to a 
number of factors. The district Landcare Coordinator provided these figures 
and indicated an 8-10% margin of error. Gender breakdown was estimated 
according to active members. The coordinator stated that projects in and 
around towns attracted more women and young people, while farm-based 
projects attracted more men. 
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Appendix 2 
Source: Ecopolitics Thought + Action 
Vol.I, No.3 Autumn 2002 p. x 
.c.; 
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